THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 11 & 12. FEB. & MARCH, 1928. Vol. XVII.

THE VICTORY OF THE PROTESTANT UNDERWORLD

Not a few liberally-minded Churchmen, with no misguided love for Romanism, were greatly perturbed and deeply disappointed when they heard the news that the House of Commons had rejected the Prayer Book measure. Some of them, in the poignant phrases of the Vulgate, might claim that they were filled with *vexatio spiritus* or even *evisceratio mentis*. They had looked to the passing of the measure as the end of all controversy, the sweet harbinger of peace and of godly union and concord, the prelude to much practical Christian work, especially among our youthful *intelligentsia*, who believe they have rejected Christianity because they have turned away from various spurious or inadequate presentations of it.

Time for reflection has enabled these depressed Churchmen to take a more cheerful view. They are beginning to recognize that the decision of the House of Commons is a blessing in disguise. They realize that the hope, had the measure been passed, that it would have put an end to party strife within the Church was an illusion, the product of that tired feeling—the *quousque tandem patientia nostra abutere*—which has its root not in virtue but in boredom, even though it be experienced by the souls of the righteous under the altar. Whilst we have organized propaganda by a powerful body of pro-Romans within the English Church there can never be harmony within it, and the new Prayer Book seemed likely to give them larger scope.

Attentive reading of the full report[1] of the debate which preceded the rejection of the Book leaves no doubt, although Lord Birkenhead was precluded from taking part in the debate, that it was of a very high order—no riot of rhetoric and Protestant prejudice, but the able and eloquent expression of deep conviction and prolonged reflection. As Sir John Simon, no mean judge of such matters, predicted, it was of a quality 'which will make this occasion memorable not only in the history of the Church of England, but in the history of this House.'

Since the debate it has become clear how amazingly popular is the rejection of the Prayer Book measure, not simply in the country at large, but in Church circles. The House of Commons, although its members may be described by rigid Churchmen as 'Jews, infidels, and heretics,' exhibited a moral and religious conviction combined with a sense of reverence and restraint superior to that of many General Councils of the Church. But, what is perhaps even more significant, it represented the views and feelings of a large body of Church people who are quite unrepresented in our Church representative bodies. It is true that this large body of Church people may seem to their ecclesiastical rulers to-day as did the *am ha-aretz* —'the people of the earth'—to the Pharisees in Christ's day, 'a people accursed that knoweth not the Law'; yet the Church of England exists primarily for these people, and the Church authorities in the Christian scheme of things are not their rulers but their servants. The House of Commons' vote did represent in one of its aspects the feelings of these Church people—their convictions, apprehensions, dissatisfactions—and, we must add also, their distrust of the Bishops. It will be retorted that it mainly represented their ignorance. It is becoming increasingly clear that this was not the case. Lord Birkenhead, when condemning the rejection of the measure, singled out Mr. Saklatvala's vote against the measure as typical of the spirit which rejected it. Apparently Lord Birkenhead did not know that Mr. Saklatvala before voting took much pains to understand the measure and to gauge the feelings of his constituents towards it. He even consulted a well-known clergyman about the significance of some points at issue.

[1] The Debate can be obtained for 6*d*. from H.M. Stationery Office, Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C. 2.

It is quite true that the great body of Church people have little precise knowledge of the contents of the Deposited Book, but they have a very good knowledge of what has been going on in the Romanizing direction in their parish churches and its baneful effect. They believed that the Bishops alone could stop this Romanizing. That was the view also of those in the House who rejected the measure. They knew that the Bishops were responsible for the Book; that they had exercised all their influence to secure support for it; it had become known as the Bishops' Book; the Bishops claimed that if it were legalized they could secure order in the Church; but, alas! the Bishops were not trusted. Their past record was against them.

In this respect the spirit of the House of Lords differed from the spirit of the country at large and the spirit of the majority of the House of Commons. The Lords passed the measure, not only because they had its character and contents very ably explained to them by the Primate, but because they trusted the Bishops. Perhaps they felt that it was the only thing to do. The question was really a technical one. The Lords knew that they themselves were not experts; they regarded the Bishops as experts. The Bishops had created the machine; they had declared that it was the only machine for the job; the Lords knew—and were probably glad to know—that it was the Bishops, not they, who were responsible for doing the job, and that there was a very pressing need for it to be done; and so, like cautious, responsible Englishmen, they accepted the decision of the experts and passed the measure.

With the Commons it was not so. They did not trust the experts, and with very good reasons. At the outset of the debate the Home Secretary, while extremely respectful in his tone, quite discredited the competency of the Primate to deal effectively with the Romanizing clergy. On at least two notable occasions his Grace had promised to do so, but nothing had been accomplished. He had even promoted a notable Romanizer, Canon Bullock-Webster. At last the Primate, realizing his inability to enforce order, had resolved to secure the alteration of the law so as to legalize the illegalities of the law-breakers. The Prayer Book measure was the instrument of this surrender to the law-breakers. It was the betrayal of the Reformed position of the Church of England. It said to the deadly foes of

that position: 'Take, take all that we as a Reformed Church possess, only give us peace.' In short, the measure offered peace in exchange for Protestantism.

Sir William Joynson-Hicks was the leader of the solid phalanx of men of law who stoutly contended for the Reformed position of the Church of England. The great Selden, and the judicious Hooker, sometime Master of the Temple, would have felt, had they been present, no little joy at the doughty deeds of their sons. Had Charles Kingsley been there, he would, to judge by the following parable in *The Water Babies*, have been equally glad:

> 'On the borders of that island Tom found Gotham, where the wise men live; the same who dragged a pond because the moon had fallen into it, and planted a hedge round the cuckoo, to keep spring all the year. And he found them bricking up the town gate, because it was so wide that little folk could not get through. And, when he asked why, they told him they were expanding their liturgy. So he went on: for it was no business of his: only he could not help saying that in his country, if the kitten could not get in at the same hole as the cat, she might stay outside and mew.' (Chap. viii.)

Even the Prime Minister's eloquent plea for support for the Book, because it maintained the traditional Anglican policy of tolerant comprehensiveness, failed under the effective criticism of Sir Thomas Inskip, who spoke as follows:

> 'The Prime Minister . . . spoke of two great streams which the Church has always known: a double stream of opinion concerning the Sacrament, and that both schools had produced saints and scholars in the past. Do we not all know it? Has it not been possible in the past for these two streams to flow side by side through the spacious meadows of the English Church . . . in one Book? The Prime Minister asked whether the ground was to be narrowed. Who proposes to narrow it? We do not. The proposal before Parliament is not to restrict the doctrines of the Church of England. One proposal is to enlarge the ground. The question is whether the enlargement is justifiable or permissible. If in the past the two great streams have been able to flow together so as to produce the saints and scholars . . . what is the demand for some change in that doctrine of the Church which has been so successful and so happy in the experiences of the past?'

When the result of the division was announced it was clear that the Protestant underworld had prevailed. The Prelatical overworld had suffered a severe defeat. Only the words of the Psalmist could express adequately the emotions of the victors: 'When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion, then were we like unto them that dreamed.' It was not the Church of England which had been defeated, but the policy of the Bishops

—the policy that sought to secure peace by legalizing a grave departure from the Reformation Settlement, in the Romeward direction. The Bishops had asserted that there was no such departure, and that if the Deposited Book were authorized they would restore order. The House of Commons distrusted both statements; and, in view of the facts elicited in the debate, it is not surprising. It was not a riot of rhetoric, nor an appeal to Protestant prejudice, but the failure of the Bishops to check the Romeward movement of the Church of England, which had secured the rejection of the Book. Can anyone, who is seriously aware of what has been and is going on in several thousand English parishes, blame the Commons? It was really the Romanizers who had defeated the Prayer Book measure. They had 'queered the pitch.'

THE BISHOPS AT THE HELM

We are glad indeed that the Bishops, although feeling a natural, hardly perhaps a Christian, resentment at the rejection of the Prayer Book measure by the House of Commons, have decided, under the leadership of the Primate, not that of Lord Birkenhead, to amend the Book and present it again. We recognize that the amendments they have so far made are not to be despised, but we fear that they are inadequate. The Commons plainly required the reduplication of the Black Rubric and that the King should be prayed for at Morning and Evening Prayer. These *tolerabiles ineptiae* the Bishops have conceded. The definite limiting of the Declaration of Assent by the clergy to the book of 1662 will relieve some clerical consciences. The Bishops have also excised the clause which gave power to the Archbishop and Bishops of each province to make and rescind such Rules as were required and authorized to be made by them under any Rubric of the Deposited Book, such Rules having the authority of Rubrics. This is a most important and necessary amendment. No less important is the transforming into Rubrics of the Bishops' draft Rules dealing with Reservation. Unfortunately the Rules themselves which allowed Reservation of the Elements in an aumbry set in the north wall of the sanctuary of the church, or if need be in some other place approved by the Bishop, have not been amended.

Moreover, the manner in which the Reserved Elements are to be conveyed to the sick is not prescribed in a Rubric, but is left to the direction of the Bishop. These things, we fear, will lead to the rejection of the Book. Many will claim that they do not prevent organized worship in the presence of the Reserved Elements, nor even processions of the Host, if the Bishop of the Diocese sees fit to sanction them. The feeling of many Church people against Reservation of the Elements in any part of the church used for worship is exceedingly strong, and the feeling against perpetual Reservation is hardly less strong. We hope that the Church Assembly will insist on the prohibition of these things.

The Council of the Churchmen's Union sent up to the Archbishops and Bishops the following statement of needful amendments :

> The Council of the Churchmen's Union desires respectfully to urge upon the Episcopate the supreme importance of making the following amendments in the Deposited Book before again presenting it to Parliament :—
>
> (1) That it be provided by a Rubric that the Elements, if reserved at all, be only reserved outside the parts of the church used for public worship, *e.g.*, in a closed safe in a vestry.
>
> (2) That there be inserted a Rubric, after the example of the Black Rubric, indicating the lawfulness of reserving the Elements for the Communion of the Sick, but the unlawfulness of reserving the Elements for purposes of adoration.
>
> (3) That there be inserted in an appropriate place in the Prayer Book a statement that non-fasting Communion does not conflict with either the practice or the teaching of the Church of England.

We are not convinced that these are sufficient, in addition to those which the Bishops have made, to pass the Book, but we are sure that they would go a long way towards disarming opposition both among Churchmen and in Parliament.

It would be infinitely better for the Bishops to excise all the notoriously controversial sections from the Book, including the alternative Communion Service. Possibly the House of Laymen may be disposed to do this.

The need of Reservation for the Communion of the Sick has been grossly exaggerated, and the need itself has often been created by a type of sacramental teaching which is both novel and alien. We have done without Reservation for nearly four hundred years, and there is no reason to suppose that anyone has really suffered spiritually because that is so. Anglicans do

not regard the Sacrament as the needful *viaticum* of the dying. The Prayer Book teaches the doctrine of spiritual communion. This was taught in the First Prayer Book of Edward VI (1549), but even then it was not new. In the pre-Reformation Sarum Manual, if the sick man were unable to communicate, the priest was directed to say to him:

> 'Brother, in this case true faith and a good will suffice: believe only, and thou hast eaten.'

What we fear extremely is that the Bishops, who have become isolated from the great body of Church people, and in some measure from many of the clergy, may place themselves in the unenviable position of champions and protectors of the Romanizers. Only on two occasions in post-Reformation English History have the Bishops been really popular, and that was when they were national leaders in the fight against Romanism, namely, in the Tudor period and in the reign of James II. Should the Bishops appear before the public as contending against Parliament for perpetual Reservation in the chancels of churches, it would be most unfortunate. It would be like the Bishop of London, who appeared as contending with all the forces and devices at his command for the right to pull down the ancient city churches and sell their sites in opposition to the Lord Mayor and Corporation of London, who appeared as the stout defenders of their places of worship.

The amendments of the Bishops have not had 'a good press.' To go to Parliament with nothing more than these would be to place the Church in jeopardy. If the ship goes on the rocks, it is not the winds, currents and fogs, but the navigators who are held responsible.

A PLEA FOR POSTPONEMENT

It is the intention of the Bishops to present the Book again to Parliament. This is infinitely better than to follow the fatal advice of Lord Birkenhead and authorize the Book without again submitting it to Parliament. The Bishops plan to do this within the next three or four months. We wonder whether this is judicious. We know that there is a strong desire to complete the task of Prayer Book revision and to proceed to other matters. To those who take long views the quality of the revision is of more importance than the date of its completion.

In literary quality and liturgical precision the Deposited Book compares unfavourably with those of 1662 and 1604. The verdict of Dr. Brightman, a very great liturgical authority, though severe, is worthy of serious attention :

> 'As to the book as a whole, I would say at once that on almost every page of it I find something irritating, something inexact or untidy or superfluous or ill-considered or unreal.' [2]

The Primate is credited with saying of revision : 'The longer it takes the better it will be.' Does it matter if another year or two is taken over removing those defects of which Dr. Brightman complains? There is no need for the Bishops to spend their time over it. A small mixed committee of liturgiologists, men of letters, and theologians could do it, and submit their revision to the Bishops.

Another advantage in delay lies in the reduction of the spirit of controversy. Time for reflection is always advantageous in such cases. Moreover, if ignorance and prejudice are responsible for our troubles, a further year or two spent on liturgical education and English Church History would be all to the good. The Bishops also, with the powers and influence they at present possess, might meanwhile do a good deal to correct the more flagrant liturgical disorders, and so recover in some measure the confidence of alienated and disgruntled Churchmen.

These all seem to us solid advantages connected with postponement. It is quite true that the present Government is very favourably disposed towards the Church, but we may reasonably hope that after the next General Election the new Government, whatever it is, will also be favourable. No Government will undertake the difficult task of Disestablishment unless compelled, and it is only injudicious action on the part of the Church's leaders which can bring this about. We believe that the announcement of postponement would be favourably received with a sigh of relief by all parties in the Church. What has been done is not wasted. In the interval the clergy would be able to draw on the Deposited Book for Harvest Festivals and special services of all kinds, with the hearty goodwill of Church people. There are few indeed, if any, who would object to this enrichment and modernization of our services. It is Romanizing in our services that is resented.

[2] *C.Q.R.*, July, 1927 ; vol. xiv, p. 204.

THE PROBLEM OF LITURGICAL DISCIPLINE

The Bishops decline to ask for further legal disciplinary powers to enable them to restore liturgical order. This is not because they are Romanizers, but because they wish to trust to episcopal influence, moral suasion, and the advance of modern views among the clergy, to check superstition. In theory this is sound, but in practical experience it is open to serious objection. Surely all these things have been in operation for many years past, yet Romanizing has been steadily increasing. Why is this? It is partly due to the promotion of the Romanizing clergy. As a well-known Professor of Theology recently said, 'There is hardly a bishop on the bench whose principles are secure against a devoted parish priest.' It is natural that a broad-minded, large-hearted, peace-loving bishop with an optimistic temperament should yield in such a case. A number of our Romanizers are able, zealous, self-sacrificing parish priests. Were it not for their practices and views they would certainly deserve promotion. Their only defect is that they identify the Religion of Christ with Catholicism, and Catholicism with Romanism, and they are Catholics first and Anglicans afterwards. It is almost impossible for a pastorally-minded bishop to refuse promotion in such cases. The more pastorally-minded the bishop is, the more he will yield. It matters not whether it be the Book of 1662 or the Deposited Book; it matters not whether the bishop have only his present powers or increased powers. Many bishops even if they had absolute power could not and would not penalize such priests. This conclusion is not based on *a priori* reasoning, but on actual experience. The first-class chief pastor, unworldly, aimable, gentle, patient, spiritual, learned, valuing character and conduct above correct views and correct liturgical practice, will not be a good disciplinarian. Yet a situation has been reached; indeed, it was reached years ago, when discipline is needful to check Romanizing and save the Church of England. What is to be done?

Charles Lamb tells of one of his headmasters who handled his birch like a lily. Such an one, when flagellation is really necessary, had better hand over the birch to another.

This consideration leads us to ask: Why should not our

bishops hand over to others the discipline in liturgical matters? Some would say: 'Make the Archdeacon responsible.' In the mediaeval Church the Archdeacon had many unpleasant duties to perform. Archidiaconal functions were in those days a formidable proposition. The Archdeacon was not simply 'the eye of the bishop'; he was his least sensitive side. A good Archdeacon required to have a hard heart and a good digestion. Most desirable qualities in a disciplinarian, but not in a bishop. No doubt if the Archdeacon of the right kind were entrusted with these disciplinary functions the mediaeval query would quickly revive in modern Church life: 'Can an Archdeacon be saved?' and there would be a general tendency in clerical circles to answer it in the negative.

We, however, do not favour these disciplinary functions being delegated to the Archdeacon, or to the rural deans, or to any clergyman. The laity are chiefly, if not entirely, concerned in the observance of the liturgical rules, and the difficulties of enforcing obedience should be handed over to them. Let laymen lay information; let laymen prosecute; let laymen condemn or acquit. There would be nothing wrong in this. Did not St. Paul say: 'Set them to judge among you who are least esteemed in the Church.' It is extraordinarily important that the relations between a bishop and his clergy should not be embittered by his performing these disciplinary functions. Lay justice, lay common-sense, lay capacity, might be safely relied on. We recognize that Church finance is the business of the laity, let liturgical order be their business also. We know how loth is anyone in authority to yield up a part of his authority, and no doubt there are bishops whose idea of episcopacy is lordship rather than leadership, sovereignty rather than service, eminence rather than example; such would probably rather do a thing badly than allow others to do it well—but we may hope that such bishops are few in England.

As for the law-abiding clergy, the law is a terror to evil-doers, not to them, and they would have no objection to lay-courts for liturgical disorders.

The laity should be ready to undertake it. Some of our greatest and most highly-gifted bishops are quite incompetent to deal with liturgical disorder which they have unwillingly encouraged by promotion of the law-breakers. They are being

discredited, as is the whole English Church, by the Romanizing in their dioceses. Either they ought to resign, or to hand over their disciplinary function to others—and the laity in our judgment are those to whom it should be assigned. If the bishops were relieved from it, a great cloud would be lifted from the life of the Church.

THE TREND TOWARDS PRELACY

Prelacy is the glorification of episcopacy. Episcopacy is essentially paternal in spirit. The bishop is a father in God. Prelacy is essentially autocratic in spirit. The prelate is a lord over God's heritage. Canon Storr has recently pointed out that although the history of the Church of England is strewn with episcopal errors, yet the glorification of episcopacy is on the increase. The tone of some recent episcopal utterances gives support to Canon Storr's apprehension. Dean Rashdall predicted that the change in Church government inaugurated by the Life and Liberty movement would be

> 'one which threatened to weaken that control by Parliament which he regarded as vital to the real freedom of the Church. He feared that the movement might result in giving the Bishops too much power to over-ride the sound central opinion of the devout, if silent laity, which he regarded as the backbone and the safety of the Church of England.'

We doubt whether it is the increase of episcopal power so much as the sense of isolation and superiority produced by constant secret episcopal conclaves which is the cause of this trend towards Prelacy. Bishop Barnes, following in the footsteps of Dr. Henson, has publicly protested against this secrecy. All that might be said against it has been so ably said by Dr. Henson in his *Anglicanism*, published in 1921, in reference to the secrecy of the Lambeth Conference, that we venture to call the attention of our readers to his words:

> 'The reasonings may well be more serviceable than the resolutions, which, standing alone, may be difficult to understand. Publicity of debate would enable the religious public to judge the value of the resolutions, and to do justice to the minorities' (p. 245).
>
> 'It may fairly be questioned whether the Anglican Church would not, in the long run, gain by the adoption of a more normal and candid procedure; if more public attention would not be secured by resolutions which, although not always or often unanimous, and always preceded by open debate in which the play of conflicting tendencies and opinions within the Episcopate would perforce be frankly disclosed, would yet be felt to express a definite and deliberate verdict on the subjects under discussion. Unanimity ceases to be morally impressive when it appears to be the result of calculating diplomacy' (p. 248).

THE MALINES CONVERSATIONS*

By the Rev. ALFRED FAWKES, M.A., author of *Studies in Modernism*, *The Genius of the English Church.*

I.

FROM the point of view of the supporters of Prayer Book Revision the Report of the Malines Conversations comes at a singularly inopportune moment. On the top of the rejection of the Bishops' Book by the House of Commons, a rejection which undoubtedly has the sense of the country behind it, comes the official Report of the much-discussed Conversations which took place at Malines 1921-1925 between a group of representative Anglo-Catholics, two of them being Bishops, and the late Cardinal Mercier and certain Belgian and French priests, with the object of promoting what is described as a *rapprochement* between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church. Its publication at the present time will undoubtedly prejudice the cause of the Revisionists. 'What are these people up to?' the plain man will ask. Nor can we be surprised that he should. The Report has been in print since last July: but its publication, it seems, was postponed till the Bishops' Book had been safely piloted through Parliament, as (it was hoped) would have been the case before the New Year. The unexpected result of the historical debate of December 15 upset these calculations. Lord Halifax published his *Notes* a month later; the official Report followed; and, almost simultaneously, the crashing Encyclical of Pius XI, *De Vera Religionis Unitate Fovenda*, slammed, banged, barred, and bolted the door against the Conversationalists. The dream of a *rapprochement* between the Churches vanished. 'No, dear Dr. Cumming,' answered Pius IX, in a *Punch* cartoon, to a Presbyterian controversialist

*(1) *Notes on the Conversations at Malines*, 1921-1925, by Viscount Halifax. Mowbray (1928), 1/-.

(2) *The Conversations at Malines*, 1922-1924. Oxford University Press. Humphrey Milford (1928), 2/6.

(3) *Encyclical Letter on Fostering Religious Union, of our Most Holy Lord Pius XI, by Divine Providence Pope.* English Translation. Burns, Oates & Washbourne Ltd., Publishers to the Holy See (1928).

who wished to attend the Vatican Council of 1870, 'you may kiss my toe; but you mustn't speechify.' And as was Pius IX, so is Pius XI. The infallible is uncompromising; unity can only be brought about by 'the return of dissidents to the Mother Church.' The Malines Conversations were evidently one-sided, and will be discontinued: there is no more to be said. 'Many similar conferences will have to be held—possibly of a more authoritative nature—before we can hope to make any real progress,' Lord Halifax tells us. The prospects of this being the case are slender. 'Resumption certainly would not occur by the consent or the encouragement of the Pope,' says the official organ of the Vatican, the *Osservatore Romano* (January 20). 'He acknowledged them merely as an effort between private persons. They were not invested with any sort of mandate.' They were probably taken more seriously in England than on the Continent. 'The Anglicans came with the friendly cognizance of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York; and the Roman Catholics with the knowledge (*au su*) of the Holy See.' The difference of phrasing seems to suggest that the attitude of the Vatican was negative: it did not forbid. The English Archbishop had expressed 'his readiness to have official cognizance of the arrangements, provided that a corresponding cognizance were given by the Vatican'; and the discrepancy may have been unobserved. In any case the Conversations met with the tacit approval, not indeed of English public opinion, which knew little of them and cared less, but of the Bishops. One only, the Primate of Ireland, expressed his dissent. He did so emphatically; the Irish Bishops, when they speak of Romanism, are speaking of what they know.

> 'These overtures, or conversations, or whatever else they were, are not, as things stand, likely to help us to the only re-union we should desire. It is not desirable that any one Church should absorb the rest. The world would be very much the poorer if that happened; and, if re-union led to the creating or restoring of a universal hierarchical system, dominating human life in all its parts, and dictating doctrine and discipline with a professedly infallible authority, it would be the greatest disaster which could possibly befall mankind. What could be more fatal for the Church than that it should identify its aims with a system which the world has once for all rejected.' [1]

The words strike a European note.

[1] Message to the Church of Ireland. 1924.

II.

To speak of a religion with understanding it is necessary, not indeed to believe in it, but to have once done so. Otherwise we do but beat the air. This is why Newman so happily describes Gibbon as 'perhaps the only English writer who has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian.' And it is peculiarly the case with what Macaulay calls 'that august and fascinating superstition, the Roman Catholic Church.' To see it in perspective one must see it with such a detachment as that of Mark Pattison in England, or of Anatole France or Emile Faguet in France. It is a subject which is peculiarly fatal to Anglicans, especially to Anglican clergymen. It is one on which, to use an Irishism, they never open their mouth but they put their foot in it. Distinguished as they may be in other respects, here is their heel of Achilles: 'they reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits' end.' And the more closely they approximate to its beliefs and its ceremonial, the more they seem to misconceive its essence. This is not Orders, nor Sacramentalism, nor Ritual: no, if they think so they deceive themselves.

> 'Those rites and those doctrines which have made most noise in the Romanist controversy are those which are the least of the essence of Romanism. The Virgin and the Saints, Reliques, Images, Purgatory, and Masses—these bywords with the vulgar and the unthinking are powerless decorations or natural developments. The one essential principle of the Catholic system is the control of the individual conscience by an authority placed without it, and exercised over it by men assuming to act in the name of heaven.'[2]

Where is this authority to be found?

> *'Subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanae creaturae declaramus dicimus et definimus omnino esse de necessitate salutis.'*[3]

So Boniface VIII in the fourteenth century; so Pius XI in the Encyclical *De Vera Religionis Unitate Fovenda* to-day.

> 'In this one Church of Christ no man can be or remain who does not accept, recognize and obey the authority of Peter and his legitimate successors.'

III.

This pronouncement, the reference of which to the Malines Conversations will not be disputed, is one of the first import-

[2] Mark Pattison. Essays 2, 225.
[3] *Unam Sanctam Ecclesiam.* 1302.

ance. It may be noticed that, by what may seem an excess of precaution, while it is described as an 'Encyclical Letter of our most Holy Lord Pius XI, by Divine Providence Pope,' it is prefixed by the *Nihil obstat* and *Imprimatur* of two priests of the diocese of Westminster. Presumably these permissions apply to the translation. But the uninitiated will smile. It is a weighty and authoritative document. And, given the premises, it is unanswerable. This is the case with the Roman Catholic position as a whole, and hence its attraction for persons of a certain temperament and culture—the temperament which puts certainty before truth, and the culture for which the former can be had without the latter. But—the premises cannot be taken seriously; they are those of a former age. And no man can serve two masters; he must choose between reason and unreason, the true and the untrue. The Encyclical is as emphatic a condemnation of Anglo-Catholicism as was the *Pascendi* (1907) of Modernism. In this connection it may be regarded as supplementary to the Bull of Leo XIII, *Apostolicae Curae* (1896), which declared the nullity of Anglican Orders. The words of St. Augustine are apposite: '*Jam de hac causa duo concilia missa sunt ad sedem apostolicam; inde etiam rescripta venerunt. Causa finita est; utinam aliquando finiatur error!*'[4]

It was unnecessary to send delegates to Malines to ascertain the mind of the Church of Rome on these questions. 'It is not beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea and bring it to us?' The penny Catechism and the nearest Irish priest might have served the inquirers' turn. Such distinctions as that between a 'primacy of honour' and a 'primacy of responsibility' multiply words without increasing sense. Rome will have nothing to say to them. Nor will the Pope tolerate 'the distinction which some have seen fit to introduce between "fundamentals" and "non-fundamentals"'; the motive of faith is one. Coventry Patmore's belief in the Catholic Church 'as it will be ten thousand years hence' was a variant of the Tractarian belief in the Primitive Church, or the Church of the Fathers and the Councils. Both were evasions; neither belief makes a man a Catholic, in the European sense of the word. To be a Catholic, the Pope reminds us—and common-sense is with

[4] *Sermo*, 131.

him—a man must believe in the Church as it is to-day. His words could not be more explicit:

> 'There are some who recognize that Protestantism has rejected certain articles of faith and some external ceremonies which are, in fact, pleasing and useful, and which the Roman Church still retains. They go on, however, to say that this Church also has erred, and corrupted the original religion by adding and proposing for belief certain doctrines which are not only alien to the Gospel, but even repugnant to it. Among the chief of these they number that which concerns the primacy of jurisdiction which was granted to Peter and his successors in the see of Rome. Among these persons there are indeed some, though few, who grant to the Roman Pontiff a primacy of honour, or even a certain jurisdiction of power; though this they consider to arise not from the divine law, but from the consent of the faithful. Others again even go so far as to wish the Pontiff himself to preside over their motley, so to say, assemblies. But, all the same, although many non-Catholics may be found who loudly preach fraternal communion in Christ Jesus, yet you will find none at all to whom it occurs to submit to and obey the Vicar of Jesus Christ, either in his capacity as a teacher or as a governor. Meanwhile, they affirm that they would willingly treat with the Church of Rome, but on equal terms, that is as equals with an equal. This being so, it is clear that the Apostolic See cannot on any terms take part in their assemblies, nor is it in any way lawful for Catholics either to support or to work for such assemblies, for, if they do, they will be giving countenance to a false Christianity, quite alien to the one Church of Christ.

IV.

The Resolutions of the last Lambeth Conference gave rise to hopes which have not been, and in the nature of things could not be, realized. The Bishops differed in opinion too widely for effectual action to be possible; such action would, it was said, have 'split the Church in two.' The English mind is given to compromise. But nowhere, except in England, could so vague a Formula of Concord as that arrived at have been put forward. This was evident from the first. As soon as it was in print the subscribers took fright and ran away from it; it was signed by different Bishops in different senses. This is not to say that it was useless. But it was of the nature of Prolegomena. 'The time of figs was not yet'; nothing could be *done*. The Free Churches struck over the Episcopate; Malines was wrecked on the Papacy. 'The Gospel can tolerate the Papacy as long as this does not intrude itself into the Gospel,' says Harnack.[5] But—*Tu es Petrus*. The Pope does and cannot but

[5] *Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. I, p. 304.

intrude the Papacy into the Gospel; and he cannot tolerate the Gospel, without the gloss of ecclesiastical tradition, at all.

It is difficult not to think that the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of the Lambeth Conference was its insistence on the unity of the Church being a *visible* unity. This gave the case away before it had been as much as stated. If there is a visible Church, 'Eclipse is first, and the rest are nowhere': beyond all question it is the Church of Rome. As a fact, a visible Church is a figment of canonists and theologians; the word visible, in this connection, is not in Scripture; it is not in the Creeds; visibility is not one of the 'Notes' of the Church; there is nothing to correspond with it in history—the Church on earth has never been, and never can or will be, visibly one. The laws of human nature and of things forbid it. And happily, for such a Church would be a calamity to religion. And not to religion only; to learning, culture, and civilization. They would sink under it, as did Sindbad the Sailor under the weight of the Old Man of the Sea.

Is there not a sense in which Churches, like Governments, are necessary evils? As things are, we cannot do without them; and yet how often they defeat the purpose of their Founder, the interests of their members, and their own highest aims. Religious union between Christians is one thing; the unification of the Christian Churches is another: here a mass of prejudice—historical, traditional, and personal—blocks the way. The Papacy, Orders, Dogma, Liturgy, the relation between Church and State—these 'doubtful disputations' can only be solved indirectly, by seeing the questions at issue in perspective and with detachment. Seldom is this 'dry light' found in the Churches. Had the reunion problem been left in lay hands, it would probably have been settled with little difficulty. It has been complicated, and is at a deadlock, because considerations foreign to religion have been imported into it. The union originally desired was religious, not ecclesiastical. That important book, *The Army and Religion*,[6] gave expression to the conviction general among good and thoughtful men that the refusal of the various religious bodies to unite in worship and at the Lord's Supper was scandalous and un-Christian. It was, and is, both. The misfortune was that the movement fell into the hands of

[6] Macmillan. (1919.)

official Churchmen and was side-tracked. It will probably remain so till it escapes from their control. An open Communion in Westminster Abbey, or in St. Giles', Edinburgh, would do more to revive it than a hundred *conciliabula* at Malines, Lambeth, or Lausanne. The dream of a visibly united Christendom is a survival, not a possibility. Nor need we wish it otherwise. It might be a δῶρον ἄδωρον; a gift which we should have reason to repent of having received.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMANIZING MOVEMENT IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

By the Rev. G. L. H. Harvey, B.A., Vicar of Earley.

'I HAVE ever kept before me,' writes Newman after his conversion, 'that there was something greater than the Established Church, and that was the Church Catholic and Apostolic, set up from the beginning, of which she was but the local presence and organ.' In accordance with that principle the Tractarians strove to establish and enforce the claim that Anglican doctrinal formularies must be interpreted in the light of Catholic doctrine. That way lay anarchy, as the subsequent history of the Church of England was abundantly to testify. The Articles and Prayer Book express the Anglican interpretation of the Catholic faith, and either submission to Rome or domestic anarchy are bound to ensue if Newman's line be adopted. Newman himself in Tract xc attempted, by making a distinction between the words 'Roman' and 'Romish,' to square the Thirty-nine Articles with the Tridentine Decrees, but futile is it to attempt to show 'that, if we could only see it, there is nothing Protestant in the Thirty-nine Articles, and nothing really Romish in the Decrees of Trent.' As the Archbishop of Canterbury has said, 'If this were so, language must be a still more uncertain vehicle of men's thoughts than all acknowledge it to be.' Later, W. G. Ward propounded the theory that the Articles may be interpreted in a non-natural sense, and, if we may accept the statement contained in the official report of the

Malines Conference that 'many Anglicans . . . consider the Articles as practically obsolete,'[1] it would seem that some of the modern descendants of the Tractarians go further still and throw the Articles overboard altogether. The appeal from Prayer Book and Articles to the teaching of the Catholic Church was used consistently throughout the nineteenth century to break down the barrier which the Reformers erected against Roman doctrine. Apparently in some circles the barrier is now regarded as in principle non-existent. Professor Relton has recently urged that the line of demarcation between the Church of England and the Church of Rome lies in the sphere of jurisdiction, not in the sphere of doctrine, nor in that of ritual and ceremonial.[2] Keble, writing in 1865, stated that the Ritualists were 'found among the most earnest deprecators of Transubstantiation.' So far has respect for the formularies of the Church become obsolete in certain circles that Canon Lacey can now say that most Anglo-Catholics 'have a decided leaning' to that doctrine as received by the Church of England prior to the Reformation in common with the whole Western Church.[3] The appeal to Catholicism has not only been used to the prejudice of the Anglican position; it has also been used to undermine the authority of the Anglican episcopate. Even when appealing at the Anglo-Catholic Conference for obedience to the bishops, the Bishop of Zanzibar only asked for obedience 'in so far as they [the bishops] themselves obey the Catholic Church.'[4]

The Oxford Movement received a severe blow in the secession in 1845 of Newman and a large number of influential adherents. It revived in a new form, a form which did not meet with the entire approval of the older leaders. There is no hint in the Tracts of any desire for ritual change, but now the movement became for the most part definitely ritualistic. Pusey bitterly deplored this development, and in 1860 wrote:

> 'I am in this strange position that my name is made a by-word for that with which I never had any sympathy, that with which the writers

[1] *The Conversations at Malines*, p. 79.
[2] *The New Prayer Book*, Lecture I.
[3] *The Anglo-Catholic Faith*, p. 127.
[4] *Report of the Anglo-Catholic Congress*, 1923, p. 183.

> of the tracts with whom in early days I was associated always deprecated; any innovations in the way of conducting the service, anything of ritualism, or especially any revival of disused vestments.'

A few years later he adopted a more sympathetic attitude towards ritualism, but in 1873 his old distrust had revived. 'I do fear,' he wrote in 1873, 'that the Ritualists and the old Tractarians differ both in principle and in object.' The older leaders also looked askance at certain developments unconnected with ritual. The new men inculcated fasting Communion on the ground that fasting reception is a Catholic custom. Keble strongly disapproved of insistence on fasting reception as a matter of obligation, but the Ritualists made it, as the Anglo-Catholics make it to-day, an essential item in their programme. So prominent did this question ultimately become that in 1899 the Upper House of Convocation of York unanimously adopted a report which laid it down that 'the circumstances of the institution of the Holy Eucharist exclude the thought that taking food shortly before disqualifies for reception,' and that 'to describe reception without fasting as a sin is wholly unwarranted by the teaching of Holy Scripture, and is, therefore, inconsistent with the Ordination Vow.' But nineteenth century Ritualists paid scant attention to the teaching of the Anglican episcopate if it did not coincide with their conception of Catholic teaching and practice. In this respect twentieth century Anglo-Catholics follow them faithfully. In the Anglo-Catholic Congress Book on Holy Communion we read: 'It was the custom in the early Church to receive the Holy Communion fasting whatever the hour of reception might be, and this rule binds us still, except we are in such serious sickness as to be in danger of death. We must abstain from all food and drink after midnight on the day before we make our Communion.'[5] The question, of course, has in recent years acquired an enhanced importance from the fact that the obligation of fasting reception has been advanced as one of the grounds for the practice of Reservation.

It is noteworthy that Keble deprecated the presence of non-communicants at the service of Holy Communion, a custom which has aided the progressive transformation of the Com-

[5] *Congress Books*, No. 27, p. 10.

munion into the Mass. He said that 'it has brought in and encouraged . . . a notion of quasi-sacramental virtue in such attendance which I take to be a great part of the error stigmatised in our 31st Article.' Pusey took the strongest exception to the use of the word Mass as a designation for the Communion Service. Whether or not Anglo-Catholics of to-day attach any importance to the 31st Article, we now find Lord Halifax defying 'anyone to see the difference between Mass as it is said in the parish church at Hickleton (with the acquiescence of ecclesiastical authority) and Mass as anyone may hear it in any village church in France,'[6] while Dr. Kidd can see no objection to the interpolation of the Roman Canon of the Mass in the course of the English service as part of the private devotions of the priest at the altar 'so long as these devotions do not interfere with the public rite.'[7]

The Ritualist development of Tractarianism, whether legitimate or not, possessed a high propaganda value. Politicians well know that a good catch-phrase is a more effective instrument for winning the votes of the populace than the most profound exposition of political principle. In the same way, if you give a man something tangible to fight for, such as vestments, candles, or incense, you appeal effectively to the universal spirit of combativeness. That is why in the ecclesiastical controversies of the nineteenth century on both sides passions ran high about points which seem to us of comparatively trifling importance. Ritual also made an aesthetic appeal to men who were little likely to take any interest in such matters as the distinctions between a 'real presence,' an 'objective presence,' and a 'spiritual presence.' The appeal of the movement widened, and it secured the support of many who liked ritual for ritual's sake and were 'Catholic in all but essentials,' though the best Ritualists still maintained the lofty idealism and devoted austerity of the early Tractarians.

The earliest Ritualists were confident that in the changes which they began to introduce the law was on their side. Their objection to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the

[6] *Further Considerations on behalf of Reunion*, p. 9.
[7] *Church Times*, 18 February, 1927, p. 182.

Privy Council was limited to the definitely doctrinal sphere. In fact, they challenged the bishops who questioned their innovations to take them into court. Mr. Stuart, one of the founders of the English Church Union, wrote in 1858 to Bishop Tait with whom he was at variance on the question of lights: 'I must respectfully decline to obey this command. . . . The Church has given abundant power to her bishops to compel obedience.' They were encouraged in this attitude by the Privy Council judgment in the case of *Westerton v. Liddell* in 1857, which was distinctly in their favour. In the course of a speech at a great meeting in St. James' Hall in 1867, Archdeacon Denison said: 'Some said, "Go into the courts of law and decide it there." Let them go into the courts of law by all means. No Englishman was afraid of a court of law.' Four years later, however, the Privy Council judgment in the Purchas case put a very different complexion on the matter. It condemned the eastward position and the use of vestments, wafer bread, and the mixed chalice. No doubt at the time the condemnation of vestments would in itself have been accepted without demur, and even in spite of the condemnation of the eastward position, wafer bread, and mixed chalice, the President of the English Church Union still said, 'I think that a calm and dispassionate survey of the situation makes it obvious that any organized resistance to the decree of the late judgment is strongly to be deprecated'; but the eastward position had, unlike vestments, been adopted very widely, and its condemnation quickly aroused a violent agitation. From this period dates the general refusal of the Ritualists to recognize the decisions of the courts.

The bishops were not only faced with a widespread refusal to recognize the authority of the courts. Another difficulty lay in the fact that ecclesiastical litigation was cumbersome and ruinously expensive. The costs in the Bennett case were £11,000, and in the Purchas case the costs for one side only were £7,000. They therefore sought a cheaper and more expeditious form of procedure, and in 1874 Parliament passed the Public Worship Regulation Act. It is sometimes said that this Act introduced the penalty of imprisonment for ecclesiastical offences. This is not true. The penalty imposed by the Public Worship Regulation Act was suspension, or, on contumacy after

monition, ultimate deprivation. The clergy who were imprisoned were imprisoned for contempt of court, not for any ecclesiastical offence. The reason that clergy had not been imprisoned before 1874 was that they had not before that date deliberately been guilty of contempt of court. One of the Ritualist martyrs, Rev. A. Tooth, actually 'resisted the endeavour of the clergyman appointed to officiate in the church during his suspension—resisted his entrance into the building by force.'[8] The action of the clergy who went to prison was analogous to that of the hunger-striking suffragettes, and it was even more embarrassing to the bishops than was the suffragette hunger-strike to Mr. Asquith's Government. The bishops were reduced to almost complete impotence. The Ritualists continued to determine for themselves 'the meaning and obligation of Anglican formularies' in the light of 'the general teaching and laudable customs of the Catholic Church.'[9] In practice there has been an increasing tendency to look to the Roman Church for the Catholic teaching and customs which constitute the ultimate standard. Lord Halifax thinks that 'where the teaching of the episcopate in communion with Canterbury differs from that of Rome some doubt at least must be cast upon what, on Anglican principles, is to be accepted as the teaching of the Church,'[10] and Canon Lacey is of opinion that 'most Anglo-Catholics are well aware that they would be happier on the other side of the very visible frontier, which could be crossed with little difficulty.'[11]

In 1899 Archbishop Temple sought a way out of the administrative *impasse* by an adaptation of the procedure laid down in the Prayer Book Preface 'Concerning the Service of the Church' for the appeasement of diversity and the resolution of doubts. He thought that 'if the clergy really desired to be heard, and if, as so many of them say in these days, they wish to be heard by a spiritual court—by a court, that is, which represents the Church and the Church alone—the opportunity ought to be given to them.' He therefore proposed that the two Arch-

[8] *Evidence of the Archbishop of Canterbury before the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline.* Question 12942.

[9] *Further Considerations on behalf of Reunion,* by Lord Halifax, p. 12.

[10] *Ib.*, p. 14.

[11] *The Anglo-Catholic Faith,* p. 97.

bishops should hear cases and, as an informal court, pronounce decisions which, though not legally binding, would be ecclesiastically authoritative. The proposal received widespread approval. Lord Halifax, in a circular to the members of the English Church Union, said that 'the method may be informal, but the principle is sound.' In 1900, under the new scheme, the Archbishops pronounced their famous Lambeth Opinions declaring Reservation and the use of incense and processional lights to be illegal. In the following year all the bishops, with the exception of the Bishop of Sodor and Man, addressed a letter to the clergy generally urging 'the duty of submission to the decisions of the Archbishops' on the ground that 'those who refuse such obedience are practically setting up a form of government which is distinctly not episcopal.' So far as the more extreme clergy were concerned the appeal fell on deaf ears. They looked towards Rome rather than Lambeth, and they had little difficulty in finding reasons satisfactory to themselves for refusing submission to the decisions of the Archbishops and rejecting the admonitions of the episcopate. The authority of 'the general teaching and laudable customs of the Catholic Church' was capable of being used against bishops as well as against ecclesiastical courts.

It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the practice of Reservation spread during the latter part of the nineteenth century, but it is clear from Bishop Thirlwall's Charge of 1866 that it arose quite early.

> 'The adoration of the consecrated wafer,' he writes, 'reserved for that purpose, which is one of the most characteristic Roman rites, and a legitimate consequence of the Romish Eucharistic doctrine, is contemplated, if it has not been already adopted, in some of our churches, and the Romish festival of *Corpus Christi* instituted for the more conspicuous exercise of that adoration has, it appears, actually begun to be observed by clergymen of our Church.'

At the end of the century, in 1899, a meeting of two hundred and twenty incumbents, assembled in Holborn Town Hall, passed a resolution 'that the Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament in parish churches for the *bona fide* purpose of communicating the sick and dying . . . cannot and must not be abandoned.' The development of the practice during the present century has been rapid.

In 1906 there were about a hundred churches in which Reservation was practised. Estimates to-day vary from 600 to 1000. The extraordinary rapidity of the recent growth of the practice is no doubt largely due to the impetus given by a resolution passed in 1917 by the Bishops of the Province of Canterbury approving Reservation for communicating the sick. The opportunist policy of conniving at breaches of the law with the object of keeping some measure of control over the law-breakers may be understandable; but, even so, this resolution is distinctly surprising in face not only of the Lambeth Opinion of 1900, but also of the decision in the case Bishop of Oxford *v.* Healy in 1907 that Reservation is illegal.

The practice of Reservation has led and must almost inevitably lead to the cult of the Reserved Sacrament. In an article on Eucharistic missions in the *Church Times* of 16th December last, the writer says:

> 'Leisured people can be formed into a bodyguard for the Blessed Sacrament, pledged to pay frequent visits to our Lord in the Tabernacle. . . . The people could be taught to gather in church as individuals at specified times to worship our Lord there present in the Sacrament. . . . This unorganized prayer of individuals would inevitably result sooner or later in a demand for corporate services of devotion.'

It would. At the Anglo-Catholic Conference of 1923 the Rev. M. R. Carpenter-Garnier, then Librarian of Pusey House, now Bishop of Colombo, in the course of a paper entitled 'The Divine Guest,' said with reference to the reserved elements:

> 'Where the Blessed Sacrament is, there is Christ Himself. . . . Here is the trysting place of all who desire and love Jesus. Here is the abode of peace and the home of hope. . . . Yes, Catholics know it well; in the most Holy Sacrament the Jesus of to-day is to be sought and found, loved, adored, possessed. . . . Whatever men may say or do, here in the most Holy Sacrament Jesus Christ abides.' [12]

Such language is strangely remote from the atmosphere of the Prayer Book. It is nearer in tone to that of the Roman Catholic Dr. S. J. Smith, in *The Month* of March, 1917:

> 'Of course to have Him in our hearts in Holy Communion is more in itself than to have Him near to us in the tabernacle. But we have Him in Holy Communion only for a few minutes at a time, and in proportion as we believe this and take it to heart is our desire to seek His Presence in the tabernacle again and again.' [13]

[12] *Report of the Anglo-Catholic Congress*, 1923, pp. 87 and 88.

[13] Quoted in *Reservation* by Prof. Bethune-Baker, p. 7.

The assimilation of Anglican doctrine and practice to that of the Roman Church is open and avowed. The Roman theologians at Malines, after an interchange of explanations with the Anglicans, formed 'a very hopeful impression that a satisfactory accommodation may be reached with regard to the doctrine of the sacraments regarded as means of grace and of the spiritual life,'[14] while Dr. Kidd has recorded with complacency that:

> 'our present rite has been adopted more openly to the Latin, as, ritually, by the insertion at several points of the Mutual Salutation, and, ceremonially, by the use of the bell, elevation, and genuflexion in connexion with the recital of the Words of Institution.'[15]

However, in spite of this measure of assimilation, according to the Rev. Maurice Child, there seems to remain full play for a variety of tastes. 'Finally,' he writes in his booklet on Anglo-Catholic Ceremonial,

> 'it is necessary to note that different types of ceremonial are adopted in different Anglo-Catholic churches. . . . In one church "Gothic" vestments are preferred, in another "classic," in another modern types; ceremonies are performed according to various uses, such as "Sarum," "English," or "Roman." . . . The "English" and "Sarum" customs may be found to-day used in many Roman Catholic churches abroad, and the "Roman" in many English churches. . . . It makes little difference which use is adopted provided that people do not quarrel about it, but do their best to make their own use as dignified and edifying as possible.'[16]

The Tractarians started from the principle that there is something greater than the Established Church — the Church Catholic and Apostolic. The Ritualists used that principle to disintegrate those elements in Anglicanism which differentiate it from Roman Catholicism. The Anglo-Catholics have continued the work of the Ritualists and carried it considerably further, while establishing at the same time within the bosom of the Church a curious, irresponsible, Romish type of congregationalism. Is it pessimistic to write: 'And the end is not yet'?

After the War the Communists sought to forward the cause of revolution in England by gradually penetrating local Trade Union organizations in the hope that they might ultimately

[14] *The Conversations at Malines*, p. 83.
[15] *Church Times*, 18 February, 1927, p. 182.
[16] *Congress Books*, No. 29, p. 15.

dominate them. It was in these obscure activities that their best chance lay. A similar process of propagating ecclesiastical Bolshevism has long been going on below the surface of the ecclesiastical world. No one would suggest that any intrinsic importance attaches to the pronouncements of Parish Magazines, but the Parish Magazine is locally quite a powerful weapon for the propagation of subversive ideas, and it is sometimes used very effectively. It circulates widely among people who read nothing more authoritative and are insufficiently instructed to resist its influence. In the current issue of a Reading Parish Magazine the attention of the readers is drawn to the significance of the Angelus which 'is rung at S. Mary's every day at 12 noon.' 'If you listen for it you will notice the bell rings three times thrice and once nine times. There is a prayer which exactly fits this, as follows: "Then follows a prayer in three sections in each of which occurs the invocation, 'Hail, Mary, full of grace . . . Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of death.'".' This kind of thing is characteristic of the quiet but unceasing campaign which is being carried on not only through Parish Magazines but through Parochial Guilds and other local organizations with the object of undoing the Reformation. It is the method of 'here a little, there a little.' The individual spheres of action are for the most part so insignificant as to seem unworthy of notice; but they are numerous, and the result of the process after a period of time is by no means insignificant. In the civil sphere the Labour leaders, despite the presence among them of some who sympathized with Communion, were aware of the danger of gradual percolation, and took steps to deal with it. Unless the Church of England finds some means of checking the insidious campaign which is gradually sapping the very foundations of Anglicanism, the Anglican Ecclesiastical Polity, which even now is in grave danger, will be surely doomed to disruption and collapse.

AN ANTHROPOLOGY FOR TO-DAY*

By the Rev. J. F. Bethune-Baker, D.D., Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, Cambridge.

WHAT is Man? What account of him can be given to-day? When any question like this is put there are always some who think that if only you can discover origins you will have found the answer. They look to the beginnings and the past. Others are disposed to limit themselves to the actual facts before them at the moment and to test all answers by their own experience. That is what it is. Others, again, look forward and, for good or for evil, judge the thing by what they can detect of its tendencies that show what it is likely to become. Roots, fruits in being, fruits to be. History, experience, prophecy.

If in place of prophecy we were to say 'reasonable inference from knowledge of what has been and what is' (a main constituent of every kind of prophecy that we know), I think we should agree that in giving an account of anything we ought to draw from all these three sources of possible information. We ought to know origins at least as far back as we can trace them with certainty and reasonable probability. We ought to consider carefully, and within as wide a range as we can command, the existing state and conditions and characteristics. And we ought also to bring to account, though here we are on much less safe and stable ground, the probabilities of the future, both as regards the further development of the capacities and tendencies of the thing we are dealing with and as regards the new conditions which are likely to determine its environment.

Let us then at least recognize the principle that in making up our main account we should have to include evidence derivable from all these quarters.

It is Man's own witness to himself, for or against himself, that his long history reveals—enduring and daring, brutal and chivalrous, self-seeking and self-sacrificing, hating and loving. If he has felt himself a worm, if he has shown himself heroic: if he has just kept going and relapsed and recovered and forged ahead—all this is his own unconscious witness to himself. All that he has resisted, all that he has tried to do, all that he has

* A paper read to the London Branch of the Churchmen's Union.

acquiesced in, all that he has set his heart on, all that he has given his mind to: his ordering of his life and surroundings: this is evidence of what he is and of what he may become. There can be no evidence that can outweigh it.

Whatever Man has thought about himself in the past must be taken as evidence. His beliefs in gods and devils, beings of a more powerful order, and in various ways of placating or circumventing them; his beliefs in another world and revelations coming to him from it: these beliefs are evidence of facts about him, whether the meanings he assigned to them were adequate or not. The interpretations were man's own: all the religious schemes of sacrament and ritual and doctrine were his own creation; but they indicate facts about him.

I need not, I think, enlarge further on this fairly obvious point, though it seems to me often to be ignored.

All our 'Christian' ideas about Man come to us on human testimony, as inferences from actual human experience—inductions from it made at first by men and afterwards accepted or acquiesced in by other men. These inductions, that found expression in doctrines and institutions, may be mistaken, or partly true and partly false; but we cannot ignore the realities of human nature of which they were the expression.

I do not think it would repay us to attempt any detailed survey of the early history of Jewish or Christian thought about the Fall and Original Sin. It has been recovered and expounded as fully, I suppose, as it need be by Dr. Tennant in his careful and exhaustive study of *The Sources of the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin* (Cambridge, 1903), and it has been surveyed again after him by Mr. N. P. Williams in the Bampton Lectures of 1924, recently published under the title *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1927).

We commonly speak of the traditional Christian doctrine of Man. When English Christians do that, they have in mind the ideas and teaching that have been prevalent in England, as also in the reformed churches in general, since the sixteenth century —ideas and teaching plainly stated in our Articles of Religion, which were intended to define the position of the Church of England in relation to matters of faith and practice that were in dispute at the time.

Articles IX—XVIII cover the whole ground. They declare Man's original state to have been one of righteousness. The Fall of Adam corrupted human nature at its source, so that it has no power of its own for good: on the contrary, 'man is . . . of his own nature inclined to evil.' The natural tendency—'urge'—of man is never to good but always to evil. That is the doctrine of 'original sin' as expounded and implied in our Articles of Religion.

It is true that all these Articles together express a more unfavourable doctrine of Man than the Church as a whole has ever been committed to. Neither the Eastern Churches nor the Roman Church have been in all respects as outspoken as our own Articles. There are hesitations and qualifications in detail, as well as some differences, that leave Man after the Fall in a rather better position than our anthropology assigns to him. And it is a token of the times that Mr. Williams regards himself as free to discard from the doctrine any element that cannot claim Catholic sanction.

Neither do I think that it is worth while to deal with details of the doctrine, though I think that logic has its function to perform even in the realm of spiritual insight and moral valuation, and that our Reformers of the sixteenth century saw clearly and judged surely in these matters, and that if the main premiss of the Catholic doctrine is retained it carries with it, into our new world, most of its *impedimenta*.

It is, then, the main premiss only with which we need concern ourselves. Mr. Williams holds that 'Catholic Christianity as such is committed to no more than the bare assertion that there *was* a Fall,' and by a Fall he means 'a primal rebellion of a created will against God.' He thinks that the fact of the 'inherited infirmity' which is universally recognized, when taken with our monotheistic belief, compels us to postulate such a catastrophe. By our monotheistic belief he means belief in the reality of the God revealed in the Bible and through Christ—a God, that is, who is Creator of the world and good. The two axioms are the goodness of God and the sinfulness of men. Both axioms, of course, express religious valuation in terms of states—goodness on the one side, sinfulness on the other. The common consciousness of Christians affirms them both. We may

say that both of them are *de fide*, part of the common stock of Christian religion. But do they necessitate the assumption of an act of conscious rebellion on the part of the created against the known will of the Creator, at any stage in the history of the created? In order to provide a *rationale* for these two axioms must we keep in some form or other the conception of a Fall?—the idea, that is, that somehow an evil infection was introduced into human nature for which the Creator God was not responsible.

I say 'in some form or other' and 'somehow' because we must not, of course, reject the conception or disbelieve that it is the reflexion of a fact merely because we do not know how it happened. We may feel sure that, if we could have, unrolled before our eyes from the beginning, the whole drama of creation of the world and all things in it, we should find in it no scene like the story of Adam and Eve, and no sudden swoop down on earth of fallen angels drawn there by the fairness of its daughters. And yet there might be a fact in space and time of which those stories might be true pictorial, artistic representations.

I am in entire agreement with Mr. Williams when he says (p. 33) that it is 'very wide of the mark' to say 'that the idea of the Fall has been refuted by "Biblical criticism,"' and again when he says that 'the question of the truth of the doctrine is completely detachable from and independent of the question of the historicity of the stories.' For many years I have taken every opportunity of commending and urging that principle with regard to all our so-called 'Christian' doctrines that have been regarded, whether in general ecclesiastical tradition or in popular opinion, as dependent on stories in our Bible, New Testament no less than Old.

I am in entire agreement with him, again, that for the true foundations of the belief in Original Sin we must look to the actual facts of human nature—'the bed-rock facts,' as he styles them (p. 31), 'of ethical and spiritual experience—the consciousness of the moral struggle, and the feeling of a ceaseless strain and tension between duty and the clamorous appetites, which ever and anon burst victoriously forth into crude external expression, whilst reason looks on in helpless dismay and shame. *Video*

meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor: "'the evil that I would not, that I do.'" The state of things described in these almost proverbial sayings, Mr. Williams proceeds to argue, leads those who reflect upon it to the belief in some kind of 'radical evil' inherent in human nature, and 'the passionate ethical monotheism which is the heart of Judaism and Christianity alike cannot endure the idea that God is the author of evil.' So the fault, the failure, the fall, the defect must be attributed to Man himself. Here, too, I do not doubt that Mr. Williams describes as correctly as eloquently the true genesis of the doctrine of Original Sin, of an inherent taint in human nature.

But if we were to allow ourselves freely to survey all the facts we can envisage with no preconceptions, should we to-day arrive at a similar explanation of them? Should we be driven to the conclusion *either* that at some point far back in the history of Man he had so wilfully defied the true law of his nature as to be deprived thenceforward of capacity to fulfil it, which was his before, *or* that at a later stage some kind of blight had fallen upon him from outside from which ever after he was doomed to suffer, poisoned, as it were, at the source of his life?

Ideas like these have been the inspiration of various doctrines of Atonement and the roots of schemes of salvation that have twined themselves round the gospel picture of Jesus the Christ till they have seemed to be inextricably bound up with the very fact of Him and His life and place in the whole scheme of things. It was just to revive and reinstate this lost capacity —so it has been believed—to overpower and annul the corruption of human nature by uniting it to His own untainted purity like some irresistible disinfectant—it was just for this that He came into the world, or was sent by the Creator God of Love, to restore what had been lost and reconstitute that which had been destroyed.

The schemes of which these are the leading themes have appealed to men's hearts and minds. They have given stimulus and strength to them in many different states and conditions, and have inspired to noble life and helped to create fine characters and personalities. It is in close connexion with the valuation of Jesus that they imply that the peculiarly Christian conception of God as Love took shape and grew to the power in human life

that it has been. If they have to be abandoned, shall we have to lose with them our estimate of Jesus? Or again, shall we have to revise our conception of God? Or shall we find the moral and spiritual experience of mankind confirming both these valuations, though the schemes with which they have been identified fade away like mists before the march of day?

I am going to suggest that we must reject *in toto* the idea of a Fall and Original Sin in any sense which it has borne in the general scheme of Christian doctrine and find other explanations of the facts of human experience which led to the belief, and yet that we are none the less entitled to reaffirm the Christian valuation of Jesus and of God.

But Mr. Williams, though in no way holding the *Genesis* stories to be historically true and professedly accepting the evolutionist conclusions of the science of to-day, would retain the idea of the Fall. So before we go further, let us have his alternative scheme of things before us. It is man's sense of evil in the world and in himself on the one hand, and the goodness of the God who created the world and man on the other hand, that constitute the problem.

For his own explanation Mr. Williams goes back to something like what Dr. Tennant described as 'a line of fanciful semi-gnostic speculation' represented by the story of the Fallen Angels in *Genesis* vi.[1] Here we have a legend—admittedly a legend—parallel to but different from the legend of the Fall in *Genesis* iii. The Adam and Eve story does not account for the existence of evil, though it shows professedly the way in which Man first came under its influence. Inasmuch as nothing that is known of Man's history provides a point or a place for the origin of evil in the historic process of the world, and the Catholic faith requires us to believe that there was a Fall to which the evil is to be referred, there are obvious advantages in throwing over the Adam and Eve story and preferring to it the idea that underlies the story of the Fallen Angels. For that story makes the Fall take place outside the area of our world and what we usually mean by its historic process. It puts

[1] From J *Genesis* vi, 1-8, as an introduction to the Flood story in the following verses, in which sections from P have been inserted into the J narrative, so that as it stands we have alternately J and P.

the Fall in heaven among beings of the divine order, though an order inferior to the supreme God. It is pre-mundane. I suppose this story was in Disraeli's mind when, in the early days of the Darwinian controversy on the descent of man, he made his famous utterance: 'The question is this—is man an ape or an angel? My lord, I am on the side of the angels.' It was better to be descended from a fallen angel than from an ape.

But does this fantastic story help us in any kind of way to the theodicy that Mr. Williams is looking for? What is wanted for the theodicy he has in mind is a solution of the problem presented by the existence of the evil in the world to those who hold the belief that the Creator of the World is all-powerful and all good. The angels in question are assumed to be His creatures. They, or some of them, 'fell,' and it is as a consequence of their fall that evil entered into the course of the world we know. That is to say, we only put the origination of evil farther back. We put the responsibility on the angels and make men their victims. We bring evil nearer to the source of all being—*ex hypothesi* the good Creator.

Let me, however, put Mr. Williams's theory in the words of his own summary. He has put the question, Why should God have created such a world as we know? and he proceeds:

> 'The answer can only be that He did not do so; the evil which exists in organic nature, apparently coeval with it and worked into its very tissue, cannot be due to the all-loving Creator.'
>
> 'We are thus led to the hypothesis of a pre-cosmic vitiation of the whole Life-Force, at the very beginning of cosmic evolution: this, it would seem, and not the failure of primitive man to escape from already existing evil, is the true and ultimate "Fall." . . . To avoid both dualism and an infinite regress, we must suppose that the Life-Force corrupted itself—which means that we must conceive it as having been, at its creation, personal and free—a self-conscious *anima mundi* ["world-soul"]. . . . The Father of all things must have created this World-Soul good; but at the beginning of time, in some transcendental and incomprehensible manner, it turned away from Him and towards self, thus staining its own essence and, perhaps, forfeiting self-consciousness, which it has only regained after aeons of myopic striving, in sporadic fragments, which are the separate minds of men.'

So Mr. Williams, and he goes on to distinguish his own conception from that of Plotinus and to link it on to the conception of the eternal Logos. I think that Plotinus was a profounder philosopher than Mr. Williams. In Plotinus's conception of

the world-soul as divine and a manifestation of Godhead, and of the detachment of the human soul from the world-soul as the reason for the trouble in which man is enmeshed, I should judge that we are nearer the truth than Mr. Williams brings us with his curious blending of Plotinus and the legends of the Fall.

Mr. Williams expends much eloquence on his theme. But the substitution of 'the world-soul' for the angels, or 'the whole Life-Force,' as that which was vitiated by some action of its own, does not really help us to a theodicy.

Ex hypothesi, the world-soul or life-force of the universe—or (in terms with more affinity to current ideas) the 'formula' of the whole cosmic process—has its origin in God. The ground-plan or design is manifested in the evolutionary process of Nature and of Man. The conception of a 'voluntary deviation,' or a 'rebellion,' of this world-soul from conformity with the will of the Creator is introduced as an explanation of two facts: one, that the world-process does not in all respects conform to our notions as to what a process somehow initiated and directed by a God of Love ought to be; and the other, that we are conscious of disharmonies in our own natures and lives and experience as a whole and of our inability to conduct ourselves and our affairs as we divine we *ought*, and that we feel ourselves to blame for the condition in which we find ourselves. We are not willing to attribute it to God: we are not willing to say to Him, 'For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man is blackened, . . . Man's Forgiveness give—and take.'

To me it seems, first, that the explanation offered solves none of the difficulties. It in no way saves God from responsibility for originating a world-soul capable of the deviation or rebellion from His will which is supposed to have occurred, for originating, that is to say, a source of what we judge to be evil. And, secondly, it seems to me that other explanations of the common human experience that suggested the doctrine of original sin are forthcoming.

We can still only guess answers to the riddle, but even guesses are never entirely in the void. All our experience and all our knowledge of which we are aware go to the making of the guess. There is this kind of realism at the back of every

guess. And in our guesses to-day we ought to start fresh and base ourselves on all the evolutionist knowledge that lies before us as to the universe and man's place and history in it. So far as least we must be thorough-going realists.

What, then, are the facts disclosed to us that must be brought to account before we 'guess' to-day? There are still with us all the facts there ever were that led men to think of the world as the arena in which rival powers of Good and Evil were locked in a life and death struggle for mastery, victory swaying now this way and now that. That struggle is still as real a fact as ever.

There are all the fierce destructive forces of physical Nature at work, all the excursions and alarms out of which the world came to the form in which we know it. There is all the struggle of vegetation in its various forms, the blight and canker and waste. Throughout the animal world the same struggle has been going on all the time among the highest as much as among the lowest types; the waste has been enormous. Man's history tells the same tale. Everywhere there is pain and suffering and disease; what has come into being can only maintain itself by constant care and effort none the less wearing if much of it is almost automatic. 'So careless of the single life' is the power we personify as Nature. And the other line, 'So careful of the type she seems,' is only partly true. There has been what looks like useless experimentation, and we know that types have perished.

Facts of this kind are so abundant as to seem to preclude the hypothesis of a creative activity characterized as wisdom, power, and love in one.

But these facts are only a selection, an abstraction from the total group of facts that we can observe. And they are not even rightly described as 'evil.' For many of them are directly, and others indirectly, productive of good. It is because it is so commonly impossible to apply to the world and its processes the characterization 'good' or 'evil' that it is impossible for a realist to rest in the hypothesis of coeternal powers of good and evil as the ground of things.

When we turn to the other side of the picture, or rather make our observation of another set of facts, we see constructive

forces at work through processes that seem to be destructive; we see new order and beauty emerging, continuous adaptation of type to environment—a selective organizing process in operation. The struggle of which we speak has its equivalent at levels lower than that of human life, and out of it higher forms and orders of life ensue. When we come to the human level, it seems certain that much of what we carelessly call evil is a condition or even an originating cause of many of the qualities we value as the highest. As far as we can judge, a world in which there was no suffering, no sacrifice, would not be a moral world.

It seems, therefore, a mistake to judge that for the struggle, the suffering, the sacrifice of our world there must be assumed some origination alien from, and hostile to, the ground or scheme of the world itself. It is a peculiarly strange mistake for a Christian whose faith in the Incarnation bids him see in the Cross the way of life and God Himself as sharing in the suffering of the world. A Christian can only make this mistake because he has in his mind the old idea that once upon a time there was none of it. Mr. Williams's theory has at least the merit that it puts this 'once upon a time' before the supposed beginning of the world, and Man is thus freed from ultimate responsibility for having introduced into the world the taint from which it is held to suffer. He simply shares the condition; he did not make it what it is. We have got rid of the idea of a Fall of Man. For the rest, however, the theory of 'the pre-cosmic vitiation of the whole Life-Force' implies a definite evil power in existence along with the eternal God of Love. Dualism is reinstated. It does nothing to vindicate the cosmic process in relation to the God (assumed to be Love) who is the Creator.

On the other hand, the evolutionary process as we know it now, with Man emerging after almost incalculable ages of time, perhaps again and again before we come to the original ancestor of any man now living, suggests to us an ordering, organizing, shaping energy, building up this earth of ours and all things in it by stages of long duration. Nothing that is known justifies us in supposing that the process ought to have been or might have been other than it has been. It is nothing to the point that '*we* should not have created a universe' like this. We do not.

But Mr. Williams's inference that *God did not* seems to me to substitute an imaginary God of his own invention for the God in whom hitherto men have believed. 'Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him' (*Job* xiii, 15) is the reaction of the really religious man to the most crushing turns of the wheel of life. God lets all these things be. That is the fact we know, and of course Mr. Williams notes it.

I have used the present tense—God lets all these things be. We have been working up to it all the way. Mr. Williams pays lip-service to the facts of which 'evolution' is the formula, like most educated people to-day; but like them, too, he still thinks of Creation as a definite act in the past. *God did not create a world like this*, he says. For an evolutionist who knows his ABC the statement is a truism, but in a sense that does not seem to be familiar to Mr. Williams. For the process is eternal. God and the world are co-eternal to the evolutionist thinker, as they were to Augustine when he spoke as a philosopher; to Thomas Aquinas, although as a Churchman he was bound to the belief of the first book of Moses; and as they are to most philosophers to-day. No beginning either of the world or of God can come into consideration. It is the ever-present constructive, organizing process which confronts us and entices us to try to find its meaning, to value it—this process, the ways of which the science of to-day has disclosed it in large measure, and is disclosing to us more and more in detail.

If we are 'to justify the ways of God to man' and to give an account of man himself, and still think of God as Creator, the question before us is always, What is He creating? What has He been creating in the long ages in the past, what is He creating in what we call the present (the 'specious present' which is past and future), and what is He going to create in the future as illimitable as the past?

I am no easy-going optimist, but I cannot understand how anyone who tries to get a synoptic view of the facts of the history of the world, as they can be studied to-day, can doubt that the creative process that has been at work has been towards higher forms of life, and, since the emergence of Man, towards higher qualities or values and the wider diffusion of them.

I heard a sermon once by a distinguished bishop in which he

contrasted the ease of creation—the simple 'Let it be' and it was—with the enormous difficulty of redemption. We must get right away from these conceptions that God ever created the world as it was, and that 'God and Nature are at strife' because of anything that happened after any such creation. The whole has been a process towards realization, and it has all been enormously difficult through millions of years as we count them. It is not the case that the world and man have 'fallen,' but that they have not yet attained; and if we assume God at all, it must be that He is in the process all through and that the process is producing, at whatever cost, something of value which a different process might not have produced—something which justifies the contingent and apparent cruelty and waste. Moral sense or conscience is late to emerge in a form in which we can clearly recognize it. If free moral personality, as the synthesis of reason, beauty, goodness, is the highest product of the process, that must be regarded as the divine intention, and from the beginning of human history failures of individuals and of groups to shape themselves according to this end, so far as it is discerned and so far as circumstances admit—at the different stages or levels already attained—hinder the realization. In religious language all such failures are 'sin,' and the history of individuals and groups is strewn with them. Nor can we fix the fault on any one factor of human nature.

Mr. Williams says that what is wrong with man is that 'he is suffering from arrested development of "herd-instinct."' But constantly it has been the assertion of individual consciousness against 'herd-instinct' that has promoted progress towards higher levels of individual and social life, and constantly society has penalized the innovator, 'stoned the prophets,' and so on. Those in whom 'herd-instinct' was most strongly developed have been wrong—have been, in theological language, the sinners. They have not known what was good for 'the herd.' We cannot put the responsibility on to any one of the primary instincts of man. In his progress to the end the harmonious direction of all is needed, and if we are to judge from the facts we know we are forced to the position that it is our conception of God and of creation that needs to be corrected. In spite of all the facts that seem to tell the other way, there is evidence

enough that Love is the quality of highest value, the factor of things as we know them that is always emerging, always conquering in the midst of suffering and defeat.

It is love that is always in the making, and it is by what God is making of the world and us that we ought to infer what He is and what we are. It is idle for us to speculate whether or no some other process could have been devised. It is in the light of all the facts of our own individual experience, and of what we know of the experience of the race, that we ourselves have conceived the idea of a God of love. And we shall get no true conception of what we are and are to be, or of what God is—of what Love is—except from the evidence of the facts of the world and men's history, as we can read them to-day: what has been attained, achieved, already. The reality is what is to be.

It was in the course of the historic process that, in spite of all the facts of experience to the contrary, men were led to believe in Love as the character of the directing spirit of the process. The experience of which the one man Jesus was both subject and centre was, of course, of paramount significance in establishing this belief. But it would not have been established if there had not been a large enough number of men and women in the world whose own experience enabled them to enter into His, and attest it as the truth of themselves, and their own reading of the almost illegible scroll of their own minds and hearts and imaginations. And the belief would never have maintained the hold it has had ever since, and made the appeal it always makes, unless it was in harmony with the heart of things and corresponded with the inherent nature of the real. Other beliefs more easily credible would have damped it down.

None of the classical attempts to solve the problem of evil has been successful. As long as we make evil the problem which calls for solution we are not likely to find one. In the light of the evolutionary process we ought rather to conceive of the world's order from moment to moment as neither good nor evil in our absolute sense, but as tending to good, yet only through suffering, at great cost.

If God were outside it and creator of it, we could have no theodicy. But if He is the ground of it and the directing spirit of the process, sharing in it and all the suffering involved in the

shaping, ordering, organizing; if all is being made from moment to moment, and the way to all that we deem progress and betterment lies through effort that is often apparently unsuccessful: then we come perhaps as near as we can to understanding it and Him and ourselves.

And Man's experience is God's experience, with the difference, we may suppose, that the assurance 'There shall never be one lost good,' which Man finds it hard to maintain in full, is always present in the consciousness of God.

Our anthropology will be based on this well-grounded inference from all Man's past experience and his present state. He is the highest known outcome of the process, the highest organic manifestation of it, able to divine the character of the process and, to a large extent, to discern and control within himself and in his environment the factors of both that need to be directed and organized to effect the creation of good.

It is at all stages of the existence of the individual and the race the defect of this kind of direction and ordering of life, which constantly involves the sacrifice of ease and satisfaction at the moment, that is rightly characterized as evil in relation to the achievement to which the individual and the race are called.

Man is by his very constitution a partner in the eternal work of creation—a fellow-worker with God. It is only for want of words that he can even be described as either good or bad. That is why Jesus, with His insight into the things of the spirit, refused the title 'good.' Man is always in the process of becoming, always making himself and being made, and making others. It is only so far as he discerns that the business of his life is the creation of good and directs his activities to that general end that he finds himself and his true place in the whole of things.

The moral conflict, his dissatisfaction with himself and the world, is not a symptom of a Fall and original sin, but of the call to him of his own nature to forget the things that are behind and press on to the things that are in front. He has emerged from the brute; he has become conscious of wisdom, power, and love; he is on the way to the synthesis of them all in the activity of personal life such as we conceive to be the life of God. And he need never despair, for 'Man has Forever.'

AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

By the Rev. W. M. Browne, M.A., Vicar of Erith.

THE question of Authority in the Church of England is one which must be faced, as is clearly seen from the controversy which has arisen over the revision of the Prayer Book.

If we are to find an answer to the question there is need to look back into the history of the past, and also to consider what we mean by authority, or rather what are the channels of authority in matters of faith and practice in the Church of England to-day.

Our review of the past must be limited, and we will begin with the Evangelical Revival. The appeal of the great leaders of this movement was an appeal to the experimental side of religion, and certainly bore fruit not only in the individual life, but in the social life of the Church and Nation. They found out the value of religious psychology and made full use of it experimentally, without attempting to examine its meaning or theorise upon it. They produced no new appeal on the side of authority, for the Bible was accepted as infallible, and during this period the theory of verbal inspiration established itself with renewed force, the force of religious experience, as the only accepted view of what inspiration meant, and the one method of God's revelation to man. It brought the message of the Gospel home to men's hearts and bore witness by changed lives that the Spirit of God was a living force. So successful was it that the infallibility of the Bible in every part as the Word of God, as given us in the Authorized Version, was firmly rooted in the minds of the common people.

The Old Testament and the New were alike regarded as good for edifying: no distinction was made between the Book of Jonah and the Epistles of St. John, but in practice the whole of the Message of the New Testament was read into the Old. The scarlet thread in Rahab's window was a witness to the doctrine of the atonement, no less surely than the Scarlet Woman of Revelation was the Pope of Rome.

The men of the Oxford Movement took over from their spiritual Fathers (for how many of them were brought up in Evangelical circles) the accepted view of the Bible as being the truth and nothing but the truth. But for them it was no longer the whole truth, they felt the need of tradition to support a Church which still valued Catholic uses which were as they believed legitimate developments of the faith of the New Testament.

If the Bible was the foundation, traditions were the pillars to support the roof of the Church where they could find shelter. They looked behind their Evangelical Teachers, not to the Reformers of the sixteenth century, but to the Anglican Divines of the seventeenth century.

Historical criticism of the Bible and Tradition had not yet found its home in Oxford. Dr. Pusey served an apprenticeship to German theology, and was even regarded as a dangerous critic when he published his book on German theology, but he certainly never found his spiritual home there. That Newman knew no German is well known, and as Dean Stanley pointed out this no doubt had a great influence on the course of his life. The Tractarians never questioned the authority of the Bible, they accepted it whole-heartedly, but insisted that in the use of it the guidance of tradition is necessary. In order to elucidate what tradition meant they devoted themselves to the translation of the Early Fathers, but with all their laborious work there is little that would pass as serious historical research to-day. We know the interest that Newman had in the lives of the Saints, to which work he turned, amongst others, J. A. Froude (as he set Mark Pattison to translate Aquinas' 'Catena Aurea'), with results so different to the Master's hopes. This appeal to authority was certainly not unlearned, but it was as uncritical in its study of the Early Fathers as it was in the study of the Bible.

Both the Evangelicals and the Tractarians regarded revelation as static: for the former it stopped with the Canon of the New Testament, with the latter it was limited to the Fathers of the undivided Church. This was a fundamental error, though a natural one to the men of those times, for is there not development within the New Testament as also in the writings of the Early Fathers?

The same appeal to a static authority survives to-day (with little to excuse it) amongst those who are content to cling to an unexamined and therefore uncertain tradition about the Bible, or on the other hand to an unhistorical appeal to whatever is covered by the term 'Catholic Tradition.'

The development of theological thought in the nineteenth century reflects the conditions of the Renaissance. Science has enlarged our view of the universe and opened up the prehistoric origins of the earth and its inhabitants; while historical criticism has recast all those preconceived theories of the Bible which satisfied our fathers and stood them in good stead.

For the Old Testament the main outlines of its growth and development are clearly drawn, and for scholarship the results are generally accepted. Wellhausen's work and that of Robertson Smith have made it clear that in the Old Testament we are dealing with a nation's literature, not unlike our own literature before the days of the printing press. Bede may not unfairly be likened to the editor of the books of *Samuel* and *Kings*, and the author of *Piers Plowman* has the fire if not the spiritual vision of a Hebrew Prophet.

In regard to the New Testament the work of critical analysis of the sources has not yet been completed, nor can we grasp the results of critical scholarship with the same clearness as in the case of the Old Testament; but the study of the Gospels and the sayings of our Lord show that as a final authority in matters of faith the New Testament must be used with discrimination. Critical scholarship is often accused of missing the wood for the trees, but the aim of it all for a devout scholar like Dr. Sanday is to get behind the recorded sayings to the mind of the Master. Similarly, the scientific study of Early Church History has helped to clear away the undergrowth of what we know as tradition in the first three centuries, and though much remains to be done, we have a better understanding of the Early Church than ever before. Modern criticism has brought us to an age of transition, though that need not trouble us—for what age has not been an age of transition to those who played their part in it?—but it undoubtedly makes it difficult for us to accept the Bible or Tradition as our final authority in matters of faith. We cannot be content with an unexamined appeal either to the

Bible or Tradition. We are more interested in the way truths developed and were revealed than in ascertained results and dogmatic assertions.

The question with which we are faced is an urgent question, a question which cannot be shirked. What is the authority within the Bible and within tradition? The immediate answer to our question lies near at hand, namely, in the authority of the Spirit of Truth which Christ promised to His disciples of all ages to guide them into all truth. Loyalty to truth as we find it after diligent search, is loyalty to the Master. Truth is not a monopoly of the past but the goal of the future; for the pilgrim it is a better thing to travel hopefully than to look backward, for when we think we have arrived the path is still before us.

We must now consider what we have to learn about the lamps which the Spirit of God can and does use to throw light upon our way, remembering that it is foolish to quarrel about the shape of the lamps instead of using the light to walk by. What kind of authority is it that we rightly look for in the Church of England to-day in matters of faith and practice? The word is not without some ambiguity, for it is used in different senses according to the questions which are under consideration. Unfortunately the common use of the term suggests a legal authority. For the lawyer, authority means the written law of a code, or the precedents of a Court of Law in interpreting which the legal opinion of eminent lawyers will necessarily carry weight.

It is this kind of authority that lies at the back of the Papal claims; certainly it was so in the Middle Ages, and it seems to be so now. The Pope is judge to whom appeal can be made, and without doubt the methods of the Roman Curia for good or ill help to determine the decision. Whether the Pope speaks infallibly or not is determined by the question as to whether or no he speaks *ex cathedra*; the whole setting is legal, a legacy of the Roman Empire.

The appeal to authority in our Church still bears this legal aspect, but it is not the kind of authority that we need except in a small number of instances which in their nature come within the scope of a legal decision. The Bishops of our Church, as rulers of a diocese, undoubtedly have authority over all who

have promised canonical obedience to them, and from the Bishops there is an appeal to the Archbishop. The most famous modern instance of such an appeal in our Church is, of course, the trial of the Bishop of Lincoln before Archbishop Benson and his assessors. But here the authority was not only a legal one but a moral one. The Church at large recognized that if there was to be a trial, which some deprecated, the procedure, though novel, was right. It was felt that this was an improvement on the Ritual Trials before the Privy Council. But a spiritual court, even though presided over by an Archbishop, cannot settle all questions, and the reason for that is that by authority we do not simply mean a legal authority.

The second type of authority that bears closely on our meaning of the use of the term is taken from the Historian. His authorities are those writings which come down from the period that he has under review. He compares authority with authority, and uses his critical judgment to determine their value. He is limited by the number of such authorities as are still extant. In some periods, as the second century of our era, he is seriously handicapped by the paucity of the materials which he has before him, and which he uses to piece together his account of the events concerning which he is writing. In other periods he is embarassed by the mass of authorities which he finds it necessary to examine.

When we speak of the New Testament and the Early Fathers as our authorities, we certainly should have this problem of the historian in mind — the problem of the literary authorities for the origins of our faith which remain available. Much confusion has arisen, however, from the double use of the term : authority in its historical sense and authority in its legal sense. All traditions, true or false, will for the historian have importance in judging the men and customs of a particular age, but all traditions will not have equal authority in our present beliefs and practices. To say there is authority for such a use or custom is not to justify it, unless we can show cause why it is of value to-day. This brings us to a third type of authority.

What is the authority of science? I do not mean philosophical authority for its pronouncements which would involve questions of epistemology, but what is the practical authority to

which the scientist appeals? It is, of course, the authority of experiment. This is the test the scientist applies. Whether we think of chemistry or medical science, for the scientific investigator his theory is true, as far as it goes, if it works in experience.

Spiritually this appeal is of great use and is appealed to by all who are endeavouring to forward the cause of the Kingdom of God; we should all agree with Dean Inge's saying that 'faith is an experiment that ends in an experience.' This was the real strength of the 'Evangelical Revival.' Teachers of the doctrine of that school saw the results of their preaching in men's lives; but though it was proof that the Spirit of God was using them, it was by no means proof that their expression of the doctrine was finally and absolutely true for all time.

The preaching of those doctrines—the necessity of Conversion, the certainty of Hell fire for all unbelievers, the infallibility of every word of the Bible, a crude substitutionary theory of the atonement—would meet with very different results to-day. The value of prayer, the need of Sacraments, the fellowship in the Church, the social outcome of our faith, all these vital questions are such as can be tested by an appeal to experience. They have been proved by the work of the Oxford Movement and those who were heirs to that great inheritance.

These three examples of what we mean by authority—the legal, the historical, and the experimental—will be sufficient to show that the use of the term must be determined by the nature of the matter under discussion. But in no branch of knowledge or social life to-day would appeal be made to an unexamined tradition; therefore, I take it, that type of authority should have no weight in a branch of the living Church of God. We need a living channel which has behind it law and order. We need an authority that can appeal to history with critical knowledge. We need an authority that appeals to present-day experience. If theology in the widest sense of the term is a living science, if faith is true to experience, our authority must be dynamic, not static. It must give room for growth and development; it must expand just because all knowledge grows.

When we ask what is the authority in the Church of England, we are of course referred to Scripture, and probably to the

Creeds, and sometimes to the Articles. Now each of these are authorities, but each in a very different sense. An appeal to the authority of Scripture will bring to mind what has already been stated, that they are not to be accepted as an infallible written revelation of God, but as 'the record of God's revelation to man,' to quote the Lambeth Conference Report. They must be read in the light of modern scholarship: our appeal will not be to the Scriptures as a whole, but to the spiritual authority within the records of Holy Writ.

The Creeds come down to us as the considered conclusions of the experience of the Church in the fifth century. They are undoubtedly of great authority: they safeguarded the Church from heresies current in the first centuries, but they have to be read in the light of the history of their times. On many questions that arise to-day the Creeds give us no answer, for the problems to which we seek an answer have only arisen with the vast increase of human knowledge since the fourth and fifth centuries. They must be treated as historical documents, and not as statements complete and sufficient for all time: in other words, their authority is relative to the times in which they were produced.

The Articles are still of authority, but only in a limited sense. It is recognized that they are not binding on the laity, nor even on the clergy in every detail. Clerical subscription to the Articles only implies a general assent. This concession was made at a time when it was felt that the strain on the clerical conscience in giving absolute assent to Articles which were written to meet the needs of the seventeenth century, and not the nineteenth, would be intolerable. They belonged to a period which loved Articles bordering round the number forty, a form of pronouncement which did not appeal to the writers of *Lux Mundi* or to the scholars who published *Foundations*.

Even supposing Scripture, the Creeds, and the Articles were the final authority in the Church of England, it is clear that we should want a living authority to guide us in the use of Scripture, to interpret the Creeds in language of our own day, and to say how far the Articles might be disregarded. We need an authority other than documentary, and no legal interpretations of written statements, however venerable, can really satisfy.

The Latin Church satisfies its need by an appeal to the infallibility of the Pope—but an infallible authority personified in an individual is an embarrassment, as Newman felt and George Tyrrell found. Even the powers that be at Rome realize the difficulty and have left themselves a loophole of escape in the question as to when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*, lest a hasty pronouncement might embarrass the faithful. As Bishop Creighton says, 'the appeal of our Church is to "sound learning," and if so it is to a living, growing body of belief.'

If we were logical we might expect that Convocation and Lambeth Conferences would in their reports so give expression to sound learning that the conclusions they reached would be not merely commended to Churchmen but binding upon them. But, to quote Bishop Creighton again, 'The English mind is not fertile in definitions and we are apt to rejoice in our freedom from the restraints of mere logic.' 'The test of our institutions is their general adaptibility to the work they have to do.' If this is a correct judgment on the English temperament, our Church is typically English.

The kind of authority that has guided our Church amid all the changes of thought during the last century has been the tentative 'authority of sound learning.' This has not meant an appeal to scholarship alone—there has been nothing academic in the use of this authority, such as it is. We have usually waited—while the leaders of thought have been wantonly criticized and abused — and then, through the guidance of their disciples, come to accept the conclusions they reached; not by any sudden decision, but gradually, one might almost say unconsciously.

Is not this a true view of what followed on the controversies concerning *Essays and Reviews*, *Lux Mundi* and *Foundations*? There is no conscious appeal to sound learning, but the men who have practically moulded the thought of the Church of England—almost against her will, but very much for her benefit —have been as a matter of fact her men of learning. And if we ask why this has come about, I think we should acknowledge it is largely because they were not arrogant but humble. They schooled themselves in the discipleship of Christ, seeking to learn the mind of the Master.

There seems to be a desire for some constitutional means of voicing what is thought to be of authority, and we sometimes hear Diocesan Synods spoken of as means by which authoritative decisions might be given. This may be true of certain minor points of Church order, but in no sense would it be right to expect Diocesan Synods to speak with authority on weightier questions of the day that obviously require very careful consideration by those who have the ability and time to study the subjects under review with expert knowledge. The appeal to the clergy in Synod is not the appeal to sound learning such as was referred to by Bishop Creighton.

The danger of setting up any final court of appeal in matters of faith is one about which the Archbishop has spoken very frankly. In his charge to the Diocese of Canterbury in 1912 the Archbishop refers to the difficult decisions that he has to make on countless matters where his advice is sought, not only by Diocesan Bishops in England, but by Anglicans all over the world. He deprecates any increase in the official authority of Archbishop as such; he of course disclaims any desire to be infallible in his decisions. He recognizes the great debt he owes to bishops and scholars, who have ever been ready to place their resources at his service, but he definitely says that, though he has a central consultative body to whom he can turn for advice, the setting up of anything like a curia or court of appeal would be a step in the wrong direction. 'The misuse of authority is a very great responsibility.' He maintains that:

> 'Our Church stands for order in the Church, the unfettered study of Holy Scripture, liberty in its interpretation and in matters of faith, variety in its practices and opinions, and simplicity in all our formularies.'
>
> 'As we look back,' he says, 'along the road travelled by our predecessors, memorable examples of mistakes made stand up like warning pillars, bidding us in the light of such experience beware lest we narrow the legitimate field of liberty or retard and hamper the progress and development of religious thought.
>
> 'There are great names even within the last half-century inscribed upon those pillars, and the danger is at all times real.'
>
> 'But it is for the due and reasonable discharge of responsibility that men are placed in positions of authority, and they, like every honest disciple of the Divine Lord, have a right to look for His promised aid. He has not given us among human leaders an infallible guide, but He gave us this promise:
>
> 'The Spirit of Truth will guide you into all Truth.'

When we are looking for authority it is well to know first of all the kind of authority we seek. It is well to bear in mind the words of the Archbishop, that the misuse of authority is a very great responsibility. Our choice of authority in the Church of England does seem to lie between an accepted but unexamined tradition, or the tentative authority of sound learning, to be accepted not arrogantly but with humility, for no learning is sound that is not humble. The authority we should like may not always be the authority we need.

Does this guidance seem unsatisfactory? Is it not the guidance given to the Church as depicted in the *Acts of the Apostles* before they had a New Testament or credal forms? A St. Peter who as a leader was less infallible than his successors at Rome claim to be. A Council at Jerusalem whose decrees can bear more than one interpretation. A St. Paul struggling to express his faith in the face of controversies not only with Jew and Greek, but with fellow-believers. Different uses are found in the Churches of Jerusalem and Corinth. There come letters of power from the Apostle, but sometimes hard to be understood. Yet through it all, in spite of divisions and moral failures, stubbornness in welcoming new revelations, and undue haste in casting off the old, the Spirit of Jesus triumphed and led men captive to His Love.

As it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be, the authority of Church formulas, councils, scholars and saints is given by measure. It is never really binding until it is recognized, not as a legal authority, but as a moral authority—the authority which speaks the Truth in Love—the Word that expresses, not the opinion of disciples, but the mind of the Master.

THE TEMPTATION OF THE CHRIST

By the Rev. SAMUEL MCCOMB, D.D., author of *The Future Life in the light of Modern Inquiry.*

THERE is perhaps no incident in the history of our Lord which has given, in the form in which the story of it has come down to us, so much ground of offence to the critic of Christianity, and so much embarrassment to the believer, as the event which we call the Temptation. The champion of popular scepticism has, of course, found it easy to make merry over the strange and bizarre oriental imagery with which the incident is clothed. The apparition of the Devil in human form; the journeys through the air under his magical direction; the existence of a mountain so high that all the kingdoms of the world could be seen from its summit; the strange lack of cunning usually ascribed to Satan, who offers to the Saviour seductions which, in their literal form, could have made no appeal to His lofty spiritual nature; as, for example, his offer of worldly glory if He would apostatize from God and become a Devil-worshipper —all these features have easily thrown discredit upon the whole tradition.[1] The greatest modern denier of the story is Strauss. In accordance with his general theory of the origin of Christianity, he explains the Temptation as a myth, built up out of Old Testament suggestions. Just as Israel, the first-born son of Jehovah, was tempted in the wilderness for forty years, so the Messiah must be tempted in the wilderness for forty days. Orthodox theologians, he says, have been compelled to surrender the suburbs of the citadel of the Gospel history, that is, the stories of our Lord's birth and infancy. They will also, he maintains, be compelled to surrender the incidents of the Baptism and the Temptation, placed just within the walls now threatened by critical science. But all that Strauss does is only to account for the mere allegorical form of the story. He does not account for the origin of the story itself. Bruno Bauer seeks to supply this omission. He supposes that the story is

[1] And yet Papini in his *Storia di Christo* accepts and defends all these details.

no historical reminiscence of our Lord's life, but embodies an experience of the primitive community. It represents the conflicts of the Church with the devil on her journeys through the world, and is to be interpreted as a record of the Church's triumph of faith over the allurements of the world. This is the best account of the matter that has been given from the standpoint of extreme scepticism. The rationalistic explanation is best represented by the theory of Schleiermacher. He finds the story of the Temptation, as it is given by the Synoptists, to be unintelligible. He maintains that the story was originally a parable in which Jesus explained the true meaning of His Messiahship, and that later this parable was transformed into an actual historical event in the life of Jesus. The parable was designed as a warning to His disciples to attempt no miracle for their own benefit; to venture on no foolish enterprise, relying on Divine aid; and to make no compromise with evil, however strong the temptation. The modern German Liberal School, as represented by such writers as H. J. Holtzmann, Theodore Keim, Oscar Holtzmann, and the novelist Gustav Frenssen, accepts the story, distinguishes between its allegorical dress and its spiritual content, and interprets it now as a test of His Messianic consciousness at the beginning of His career, now as a dramatic picture embodying crises in His later history (*e.g.*, Peter's attempt to turn Him aside from His chosen path of sacrifice), and now as an experience perfectly explicable when measured by the standards of modern psychology. This last tendency is best seen in the life of Jesus incorporated by Frenssen in his remarkable romance *Hilligenlei*. Here Jesus is represented in the days of His temptation as 'Cowering beneath a rock, a poor lonely man, torn by frightful doubts—a man in unbearable distress. . . . He was often in danger of betraying His Father in Heaven, and of going back to His village to take up His trade, but now as a man with a torn, distracted soul and with an inner life laid waste by an outraged conscience.'[2] It is needless to say that all this is the product of an untrammeled imagination. There is not a single point of support for this psychological construction in the Gospel Records.

[2] See *Hilligenlei*, p. 510.

Two or three circumstances enable us to-day to do greater justice to this story than has ever been possible before. In the first place, New Testament scholarship, having arrived approximately at the earliest sources of information about the life of Jesus, is disposed to trust them boldly and to see where they lead. In the second place, we cannot reject the story of the Temptation without rejecting much else, for it stands in organic connection with the Saviour's baptism and is not without influence upon His after career. In the third place, it finds points of support in the general moral and psychological verisimilitude of the situation.

The general fact of the Temptation is embedded in the two earliest sources (*Mark* and *Q*), and at the same point in the narrative. As to the second consideration, our sources, while differing in some details, agree in attributing to the Spirit of God the influence that leads Jesus from the Jordan into the wilderness. The Collection of Sayings records that Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil, and *Mark* still more realistically phrases it, 'And straightway the Spirit driveth Him forth into the wilderness.' Thus the tradition places the Temptation as the link of connection between His baptism and the opening of His ministry. The power of the Divine Spirit which He felt within Him at the baptism is the same power that now tears Him from human companionship and plunges Him into a solitude that is at once physical and spiritual. As to the third point, we can here recognize the deep psychological necessity of the situation. So necessary is it, that, as has been said, we should have had to assume some such trial of His new-found intuition even if it had not been recorded. At His baptism He hears the Divine voice calling Him, 'Thou art my Son, the Beloved, in Thee I am well pleased'; or, as the Western text of Proto-Luke and *Hebrews* i, 5 has it, 'Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten Thee.' But this knowledge was for Him not a cold-blooded dogmatic proposition, but a Divine Call accompanied by a Divine Anointing. Therefore it could not be merely a quiet, peaceful possession, but must contain within it an element of strain and uncertainty. With the call of His Heavenly Father there must have come into His soul, not only confidence, but

also deep questioning. His destiny is not only a task imposed upon Him by God; it is a riddle, the solution of which must have seemed to Him full of danger and difficulty. That Jesus, after the experience of His baptism, should wish to be alone in order to fight out the grave problems that now confronted Him, is in harmony with the experience of other great religious leaders. We may recall the mysterious struggles of Gotama with Mara, the Prince of the Air, who would tempt the great teacher to give up his vocation, to return to the pleasures of the world and to the love of wife and child. Or we may recall the days of prayer and spiritual conflict spent by Mohammed on Mt. Hera, where he was tempted more than once to commit suicide. Or, to quote a still more fitting illustration, we remember that Paul, after his great experience on the road to Damascus, conferred not with flesh and blood, but retired into the Desert of Arabia to come to terms with himself and with his new experience. Moreover, every great crisis in the Master's after-life involved trial or temptation. Not without significance is the remark preserved by Luke, 'Ye are they that have continued with me in my temptations.'[3] Luke and the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* conceive of our Lord's life as a curriculum of trial. His flight from Galilee, His resolve to die, His appearance in Jerusalem, His agony in the Garden—each of these experiences involved a special temptation. Is it not, then, most probable that a unique trial should have befallen Him at the commencement of His ministry? The general fact, then, of the Temptation is abundantly supported by the strongest historical and psychological considerations.

Let us now turn to the material in the Gospels bearing on our problem. The author of the Fourth Gospel, it is worth noting, has so framed his narrative as to exclude deliberately the story of the Temptation. The Wedding Feast at Cana of Galilee with its miraculous wine takes the place of the gloomy desert and the stones that were not made into bread. The writer of this Gospel, of course, knew the synoptic tradition. But his conception of our Lord as the Eternal Logos who tabernacled in human flesh made the notion of such a Being coming into primal conflict with Satan seem far from reality.

[3] Chapter xxii, 28.

The Synoptic reports, as has been said, ultimately rest upon the two sources, Mark and the Collection of Sayings. Mark dismisses the tremendous transaction in a few lines, 'And He was in the wilderness forty days, tempted of Satan; and He was with the wild beasts; and the angels were ministering unto Him.'[4] These words, as Harnack remarks, 'arouse suspicion that Mark here knew more than he has told us, for legend is not accustomed to work by a method so concise and elusive.' Wellhausen thinks that the story as given by Mark, who conceives of the Temptation as a general human and non-Messianic experience, is the germ out of which was developed later the legend of Matthew and Luke, a legend which has been developed along Messianic lines. Apart from the fact that the document of the Sayings of Jesus is regarded as being more primitive than the Marcan document, the symbolism of Mark's story refutes this theory. According to him, it is the Spirit which descended upon our Lord at the baptism that drives Him into the wilderness, where for forty days He is tempted by the Evil One, and where He is supported by angels' food. It is obvious that the writer of this story means us to see in it something special to Christ, therefore something relating to His special (that is, His Messianic) calling. A recent writer maintains that the obscure reference in *Mark*, 'He was with wild beasts,' formed the key to the entire narrative. He points out that in Persia there is an ancestral custom called the subjugation of the jinns. When one wishes to have special power over demons he retires to the desert for forty days, where he fasts, and then when the jinns or demons appear in the form of a lion, a tiger, and a dragon, he must hold his ground without fear. He concludes that the story of the Temptation, in its original form, was a description of the practice by means of which it was believed that man could acquire a power of controlling demons. It is a sufficient criticism of this theory to say that there is not the slightest evidence that a custom of such a kind prevailed among Palestinian Jews, and, further, that the Temptation is perfectly explicable through the facts of Christ's own life.

When we turn to the First and Third Gospels, it would

[4] Chapter i, 13.

seem that Matthew's narrative lies nearest the original text as it stood in the Collection of Sayings. For various reasons Luke corrects this text, as, for example, when he represents the Saviour's fast for forty days as an absolute one. 'And He did eat nothing in those days.' Evidently Luke here ignores the fact that 'fasting' had a technical meaning. John the Baptist 'fasted.' 'He came,' said Christ, 'neither eating nor drinking,' yet we know that he ate locusts and wild honey. We have reason to suspect that Luke's order of the temptations is wrong. He places the temptation on the high mountain, which is the crowning act of the drama, before the temptation on the pinnacle of the Temple. This compels him to excise 'Get thee hence, Satan,' where it properly occurs in Matthew's Gospel. We may, therefore, follow Matthew's order as most probably the correct one. Hence we have first, the temptation to turn stones into bread and so preserve the Messiah's life; second, the temptation to take a magical flight through the air to Jerusalem and hurl Himself from the pinnacle of the Temple, and so prove the reality of God's special care of the Messiah; third, the temptation to forswear allegiance to God and to give service to the Devil, in return for which he should gain Messianic sovereignty over all the kingdoms of the world. In connection with this last temptation, it is interesting to recall a tradition preserved in a fragment of the lost *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which runs: 'Jesus said, Then my Mother, the Holy Ghost, took me by one of my hairs and carried me to the great mountain of Tabor.' Here we seem to have a sound, historical reminiscence. The account of the Temptation is referred to by Jesus Himself, and it is narrated in the first person. Moreover, the high mountain, the name of which is unknown to the canonical writers, is identical with Tabor,[5] the lofty hill near Nazareth, some 1,800 feet above the sea level, from the summit of which Jesus must have gained his first impression of the greatness of the world.

What, it now remains to ask, is the inner significance of the story? The key to the problem lies in the double series of texts of the Old Testament which are suggested to the Saviour's

[5] The giving of names to persons and places unnamed in the Canonical Gospels is characteristic of the Apocryphal Gospels.

mind. Coming from the baptism in a state of powerful exaltation of soul, He is conscious that, on all sides, different lines of action seem open to Him for the realization of the Divine call. These different possibilities He regards as seductions, temptations of the Evil One. They are supported by the Divine words of the Old Testament, which must therefore, be opposed by words diviner still. In the first temptation the hard realities of His situation tempt Him to doubt the reality of the vision vouchsafed Him at His baptism. He needs daily bread, and yet daily bread is denied him by the exigencies of His Messianic calling. 'If Thou be the Son of God,' said the Tempter, 'command that these stones become bread.' But at once He rejects the thought by the nobler reflection that the Spirit is not given Him that He might serve Himself, and advance His material interests, without reference to God and to God's help, and He answers, 'It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone.' Therefore He will fulfil the duties of the Divine Call and not devote His divinely-given powers to the satisfying of His material needs.

The second act in the drama of the Temptation is in closest connection with the first—the Messiah appeals to faith in God as the constitutive principle of His life. Now it is this principle which the Tempter invites Him to put to the test. Can He really trust God to the very uttermost? Suppose, then, He should take a flight through the air supported on angels' wings, gain the top of the Temple, then let himself down to the abyss below, would not that be a great proof of His filial trust in God? Moreover, that such a test would have a favourable outcome is supported by the Word of God Himself. 'He shall give his angels charge concerning Thee, and in their hands they shall bear Thee up, lest haply Thou should dash Thy feet against a stone'; but the mind of Christ reveals its sanity and reverence in recognizing in this temptation a subtle provocation of the Most High. So far from such an act being an act of trust, He sees it to be an act of disobedience to the Divine order of the world, and He replies by another word of God: 'Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.' The Divine protection on which He, as God's Son, can specially reckon will be at His command only if He goes the way God Himself has ordained.

The third act in the drama follows naturally upon the preceding two. Even granted that the Son of Man must lead a life of poverty and obscurity, without a place to lay His head, exposed to manifold dangers, will His trust in God suffice to gain for Him the Messianic Kingdom? There was an ancient Messianic promise, 'Ask of Me and I will give Thee the heathen for Thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the world for Thy possession.' Can this vast kingdom, then, be built simply on the Messiah's trust in God? Must He not make compromise with the political aspirations of the Zealots? As the Messiah, may He not claim the fulfilment of the Divine promise and seize the kingdoms of the world by a revolutionary movement? We must remember that, however deeply convinced Jesus was of His Messiahship and of His being the herald of the Kingdom of God, it still remains true that He had no precedent by which He might be guided in the realization of His stupendous task. His mind is pre-occupied with the thought of the coming Kingdom, but how are the dull and spiritually insensate minds of His contemporaries to be won to a purely spiritual ideal? In order to gain them, must He not lower somewhat the rigorous demands of His lofty faith? He recognizes in this a suggestion of the Devil. Once and for all a revolutionary establishment of His Messianic power is set aside as incompatible with the work God has given Him to do. Not only because His weapons must be spiritual, but also because the Kingdom is the free gift of God, to be enjoyed when and as He wills. Words which the author of the Fourth Gospel ascribes to Him before Pilate testify to His conception of the nature of His Kingship, 'My Kingdom is not of this world.' To God and to His service He consecrates Himself. By faith in God the Divine Call to Messiahship shall be obeyed, and the Messiahship itself realized in strict obedience to the Divine Will.

WILLIAM BLAKE*

By the Rev. R. D. Richardson, M.A., B.Litt., author of *The Present Conflict of Ideals in the Church of England.*

LIKE certain other men of genius, William Blake was held by some to be mad, by others to be immoral. His views on religion were considered dangerous; also his views on politics. The truth is that he was an independent thinker, and therefore anathema to those determined not to change. His life, though singularly pure and good, was unconventional, and therefore shocking to the straight-laced and the commonplace. Of politics he was probably quite ignorant, but his insight into the foundations of religion was profound. He was both a mystic and a prophet: and not only so, but a poet and a painter.

Blake was born in London in the year 1757, the son of a hosier. When he was ten he began to study art in the Strand, and at the age of fourteen was apprenticed to an engraver. Engraving was thenceforward his business and means of livelihood, but though as a draughtsman and a designer his skill was masterly, his soul was elsewhere—in poetry, painting and religion.

He was subject to visions from very early childhood: he wrote his first poems when he was eleven, and exhibited in the Academy before he was twenty-three.

The next year, 1781, he fell in love with a certain Polly Wood; 'a lively little girl' is the way he describes her; but she rejected him. Whereon there followed an illness throughout which he was nursed by Catherine, the daughter of his landlord, a market-gardener named Bouchier. Catherine not only healed his bodily sickness but also mended his broken heart, so that he married her when he was twenty-five. She became a very skilful assistant at his trade, and cheered him till he died,

* A sermon preached in Birmingham Cathedral at the time of the Blake Centenary.

singing, at the age of seventy. Their long life together was otherwise one of almost unrelieved poverty, toil and neglect, though it must be confessed that it was partly Blake's own fault. He had the artist's contempt for mechanical processes, and preferred to starve rather than send his works to the printer. At one time we see him without food on his table: at another, buying a paint-brush with his last shilling. To-day his works command the highest prices.

They are what might be called illustrated engravings of his writings. Both poems and pictures were etched on copper by a process of his own invention, a few impressions taken off and each one delicately tinted in water-colour, so that every copy has an individuality of its own. The illustrations are astonishing conceptions, weird, looming, allegorical forms, 'framed,' as Pater says, 'in fretworks of wings and flames, strange interfusions of strength and sweetness.'

Turning to his writings, I should like to introduce them by four or five out of a large number of proverbs and paradoxes, all clever, some startling:

No bird soars too high if he soars with his own wings.

You never know what is enough unless you know what is more than enough.

The man who never changes his opinion is like standing water and breeds reptiles of the mind.

Truth can never be told so as to be understood and not believed.

I should suspect that I worshipped the Devil if I thanked my God for worldly things.

I never made friends but by spiritual gifts,
By severe contentions of friendship, and the burning fire of thought.

. . . the Worship of God is honouring His gifts
In other men, and loving the greatest men best. . . .

Let us pass to the poems. In one of the earliest he reveals the most beautiful side of his nature, that sweetness I have already mentioned which springs from the Spirit of Love. I choose this poem because it is said to have been written before he was fourteen. It tells how love restricts liberty:

How sweet I roam'd from field to field
And tasted all the summer's pride,
Till I the Prince of Love beheld
Who in the sunny beams did glide!

He shew'd me lilies for my hair
And blushing roses for my brow;
He led me through his gardens fair
Where all his golden pleasures grow.

With sweet May dews my wings were wet,
And Phoebus fired my vocal rage;
He caught me in his silken net,
And shut me in his golden cage.

He loves to sit and hear me sing,
Then, laughing, sports and plays with me;
Then stretches out my golden wing,
And mocks my loss of liberty.

To a similar theme he returns in one of the 'Songs of Experience,' written when he was thirty-seven. The first verse describes ideal love:

Love seeketh not itself to please,
Nor for itself hath any care,
But for another gives its ease,
And builds a heaven in hell's despair.

The last verse describes selfish love, which is more common:

Love seeketh only self to please,
To bind another to its delight;
Joys in another's loss of ease,
And builds a hell in heaven's despite.

This kind of contrast between what in his innocence he had thought life to be and what in experience it often actually is provides him with a number of themes. Thus there are two poems describing an annual service for charity children in St. Paul's Cathedral:

'Twas on a Holy Thursday, their innocent faces clean,
The children walking two and two, in red and blue and green,
Grey-headed beadles walk'd before, with wands as white as snow,
Till into the high dome of Paul's they like Thames waters flow.

O what a multitude they seem'd, these flowers of London town!
Seated in companies they sit, with radiance all their own.
The hum of multitudes was there, but multitudes of lambs,
Thousands of little boys and girls raising their innocent hands.

Now like a mighty wind they raise to heaven the voice of song,
Or like harmonious thunderings the seats of Heaven among.
Beneath them sit the aged men, wise guardians of the poor;
Then cherish pity, lest you turn an angel from your door.

That was the way in which the scene appealed to him at first, the way in which it would appeal to most of us. But Blake's exceeding sensitiveness to realities and his own experience of what poverty actually is led him to invest the same scene later with a very different significance. The verses are short, sharp, tragic, indignant:

Is this a holy thing to see
In a rich and fruitful land,
Babes reduced to misery
Fed with cold and usurous hand?

Is that trembling cry a song?
Can it be a song of joy?
And so many children poor?
It is a land of poverty!

And their sun does never shine,
And their fields are bleak and bare,
And their ways are filled with thorns:
It is eternal winter there.

These verses are not the jaundiced effusions of an unpractical idealist. One sentence alone, from 'Jerusalem,' reveals his shrewd practicability:

> He who would do good to another must do it in Minute Particulars. General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite and flatterer.

That reads like prophetic commentary on much modern idealism, in which sentiment and reform by talk have largely replaced individual action and achievement. The fact is that Blake saw to the heart of things and told plainly—or as plainly as he could—what he saw. He was quite incapable of the tactics and evasions which in one form or another render the religion of most of us a farce of insincerity.

I was angry with my friend:
I told my wrath, my wrath did end.
I was angry with my foe:
I told it not, my wrath did grow.

And he goes on to describe the tragedy eventually wrought by this pleasant-faced, smooth-tongued dislike, crying out in another place:

Thy friendship oft has made my heart to ache:
Do be my enemy—for friendship's sake.

Candour is no less necessary in the intellectual than in the moral sphere, which perhaps explains the strange poem about

the precocious child who could not understand how anything could be greater than Thought:

> The Priest sat by and heard the child,
> In trembling zeal he seiz'd his hair:
> He led him by his little coat,
> And all admired the priestly care.
>
> And standing on the altar high,
> 'Lo! what a fiend is here,' said he,
> 'One who sets reason up for judge
> Of our most holy Mystery.'
>
> The weeping child could not be heard,
> The weeping parents wept in vain;
> They stripp'd him to his little shirt
> And bound him in an iron chain;
>
> And burn'd him in a holy place,
> Where many had been burn'd before:
> The weeping parents wept in vain.
> Are such things done on Albion's shore?

What our poet opposed was conventional religion on the one hand and the infidelity of free-thinkers on the other. Against the former he objects its unloveliness, and its stultifying effect on human nature:

> As the caterpillar chooses the fairest leaves to lay her eggs on, so the priest lays his curse on the fairest joys.

In his day, the Church viewed askance, as of the Devil, all forms of art: likewise all intellectual pursuits so soon as they came into conflict with the accepted shibboleths. Blake is exasperated by the narrow, fearful, self-righteous religionists:

> Go! put off Holiness, and put on Intellect.

He has a healthy belief that what is true can very well look after itself, and that Christianity has no need of 'orthodox liars' to bolster it up. He himself, while rejecting many traditional beliefs, as for example the Virgin Birth, has no fundamental doubts.

> If the Sun and Moon should doubt,
> They'd immediately go out.

In this simple couplet he affirms his grand belief that religion is rooted and grounded in Nature, that it is all of a piece with the Universe.

His view of the spiritual life, after twenty years' severe mental conflict, is that it does not come through keeping rules:

neither is there any such thing as morality by the card. A man may keep the Ten Commandments and yet be neither virtuous nor a Christian. Blake cannot, in fact, understand the zeal of Churchpeople for the commandments, pointing out that Jesus Himself broke them, as, for example, when He set aside the Sabbath and refused to condemn the woman taken in adultery.

O Christians! Christians! Tell me why
You rear them on your altars high?

Virtue for him consists in having the Spirit of Jesus, and this he interprets as primarily a forgiving spirit. Thus, only those who practise continual forgiveness of sins towards each other can understand the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ.

And throughout all eternity
I forgive you, you forgive me.
As our dear Redeemer said:
This the Wine, and this the Bread.

And he prays very beautifully:

O Saviour, pour upon me Thy Spirit of meekness and love,
Annihilate the selfhood in me: be Thou all my life.

Against the infidelity of free-thinkers Blake makes an equally vigorous stand. They, indeed, are not afraid to use their reason, but they have an impoverished idea of what reason is. He mocks the confident insolence of their puny logic, likening them to a man who carried about a monkey for a show, and because he was a little wiser than the monkey grew vain. The reason which Blake exalts is reason in its most exalted mood; touched by insight, warmed with imagination, inspired by music, poetry and painting; reason grown courageous and prepared to believe the highest and best it can conceive: prepared also to *dis*believe all that is unworthy and not spiritually grand. He appeals to everything that is tenderest and noblest in human nature, and then says in effect: God is just like that: have courage to live your life accordingly: that will be the highest reason.

This is the basis on which the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation rests, and it has never received more beautiful or more rational expression than in the following poem:

To Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love,
All pray in their distress;
And to these virtues of delight
Return their thankfulness.

For Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
Is God, our Father dear;
For Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
Is man, His child and care.

For Mercy has a human heart,
Pity a human face,
And Love the human form divine,
And Peace the human dress.

Then every man, of every clime,
That prays in his distress,
Prays to the human form divine,
Love, Mercy, Pity, Peace.

And all must love the human form
In heathen, Turk or Jew;
Where Mercy, Love and Pity dwell
There God is dwelling too.

Is it not sad that the man who could write that should have been regarded as a madman and a blasphemer because of his eccentricities and determination to extinguish every lie? The fathers indeed kill the prophets and the children build their sepulchres—without, however, having learnt their lessons. Nothing is more needful for us to learn to-day than that the essence of the Christian character consists in a forgiving spirit allied to a cultured outlook. Blake still calls on us to make his dream of an England rejuvenated by such characters come true.

'England, awake, awake, awake.' 'Rouse up, O Young Men of the New Age! Set your foreheads against the ignorant hirelings! For we have hirelings in the Camp, the Court, and the University. . . . (Let us be) just and true to our own imaginations, those Worlds of Eternity in which we shall live for ever, in Jesus our Lord.'

Bring me my bow of burning gold!
Bring me my arrows of desire!
Bring me my spear! O clouds, unfold!
Bring me my chariot of fire!

I will not cease from mental fight,
Nor shall the sword sleep in my hand,
Till we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant land.

THE HANDICAP OF HEREDITY*

By the Rev. Canon BINDLEY, D.D., author of *The Œcumenical Documents of the Faith*, etc., etc.

SOME fresh presentation of Truth needs to be sought in view of the drastic change of our whole outlook on anthropology and soteriology which has been brought about by the general acceptance of the scientific theory of evolution, and the rejection of crude and unsatisfactory theories of the Atonement. Our formularies retain for the expression of truths exactly the same language in which they were couched in days when even Copernican, to say nothing of Newtonian and Darwinian, science was unknown. Can one wonder that the modern man holds aloof from teaching about sin which is out of all contact with modern thought and belief? If Pelagius had lived in these days, he would have received the generous consideration which has been accorded to Dr. Tennant. If Marcion had lived after Darwin instead of before him, some of his teaching would have been seen to be unnecessary, or most probably would not have been formulated at all.

The real question to-day is, not whether our beliefs are orthodox, but whether they are true. If they are true, and traditional expressions have to be altered in accordance with new visions of the truth, nothing will be lost. If they are not true, their falsity must be shown not by invoking the authority of the past, or by an appeal to the traditional belief of a thousand years, but by reasoned argument and the production of facts. For a thousand years, from Origen to Anselm, it was the general belief of Christendom that Christ's death was the ransom paid by God to the devil. For more than a thousand years this earth and its environment was believed to consist of three storeys, heaven above, the flat earth beneath, and under the earth some sort of hell. Hence we continue to say in our Creed, 'He descended into hell, He ascended into heaven.' For the most part, even orthodox thinking Christians have discarded the apparent implication of these phrases, and given them a more spiritual significance. But there remain other phrases, equally

*A paper read at the Waveney Valley Clerical Society, Redenhall, 13th December, 1927.

repugnant to the best Christian thought of to-day, which have not yet been re-interpreted.

The question which we ought to put to ourselves when fresh truths are revealed to us is not: How far do these ideas conflict with traditional beliefs? which is what most people do, but: If these fresh ideas are true, how can we best adjust the expression of our faith to the acceptance of them? If they are true, they cannot lead us away from Him Who is the Truth. And we clergy of all people ought to be the first to welcome and teach to our people whatever throws light upon the method of God's working, and so avoid the disgrace of having it thrown in our teeth that we accepted scientific truths ourselves, but withheld them from our people from fear of consequences. In every pulpit it should be made clear, whenever the subject is touched upon, that the pious speculations and cosmogonies recorded in Genesis are not to be interpreted by us prosaic Westerners as an inspired revelation of scientific facts. No boy or girl above the infant school should be left in ignorance of our knowledge. Nothing should be taught which must soon be unlearnt. The old taunt is still heard in the workshops, 'The Churches teach lies: they teach that the world was made in six days!' You may say: We do not teach it. But at any rate we do not contradict it; nor, so long as the fourth commandment is recited in our most solemn service, do I see how we are to contradict it. This is another instance of the need for a better selection or adaptation of our formularies.

I suppose I had better begin by trying to put the generally received form of belief about original sin into as succinct a shape as I can. It is held that all mankind are derived from an original pair, Adam and Eve. These sprang into existence, of full age, innocent, and completely righteous, by an immediate and direct creative act of God. They were disobedient to one absolute command of God, and transmitted to their descendants the *guilt* of that disobedience.

We notice in passing that there is not a word in the Genesis narrative which countenances this last deduction of the transmission of guilt to Adam's posterity; nor is there the slightest reference made to such a fact or belief in the whole of the Old Testament; yet it is generally taken for granted!

Now the modern lines of thought run, I fancy, something like this. Man is, so far, the highest development of a long, long line of animal ancestry dating back, it may be, to some millions of years. His physical frame can be traced back to whatever lowest form of living germ science can postulate, ascending through numerous stages to a mammal biped. And when the physical frame, with its natural instincts and inchoate reasoning faculties—brain and will—was sufficiently developed, the moral sense emerged, and finally a spiritual sense whereby he found himself to be akin to God Who had been guiding and ordering the whole of this evolutionary process all the time. The animal man become God-conscious. God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into him the breath of life; in other words, made him in His own Image, and gave him a share in His own immortality.

But the lower animal instincts of man's ancestry were not eradicated; and the moral struggle then began between what was intuitively felt to be the higher nature and what was recognized as the lower nature. This is always going on, and St. Paul describes it for all time as he found it in himself. 'The good that I would, I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do' (*Rom.* vii, 19). The heathen knew it equally: Listen to Ovid:

Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor (*Metam.* vii, 21).

and again:

Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata (*Am.* iii, 4, 17).

So too St. Paul's great Stoic contemporary Seneca asks, 'What is it which, while we are going one way drags us another, and impels us to that from which we are longing to recede?' (*Ep.* lii). And again, 'We shall always be obliged to pronounce the same sentence upon ourselves, that we are evil' (*de benefic* i, 10). 'These are vices of mankind and not of the times. No age has been free from fault' (*Ep.* xcvii). Even the Greek Epicurus (B.C. 300: quoted by Seneca *Ep.* xxviii, 9) felt something of it: 'The beginning of safety (he said) is in the recognition of fault' (*notitia peccati*). Or take the 'Teaching of Amen-em-ope,' the Egyptian sage of the sixteenth century before Christ, who taught that in the sight of God there is no man without sin. Say not 'I have no sin, and be not at pains to conceal it.' Failure, dis-

obedience to a higher vision, is universal. Everyone knows it—Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Jew, Christian. How to account for it? A weakness in the moral fibre? Yes, if you like: but not an inherited guilt. Each soul stands alone, passing from infancy with its unmoral neutrality to maturity with its moral responsibility. The story of the Fall was one of the theories invented to account for the universality of failure which could not be denied and was indeed patent everywhere. And the Eden story was really, according to the knowledge of the time, the most logical and plausible theory to account for the fact. Given a human race, multiplying daily, whence did it spring? Obviously from an original pair. Then only in that pair could there have originated a weakness which communicated itself to all their offspring. Nothing could be more rationally clear to the unscientific mind. But how late this theory was is seen from the utter absence of any knowledge of it in any Old Testament record till we come to the speculative ruminations of the Wisdom Books. The Fall is unrecognized, unheard of, unreferred to, in any canonical book of the Old Testament. But if the Eden story is aetiological or mythopoeic, written to account for observed facts, it must not be appealed to to establish a doctrine, as though it were true history. What I want to make clear is this—it is not the Genesis story that created the doctrine of Original Sin, but the patent fact of universal failure and frailty that suggested the Genesis story to account for it.

Yet what a sublimely grand story it is, with its transcendent insight and deep penetration into the recesses of the human heart and conscience. You see at once that it is an allegory, because it introduces us to an enchanted garden where there are wonder-working trees, and a talking serpent, and finally wondrous supernatural beings and a flaming sword. We know that knowledge does not grow on trees, that snakes do not talk, and that God does not walk in gardens in the cool of the day. Yet this allegory is one of the profoundest sermons on the deepest mysteries of human life, and shows us how sin enters into our own lives and has entered into the lives of all the human race. Each individual re-enacts the tragedy there depicted. When the moral faculties awaken in childhood, the voice of God speaks in the conscience. God says, 'Thou shalt not,' and our sense

of freedom says, 'I will': or God says, 'Thou shalt,' and we say, 'I will not.' And that constitutes the fall in the case of each human being. Nor is it an isolated act: it is constantly repeated, because there is a continuous struggle between good and evil. The forbidden thing looks pleasant and appears beautiful, and we think we should like to enlarge our experience by finding out what it is like. We do so; and then when the heat of temptation is past, we hear God speaking again 'in the cool of the day,' and we feel shame, and try to hide, and find out that by our own fault we have made our lives hard and painful as God never intended them to be.

If we are asked, 'Is the story true?' we can answer with profoundest conviction, 'It is indeed true, far truer than if it were a mere record of a single act of disobedience. It conveys a universal truth that strikes home to the heart and conscience of every human being.' But I should like to put in a caution here. When we are asked, 'Is a story true?' it is clear that there are many questions to which a simple Yes or No cannot be given. There are two kinds of truth: there is the truth of fact, which never appealed greatly to the Eastern mind, and there is the truth of edification, which did very strongly influence the religious Jew. Take our Lord's parables. Are they true? You see, it all depends upon what is meant by truth. They are not true as narratives of actual detailed occurrences, but they are true as vehicles for lessons of universal application.

Now when the historicity of the story about Adam and Eve and their fall has been given up, as it has been by most modern people, the belief in the consequences of their fall has still lingered, partly because it is very difficult to shake off the implications of our early childhood's teaching, and partly because St. Paul's description of the Christian scheme of salvation seems to demand it. I say 'seems to demand it,' and I will return to that presently. But I must say at once that if St. Paul's notions are proved to conflict with truth in a way that he could not have foreseen or apprehended at the time he was writing, then St. Paul's views must be rejected as mistaken in their *basis*, though not necessarily in their inward teaching, just as we now reject his views as to the imminence of, and indeed his whole conception of, Christ's Second Coming.

There were, however, other Jewish theories, besides the Eden story, framed to account for the universality of man's failure to avoid wrong-doing. *Genesis* vi, 1-4, refers the intrusion of evil into the human race to the intermixture of bad angels with the daughters of men. *Isaiah* xlv, 7, again, plainly ascribes evil as well as good to God as its author; though it is possible that in this passage 'evil' stands for national disaster, and not for moral evil. 'I form the light and create darkness: I make peace and create evil. I am the Lord Who doeth all these things.' *Sirach* (xv, 14), on the other hand, in true Sadducean and quasi-Pelagian fashion, places the responsibility for wrong-doing on man himself, because, when he was created, God left him in the power of his own natural disposition (*yetzer*). Yet this very *yetzer* was of God's creation, and if it had a natural bias towards what is wrong, that was of God's implanting. This was the rabbinic teaching in our Lord's time, and is still the recognized Jewish doctrine. The rabbis held that the Law was given as an all-sufficient antidote to this bias.

But none of these theories seems so satisfactory an account of sin as that which is suggested by the evolutionary theory. There we see man ever struggling and striving towards what is higher, under the direction of God's Spirit, both in the case of the noblest heathen of the past and, with the necessary help of His grace, in the case of those who have been admitted to the Christian covenant. I say emphatically 'with the *necessary* help of His grace,' because, whatever good there may be, both in Christian and heathen alike, must come from and be supplied by the One Source of all Good.

It was on this point that Pelagius went astray. He exaggerated the power of man's free-will and was inclined to deny the need for supernatural aid. He held that man possessed naturally a freedom of will and of action, and that he could, of his own power, if he willed it, turn and come to God. He insisted, and so far rightly, that if the will were not free, man was a mere puppet, and could not be held responsible. The key of his position was that, when a man sinned, he did so, not because of a taint of sin inherited from Adam, but in the same way that Adam sinned, by a failure to do right.

Now it is well to remember that Pelagianism was evoked by Augustinianism; and that, while Augustine is generally spoken of as the great opponent of Pelagius, in reality the positions were reversed. It was Pelagius who was first exasperated by Augustine's seeming denial that man had any real part of his own in the working out of his salvation. He objected to such a prayer as *Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis*, which appeared in Augustine's *Confessions* (x, 40). He deplored that laxity of conduct in ordinary Christians which excused itself under the shelter of the weakness of human nature, and he desired to quicken the sense of moral responsibility. These are historic facts. But there is no doubt that Augustine's predestinarianism was sharply accentuated in his conflict with Pelagianism, and, through his later follower, Calvin, riveted upon the greater part of Western Christendom a weight of moral, intellectual and spiritual misery that it has not yet shaken off. It is obvious that if everyone is eternally predestined either to life or to death hereafter, no atonement wrought by Christ can avail to add one single soul to the number of those that will be saved, nor is any moral effort needed; and such belief is bound to lead to laxity of life and conduct. Pelagius made a magnificent stand against this fatalism; and if he exaggerated the power of man's freewill, Augustine equally exaggerated the depravity of man's nature and the inscrutable capriciousness of the limited love of God. We remember that Pelagius was a Briton, and it has been said that something which admits in his religion a real sense of independence appeals to a Briton's native sturdiness and obstinacy of character. I agree. *O testimonium animae naturaliter Pelagianae!*

It is unfortunate that we have for the most part derived our norm of Christian dogmas from teachers who had gone through abnormal experiences, like St. Paul and Augustine, instead of normal exponents of it, like St. James and the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, and the writer of the *First Epistle of St. John*. Exceptional and one-sided expressions of truth have sometimes overlaid saner and more natural apprehensions of it.

But apart from his predestinarianism and his deplorable picture of man's utter depravity—the last deduced, no doubt, from his realization of the depth of sensual mire in which he

had himself sunk in his youth—the grave fault of Augustine's reasoning lay in arguing backwards from what he believed to take place in baptism, instead of arguing forward from facts which pointed to the necessity of that sacrament. His anti-Pelagian arguments were vitiated by the falsity of his major premiss, and most modern orthodox divines make the same mistake. They begin with a *petitio principii*. Thus—to put it in a syllogism—

> Baptism confers remission of sins:
> But infants have not committed actual sin:
> Therefore it must be original sin that is remitted in their case:
> Therefore all infants are conceived and born in sin, and are guilty.

Now the baptism of unconscious infants can no doubt be defended, but not on the ground of their inherited guilt. Guilty they cannot be, for guilt implies the conscious disobedience of a known law, or a refusal to acknowledge a moral obligation. Infants are neither moral nor immoral until the moral faculty has developed. They are neutral. The potentiality for good and for evil is there, just as the capacity for sight lies dormant in the eye of the embryo; but it has not come into use. The mistake has been made of transferring to the baptism of infants the language of the New Testament, which applies only to the baptism of adults. 'Original sin,' then, is seen to be a misnomer. It is not original; or, if original, it is not sin. It is not original in the sense that it dates from Adam; and it is not sin in the sense that it is guilt inhering in every infant born into the world. If that were true, no living man or woman would consent to be the agents of bringing a guilty child to birth: it would be the height of mad cruelty to do so. Nor can the guilt of sin attach to anything but the conscious will and choice. It is an illustration of the illogical statements of our Baptismal Office that, beginning by affirming that all 'are conceived and born in sin,' and need the remission of sins through the sacrament of Baptism, it goes on to speak of the innocence of unbaptized children, which it bids us to imitate: an incongruity only matched by that in the Marriage Service, which first states that matrimony was instituted in the time of man's innocency, and then affirms that it was ordained as a remedy against sin, when, taking as it does the Eden story as historical, there could not

have been any incentive to sin, since Adam and Eve were the only existing human beings! All this kind of false reasoning only shows into what pitfalls one slides if one takes allegory for history and myth for fact. Even the Yahwist writer of the earlier story of Creation in *Genesis* ii betrays his late date by the extraordinary anachronism of urging that a man must leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife, at the end of his story about Eve having been taken out of Adam's side, when on his own showing Adam had neither father nor mother to leave!

It is true that in the revised Baptismal Office there has been an attempt to bring the phraseology more into line with modern reason: for instance, the references to the Flood and to the passage of the Red Sea are omitted—but it has been a very half-hearted attempt. A great opportunity has been lost. We are still made to pray that the infant may 'receive remission of sin,' and speak of his 'being washed from sin.' What sin? we ask. Obviously birth sin is still in evidence, and, consistently with this retention of an implied inherited guilt, the words 'How He exhorteth all men to follow their innocency' have been expunged from the address on the Gospel.

Apart from this, it is clear that the evolutionary view of sin does not affect the desirability of infant baptism. It is the sacrament of initiation into the Christian Society and the means of effecting union with Christ.

I do not know anything more distressing than the opening words of our Baptismal Office. Here are parents overflowing with happiness in the possession of their child and in the rich joy of bringing him to be received by Christ, and the first thing one does is to assure them that their child is sinful and the offspring of sin, and has no chance of the Kingdom of Heaven until it is baptized. Indeed, most of our exhortations seem to me to be singularly ill-timed. Look at the opening address in the Marriage Service. That is not the moment to discourse upon the purposes of marriage or on the solemnity of the rite. The happy couple are there to be married, and it is insulting to suppose that they have not previously given all due consideration to the purposes and meaning of marriage. Even if they have not, nothing that is then said is likely to stop the marriage. Such teaching should be imparted at a time long preliminary to

the actual celebration of the rite. To return to the Baptismal Office. 'Forasmuch as all men are conceived and born in sin.' These words imply either that everyone is illegitimate, or that the human procreative act is sinful, notwithstanding that elsewhere God is represented as saying, 'Be fruitful and multiply.' Nor does the revised Office help us. It says that 'all men are from their birth prone to sin.' But they are equally prone to sin after their baptism; so that if that is meant to be a reason for baptism, it is futile. I would much rather that the Office began with some such words as these: 'Beloved, forasmuch as all men are made and created in the image of God, and seeing that God hath bestowed upon this infant the glorious gift of life to be used for His honour and praise and love, let us now dedicate this new life to His service and keeping, receiving him into the Body of Christ's Church, as God's own child by spiritual adoption, born anew by His Spirit.'

But I need not dwell upon this. I must touch upon the bearing of the Eden story on soteriology, as understood by St. Paul. There is no trace of his views in the Gospels, and even his own view is often very obscurely expressed, especially in the fifth chapter of the *Romans*, and it is discounted from the outset by his apparent acceptance of the literal historicity of the Eden story. His argument is that, as all mankind were summed up in the first Adam, so all mankind are summed up in the Second Adam. How, is not explained; nor is it to my mind explicable. The Son of God took our nature upon Him. Undoubtedly: but human nature does not exist by itself apart from individual persons. There is no such thing as human nature either in part or in whole which the Son of God could take to Himself in such wise as to justify the Pauline theory, 'If one died for all, then all died' (II *Cor.* v, 14). St. Paul's mysticism led him into statements which are beyond experiential verification by the ordinary consciousness. He held that by virtue of a believer's baptism everything that had happened to Christ had also happened to the one who was now 'in Him'—a death and a resurrection. If we have already died in Christ, we have already paid the supposedly demanded penalty: the whole atoning transaction has been concluded: we are no longer individually responsible. But that is absolutely contrary to fact. We *are*

responsible. We know that we are: we cannot get away from it. Then there must be some flaw in the Pauline reasoning.

But even if we grant *that*, the scheme of redemption is not disturbed. The purpose of the Incarnation was threefold. Firstly, to reveal what could be revealed to finite man of the nature and character of God—'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father' (*John* xiv, 9). Secondly, to give us an example that we should follow in His steps (I *Peter* ii, 21). Thirdly, to supply us with a new source of supernatural help through His Spirit, which is to be had for the asking. 'If *ye* know how to give good gifts to *your* children, how much more shall your Heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him.'

I think that the Scotist divines were right in holding that the Incarnation—the union of man with God—was implicit in the creation of man, and that it was not dependent on man's sin. Otherwise you get the paradox that sin brought about a more intimate union of God with man than would have existed without sin. '*O felix culpa!*' indeed. But deeper consideration rejects this.

St. Paul's argument involves two assumptions: first, that there was a first sin committed by an individual man; and, secondly, that all men are in some sense identified with that individual, apparently by actual descent from him, though this is not explicitly stated. 'Through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin,' so that 'in Adam all die.' We know now that death reigned in the universe synchronously with life from the beginning, and was in no way due to man's sin.

As a matter of fact, St. Paul's theories did not generally commend themselves to the theologians of the early Church. His distinctive ideas exercised an extraordinarily small influence. In the patristic literature of the Eastern Churches we find the doctrine of sin based upon the facts of religious experience which reveal a general consciousness of a congenital weakness in human nature. And in the West, Cyprian in the middle of the third century (*Epist.* 64) expressly denies that a newly-born infant has sin, but admits that by his descent from Adam he has 'contracted the contagion of the ancient death'—this latter statement of course depending on the mistaken belief that physical death came in as a consequence of sin. It was

not until Augustine that the Pauline doctrine was explicitly developed within a juristic framework characteristically shaped on the lines of Roman law. The very phrase 'original sin' (*originale peccatum*), which we use so glibly as though it were Biblical or inspired, was coined by Augustine (*Ad Simplicianum* i, 1), and was unknown till the fifth century. He was the first to insist not only on an inherited weakness, which is a patent fact and admitted by everyone, but also on a heritage of guilt and a burden of penalty to be paid. This, as I have said, may be traced largely to his own conscious experience. And there it may remain.

I should not like to bring this paper to a close without some mention of by far the most learned and exhaustive treatment of the subject in recent years by Dr. N. P. Williams, now Lady Margaret Professor at Oxford, in his Bampton Lectures of 1924, published in the year 1927. My own paper was written without any reference to his great work: indeed, I have only put together thoughts and lecture-notes which I have been gathering and using during the last thirty years. But Dr. Williams has shown, conclusively as I think, that the idea of 'original righteousness,' which is involved in the idea of 'original sin,' is quite unjustifiable, since there is no evidence that primitive man enjoyed vast gifts of intellect or of character or of spirituality. Dr. Williams maintains that the idea of original and transmitted guilt is unreasonable and immoral; and his sympathy is all with the Greek Fathers, who held that the first human beings were 'imperfect, undeveloped, and infantile' creatures, endowed with powers of self-consciousness and self-determination, which constituted a 'starting-point for progress and upward development.'

If there is a fear that new views will upset old beliefs, it behoves us to scrutinize on what foundations those old beliefs were based. We have to remember always that the force of Truth lies in its direction, not in its transient form, still less in its supposed finality. Truth is not a finished thing: it is progressively realized. Orthodoxy is not an unthinking and careless assent to articles of a creed, nor is it the meaningless repetition of outworn conventional shibboleths. It is right thinking; and if a new truth sometimes hurts, Truth has a wondrous power of healing the wounds that it makes.

SACRAMENTAL TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD

By the Rev. E. P. Boys-Smith, M.A., Rural Dean of Lyndhurst.

TWO things have made controversy active lately which centres round the Sacraments, mainly round that of the Lord's Supper, the one is the Deposited Book, passed after long labour by the Church to be vetoed by Parliament, and the other is an address by Bishop Barnes in Birmingham Parish Church on October 6th last. In the one, the most controversial points were the Liturgy and Reservation, both of which raised issues of sacramental truth and falsehood. In the other, the Bishop said frankly, 'To-day I propose to be controversial; I intend to discuss sacramental truth and falsehood'; and others who differed from him were not slow to take up the challenge. Now I want at the outset to emphasize the point that controversy on such a theme is not a misfortune to be deprecated; it may just as well be an advantage to be welcomed. Whether it is to prove injurious or beneficial depends entirely on the motives which underly it and the way in which it is carried on; it is our own fault if we make its effects bad instead of good. For questions which are living questions are always controversial; they cease to be so when interest no more centres in them and attention stagnates. That may be because the question is dead, and no longer of any value; or it may be because it is considered to be settled, and there is no prospect of further progress. But in either case the quest of truth is closed; and where truth is not concerned with some abstraction, nor with a bare matter of fact, but is bound up with mental, moral or spiritual life, Max Müller's saying ought never to be forgotten, that 'Truth is the property of God; the pursuit of truth is what belongs to man.' Religious truth cannot be collected, potted, and preserved; it is like the manna of old, which had to be gathered daily, and those who did not trouble to collect it daily, and thought to store it, found that it only served next day to breed corruption. So the times of controversy are always the times in which advance is made in the apprehension of truth, though it is sadly true that controversy

may waste truth instead of winning it. That depends on the motives and the mode of controversy. It presents an opportunity; and the conditions for turning the opportunity to good account are courtesy to opponents, sympathy for divers points of view, and eagerness for the truth itself and not for victory in one's own view. These conditions we may expect to find in the Churchmen's Union, so we need not hesitate here to make unreserved use of the opportunity which recent controversy gives us to clear our minds and to deepen our apprehension by frankly and reverently discussing sacramental truth and falsehood. We have all something to learn, and only good can result.

1. The first issue to raise is, What *are* sacraments? They are, of course, symbols; but the answer must be carried further. 'Life is full of sacraments great and small,' said Bishop Barnes, 'All of us have our sacraments—trivial little things sometimes that we do not speak of because others might mock, or fail to understand.' And the most extreme of the Bishop's opponents would agree with him cordially in this. There is the broad general basis on which every sacrament stands; the symbolism of life is inherent, and we can only attain the highest reaches of life by using the lower stages to stand on. But here we must note carefully a vital distinction between a symbol and an emblem. The difference is that an emblem is something which is used to suggest or represent something other than itself. A symbol is what, in being itself, and just because it is itself, implies more than itself only. It acts as a lens acts in light. A piece of plain glass may let light through, though not much if the glass be darkened; but a lens collects the light and focusses it to a point where it burns and glows with an intensity unusual. The lens remains, of course, a bit of glass, and it creates no light of its own, so that when there is no sunshine it does nothing; but when the sun's rays fall upon it they reach what lies at the focal point with a lustre and a power that would otherwise be unfelt.

The distinction I want to mark may be made clearer by taking two parallels. What is the difference between a simile and a metaphor? Both employ figures, and both relate to something further; but while the simile presents a resemblance only, the metaphor makes an identification. So a simile is the product of reflection, while the metaphor is the product of insight: there

is always something artificial about the one; the other is the purely natural way of picture-thinking, alike for primitive mankind, for children, and for poets. The simile is a verbal emblem, where one thing suggests another; the metaphor is a verbal symbol, where one thing only is mentioned and that one is found significant. Carry this on one step further. If you take a simile and expand it at length, what do you get? You get an allegory, in which one narrative is intended to call up another quite different from itself, but parallel, so that feature by feature a correspondence may be traced. But if you take a metaphor and expand it, you have a parable. There is only one story here; and it is complete as a story if you look no further. But it is a significant story, and the value of it does not lie in the story as such alone, but in the significance. And yet the significance is not expressed in any way whatever except by telling the story. Now an allegory, which only sets before you an analogy, is an emblem in speech; a parable, which sets before you an identification pictorially made in speech, is a spoken symbol. A sacrament is *not* an emblem, nor an acted allegory, but it *is* a symbol, a parable in deed instead of speech. There is the act itself, and it never is anything else than itself; but all the time it is a significant act, and the value and power of the sacrament lie in the significance, not in the mere act taken alone. The significance, however, is both brought home and expressed in and by the sacramental act, and there is no other means than this employed to convey or express it. The significance, if real, is the signification of a reality; and the apprehension of and contact with reality is the deepest thing in all life. If this were clearly and surely grasped by all, we might be quit of many of the misunderstandings and falsehoods found in sacramental beliefs and practices. The fundamental point is that the Christian sacraments are symbols, and nothing but symbols; but to say that is not to belittle them, for symbols may be some of the greatest things in life, the deepest things in thought, the most effective embodiments of truth. A man will rightly live and die for a symbol.

2. So we come to the second issue I would raise: What *are* the symbols in the Christian sacraments? For there are many kinds of symbols, some (as Bishop Barnes said) quite trivial or personal, some operative in human history on the grand scale.

What are the symbols which Christ selected and ordained? And here again we must draw a careful distinction. Some symbols are objects or things, others are actions or deeds; and sometimes the one passes into the other, or seems to do so to an inattentive or inaccurate mind. For example, a flag is often instanced as a symbol; and so it is, conveying all the significance of the people to whom it is dear. And of course a flag is a *thing*. But when a new territory is annexed by a country, or a fortress is captured which has been beseiged, it is not the flag, but the hoisting of the flag, that is the symbol of protection or capture. And that is an *action*, not a thing, though in the action the thing is used. Again, a marriage ring is quoted as a symbol, and fairly so, being a thing. But when a marriage is made it is not the ring which makes it, but, as the Marriage Service says, 'the giving and receiving of a ring.' That is an *action*, and one significant of that mutual consent openly given which is the foundation of marriage. Only a *deed* can express and convey the vital consent which makes the marriage; the ring would be nothing if it were not given and received in plain witness of the inward and invisible purpose of united life. When the King creates a knight, he strikes the man kneeling before him on the shoulder with a sword and bids him rise. He stands up a knight, though he was not when he knelt down. What is the symbol, then, in knighthood? Not the King's sword, nor yet the man's shoulder, but the blow constitutes the accolade. It is an action only, though the sword and the spoken word are accessories, no doubt.

In heathen mysteries and magic rites much use was made of symbols, but these were commonly symbolic *things*. The ear of corn in the mystery of Demeter, the candle blown out in sympathetic magic to bring about the death of an enemy, are instances. But where living experience is involved, symbolic *actions* are the natural expression. For life can only be expressed in life, and can only be drawn from life already there. A *thing* is lifeless, but an *action* implies an agent who is alive. And here the Christian sacraments stand out in contrast with most magical and heathen rites; in Christian sacraments the symbols are *actions*, not *things*. In Baptism it is not water which is the symbol, but bathing in water; in the Lord's Supper

it is not bread and wine which constitute the symbols, but eating the bread and drinking the wine.

That this is undoubtedly the case becomes all the clearer if heed be given to a few plain facts. Hebrew minds naturally concerned themselves mainly, not with abstract thought, but with what is *done*. Not ideas, not things, but deeds held the foremost place, as may be seen everywhere in the Old Testament. And so the Hebrew conception of God was based, not on what was conceived to be His inherent nature, but on what He does. 'God is to us Divine in saving acts,' says one of the psalmists, and in so saying he speaks for his race. In this Jesus was a Hebrew characteristically, and the revelation that He made of God was as a Father who loves His children and counts the very hairs of their heads. He watched His Father working daily, as He said, and found His joy in working with Him at the same task. And He made this revelation in the actual process of life; for it was the human life He led, rather than the teaching which He gave, that made His Gospel and bore witness to the Divine. When He chose out symbols, then, it was natural to Him, and natural to His disciples, who were all Hebrews with the same dynamic point of view, that He should fix on *actions*, not on *things*, as symbolic. And this the records plainly show He did. The one symbol was baptism, which does not mean water but bathing. And the command runs in the record, 'Go, make disciples, baptizing them, and teaching them to keep commandments.' It is action all through, both for the messengers and for those who should receive the message. The other symbol was eating and drinking in communion with Him. Look at any of the records, and you will find it apparent, if you read without prejudice, that all through the emphasis is on the verbs. 'Take, eat, drink; do this.' Even the phrase 'in remembrance,' where a noun is used, expresses action. And if it be asked *what* was to be eaten, drunk, and remembered, then the reply is, in the first place, just the bread and wine which lay to hand, not brought for the purpose; and secondly, on a deeper view, His body given, His life-blood of the new covenant shed, so that what was to be remembered was what He was doing in giving Himself in the supreme consecration of love. It is a false reading of the records to say that He

identified the bread with His body, or the cup with His blood. The language used did not express identity but symbolism. And the symbols were not the bread and wine, nor yet the body and blood, but the gift of His body, the outpouring of His blood, the very action by which self-sacrifice was being perfected, and consecration to the highest made complete.

If this were clearly seen and firmly held we should be spared most of the misunderstandings and disputes which have turned, and do still turn, what our Master meant to be a bond of communion into an occasion of division. And we should avoid all the superstitions which have grown up round this sacrament and clogged it with accretions wholly foreign to itself. For example, it would then be felt at once that such a doctrine as Transubstantiation is altogether beside the mark. That fixes attention on the material elements of bread and wine, and professes to say what they become by consecration. But this is really irrelevant and based on a fundamental misconception of the Lord's sacrament. The consecration He had in view is the consecration of Himself and of His servants in living union with Himself. His body and blood are mentioned as parts of the symbolism of sacrifice which was the great adventure on which His heart was set in the quest of eternal life, in which adventure He craved to have His disciples with Him, that where He was they might be also. There is nothing akin to magic here, but only stark spiritual reality. In just the same way the ambiguities of Reservation are all swept aside at once; for it is obvious that you *cannot* reserve an action, and the sacrament is that. If the action ceases, *in*action is what follows. To reserve the elements is not to reserve the sacrament at all, but merely things made use of in the sacramental action, and which may be made use of again if the symbolic action be renewed. But in that event they enter into the new action again just as they did into the former action when first employed, in no wise different from what they then were. The action of the sacrament need not, indeed, be limited to those persons who are physically gathered together in one place at the time; it might be extended to include also others who by reason of sickness or other hindrance could not attend, and to whom the celebrant would administer immediately after, when they had been expectant all the time, 'absent in body but present in spirit'

throughout. But as soon as anyone *desires* reservation of the sacrament superstition enters in, for he is setting his heart on contradictory terms; he is thinking of *things* reserved, and seeking the significant symbolism in them, instead of recognizing that the sacrament is a symbolic *deed* of the utmost significance, and that a deed cannot be reserved but must be either done or left undone.

3. To one more issue I must turn, and that as briefly as I can. At the outset of his address, which some so much resented, the Bishop of Birmingham said: 'Life is full of sacraments great and small'; and herein his most extreme opponents are in agreement with him. The sacramentalist who attempts to justify his sacramentalism always invokes the fact that the universe itself is sacramental, and life is full of sacraments of one kind or another. Now the issue which has to be faced is this: What is the relation of the Christian sacraments to these countless sacraments of nature? Is the relation between them one of affinity, or one of antithesis? If the sacramentalism of the creation is the basis on which Christian sacraments are founded, it is certain there can be no fundamental antithesis; the latter can only be particular—and of course supreme—instances of the general class of sacraments of which other instances of various value are met with everywhere. The relation must be one of affinity. This is most interestingly brought out and explained by Dr. A. N. Whitehead in a passage which I will quote from his *Religion in the Making* (chap. iv):

> 'Expression is the one fundamental sacrament; it is the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace. . . . In the process of forming a common expression of direct intuition, there is first a stage of primary expression into some medium of sense-experience which each individual contributes at first hand. No one can do this for another. It is the contribution of each to the knowledge of all. This primary expression mainly clothes itself in the media of action and words, but also partly of art. Their expressiveness to others arises from the fact that they are interpretable in terms of the intuitions of the recipients. Apart from such interpretation the modes of expression remain accidental unrationalized happenings of mere sense-experience; but with such interpretation the recipient extends his apprehension of the ordered universe by penetration into the inward nature of the originator of the expression. There is, then, a community of intuition by reason of the sacrament of expression proffered by one and received by the other. But the expressive sign is more than interpretable; it is creative; it elicits the intuition which it interprets. It cannot elicit what is not there.'

This is a piece of penetrating analysis which can be applied clause by clause to the sacraments ordained by Christ, and which are creative expressions of His own supreme spiritual intuition. As Whitehead says, 'There is very little really first-hand expression in the world'; and we may add there is none other on the same plane as that of the Lord Jesus where the profoundest intuition into the ultimate spiritual reality is concerned. The power and the function of the sacraments which He ordained is to 'extend our apprehension of God by penetration into the inward nature of Christ, and to elicit in us the intuition which was His own.' This is the same thing as saying, in the more familiar terms of religious language, 'to unite us with Him till Christ be formed in us, and it is no longer we that live but Christ living in us.' And that is the end of the Christian sacraments, which leaves nothing more to wish or hope for.

In all this you will observe the unbroken continuity of all sacraments, the least and the greatest, vast as is the interval between the smallest which are trivial, personal and commonplace, to the noblest which we have received from the Lord's hands alone. And it is beyond all question that Jesus Himself looked at all life and all nature so—as one continuous manifestation of the presence and activity of God, the sole Author of all life. That is what enabled Him to see in all sorts of common, everyday events parables of spiritual reality, parables being sacraments in speech. And that is what enabled Him to find the most cogent evidence that His Father and our Father is working even until now, and daily continuing creation, in such facts as the sun shining on both evil and good, and rain falling alike on just and unjust. To Jesus this was proof that God is Love: too many of us who lack His profound spiritual insight and experience find here evidence only of the reign of law in the natural world; and some even think to give a mechanical explanation of it. Now the sacramentalist commonly jibs when faced by this conclusion. He hankers after what is supernatural, and to secure it he cuts experience in two and sets in antithesis the natural and the supernatural. Then he disparages the one in order to exalt the other by contrast. One might have thought that as a Christian he would see how

alien is this point of view from the mind of Christ. But setting aside that consideration, important as it is, we ought to note how in doing this the sacramentalist undermines his own position. He is, in fact, in the situation of a man who sits on the branch of a tree in order to saw it off with more convenience. For he finds the basis of the Christian sacraments in the universally sacramental character of nature, and this is the proof he puts forward for believing that they have real spiritual power which is no illusion. But there is no force in this argument unless there be affinity between the sacraments of nature and those of the Church, *i.e.*, unless life be continuous throughout. Yet the sacramentalist severs life into the two divisions of the natural and supernatural and insists that the grace received in the sacraments of the Church is supernatural grace, and that is precisely why they are all-important, for only by supernatural means can supernatural grace be had with assurance. His impulse is therefore to distinguish as decisively as possible the Christian sacraments from all other means of grace, and to set them in antithesis to every kind of natural experience. In so doing he deprives them of their rational foundation, and finds himself hard put to it if he is to distinguish them from being magical rites. Thus in effect, though not at all with intention, he puts the sacraments of the Church into the same class as the pagan mysteries, and even the magic of the primitive savage, for these made the same supernatural claim; and he makes them incredible to enlightened minds.

Of course I do not say that he carries his conclusions to the logical length. He refuses to; but he does so at the expense of reason, and in consequence becomes unconvincing to anyone who is not like-minded; and he depraves the character of his own mind by harbouring in it inconsistencies which he is afraid to face and examine because he knows instinctively that he might find himself driven to accept consequences which he wants to avoid. That is an unwholesome state of mind which is irreconcilable with whole-hearted loyalty to truth. The Bishop of Birmingham knew this, and so set himself to lead or drive his hearers out of their untenable position. It is just the fact that he is unanswerable here that makes sacramentalists unite against him in a common hostility, and forces them to meet him, not by

quiet reasoning, but either by denunciation or by silence. But while the sacramentalist is in this unreasonable, he is not therefor irreligious. He knows by actual experience—his own, or that of others, probably both—that sacraments are really means of grace however that comes to be, and he rightly clings to this vital fact with awe and devotion. His error lies in supposing that means of grace to be really inspiring must be supernatural, and in his inability to trust the continuity of all creation as the expression of the unfailing operation of Divine Love. There has always been a tendency in the human mind to look for God in what is out of the common rather than in what is common and normal. Many have, for this reason, thought miracles the only signs of Divine action, or at least the chief evidences. Others feel driven to set the sacraments apart from all beside, before they can assure themselves that Divine grace can be found in them. Such minds crave for mystery even if it be nothing else than mistiness of thought and obscurantism. In some temperaments that tendency is very marked. But it is an infirmity, and it leads to error. The greatest souls are those which show least traces of it; and the strongest faith is that which sees God in all things so confidently that it needs nothing out of the normal to bear witness to His constant grace and work. When Linnaeus the botanist saw the gorse on Wimbledon Common in its May-time splendour, and fell on his knees where he was thanking God for showing him His glory, his was a stronger and a nobler faith than that of a man who can look unmoved upon such natural sights, such sacraments of nature, and can discover God only in a sacrament he thinks to be miraculous. No one ever found the whole world so alive with the grace and love of God as the Lord Jesus did. The most commonplace happenings were enough for Him to find His Father there; and one of His most characteristic sayings is the counsel, 'Look with wonder on what lies before you.' If we have faith enough in some degree to share His outlook, and faith enough to dare follow Him in His great adventure in the quest of life, we may find strength to be with Him in His self-consecration, and so discover in the sacrament He gave us a way to win life indeed.

LIBERAL CHRISTIANS IN PRAGUE

THE POSSIBILITIES OF A MODERNIST INTERNATIONAL.

By W. H. Drummond, D.D.

THE International Congress of Free Christians and other Religious Liberals, which was held at Prague on September 4—8, was an event of deep significance for all Modernists. Recent years have been a period of reaction and discouragement in many directions. Intellectual weariness, social unrest, and the emotional needs of a time of acute distress have made the path of the traditionalist in religion easier than that of the pioneer. The collapse of nineteenth century liberalism and the bankruptcy of criticism have been hailed with a shout of triumph. But all the time the leaven of freedom and toleration has been at work, and liberalism itself is emerging from the crucible of a testing experience, enriched in its content and enlarged in its outlook, with a new sense of its adequacy for men who demand that nothing in their religion shall conflict with international sympathy and the creed of brotherhood. In saying this we have in mind something much wider than the spiritual problems of a particular country or church. Spiritual forces know nothing of national frontiers. The Modernist in England or America, in Germany or France or Czechoslovakia, has to face questions which are peculiar to himself; he cannot ignore the limits set by history and race; but at bottom the problems he has to solve and the needs he has to satisfy are the same. He belongs to a world-wide spiritual fellowship. In his loneliest hours he is surrounded by an invisible company of helpers. It was this sense of solidarity, the glad conviction that in spite of all our separating differences we belong together, that made the Congress at Prague so stimulating. There were also quite special reasons for congratulation and rejoicing, due to the definite adhesion of the Czechoslovak Church to the Liberal Movement, as the sequel will show.

Many readers of the *Modern Churchman* will remember the series of Congresses which were held in the years before the war under the enthusiastic leadership of Dr. C. W. Wendte of America. They were among the first of the international meetings which have become so popular in many departments of thought and activity, and the published volumes of transactions, which are to be found in many English and continental libraries, have been an important factor in creating some sense of unity among the different national groups. There has never been any attempt to limit the membership of the Congress by any kind of definition. All have been welcome who were drawn to it by spiritual sympathy. Its name has even varied in different languages. The English title has been given already. In French it is 'Congrès international du Progrès réligieux'; in German, 'Weltkongress für freies Christentum und religiösen Fortschritt.' The culminating point of success was reached at the great Congress held in Berlin in 1910. At Paris in 1913 the clouds were gathering, and then for many years no meetings were possible. After the war the work had to be started again in a strangely different world. An encouraging beginning was made at Leiden in 1922, when a small but thoroughly international group assembled and many old friendships were renewed. Plans for a meeting in Germany in 1925 miscarried at the last moment owing to temporary political difficulties. It is accordingly to Prague that the credit must be given of receiving the first meeting of the Congress on anything approaching the large scale with which we were familiar before the war. As events proved, no place could have been more happily chosen.

About one hundred and sixty foreign delegates assembled from fourteen different countries, and this number could have been largely increased had it not been for the ever-present difficulty of finance. But the men and women who were there were an illustration of the extent and power of the liberal movement in religion on the positive side. The spirit of friendship was remarkable. There was not a jarring note during the proceedings. The interest was keen and never flagged. It had been arranged that the programme should be free from the familiar fault of overcrowding, and that the interests of the normal man should not be sacrificed to those of the expert. In the past the

subjects selected were often rather technical. Philosophical and biblical criticism claimed a large share of attention. But now the problems which face us as religious men and women are of a different order; and 'The contribution of Philosophy and Psychology to the spiritual interpretation of Life and the Idea of God,' 'Modern Religious Education,' 'Worship and its traditional forms in relation to Modern Needs,' and 'The Influence of Democratic Ideals and International Relationships upon the outlook of Religion' appeared as the chief subjects on the programme. In addition there was a series of brilliant lectures on John Huss; Comenius; Charles Wagner—a religious pioneer in modern France; and the History and Aims of the Czechoslovak Church. As might have been expected, there was a strong note of reality in the papers on Worship. The one by Prof. Kovár, on the development of the ritual of the Czechoslovak Church, covered unfamiliar ground. It called forth an impromptu address from Prof. Rudolf Otto which was one of the most moving utterances of the whole Congress.

Success of this kind would have been impossible in many places, where leading men might have held aloof and there would have been no sense of strong popular interest. In Prague we met in an atmosphere of eager religious vitality, among people who are thinking hard and feeling deeply and enthusiastically about religion. Most of the visitors were amazed at the large crowds which assembled at the meetings of a popular character and the tense silence with which they listened. Equally remarkable was the publicity given to the Congress by the daily and weekly press, including the leading Roman Catholic newspaper. Information has reached me from a reliable source that upwards of two hundred newspapers published reports of the proceedings or commented upon them. The public mind was deeply stirred. For some members, accustomed to the success with which orthodoxy practises the gentle art of ostracism on its liberal brethren, this sudden popularity was a little disconcerting. But the reason for it was quite simple. The Congress had the strong backing of two remarkable religious movements, which are the offspring of the long struggle of the Czech people for self-expression in politics and religion and of the new vitality which has come to a highly gifted race as a result of the

freedom and independence of the Czechoslovak Republic. It is significant that President Masaryk closes his recent book, *The Making of a State*, with these words: 'In our Democratic Republic, freedom of conscience and toleration must not merely be codified but realized in every domain of public life. . . . The Father of our Nation and our historical past alike enjoin upon us pure Christianity, the teaching of Jesus and His law of life. Democracy is the political form of the humane ideal.'

The two movements to which I refer are 'The Liberal Religious Fellowship,' under the inspiring leadership of Dr. Norbert Capek, and the Czechoslovak Church. In order to understand them some notice must be taken of the movement of liberation from which they spring. Up to the time of the dismemberment of Austria as a result of the war, the territory which is now included in the Czechoslovak state was, with the exception of small minority churches, solidly Roman Catholic. Hapsburg rule meant Roman obedience. But large numbers of people, especially in Bohemia and Moravia, never wore their chains willingly. The memory of John Hus and the struggles of the Hussite wars, and of the later movement of the Moravian Brethren, still stirred in their hearts. Freedom and Brotherhood were the watchwords of suppressed national feeling. When the power of Austria crumbled, the people claimed the right to self-determination in religion as in other things. The Roman Catholic Church, so long the symbol of political servitude, had to relax its hold, and upwards of two million people have formally seceded since the proclamation of the Republic in 1918. What has happened to them from a religious point of view? The attraction of orthodox Protestantism has proved to be very slight. The Reformation inheritance of dogma and ritual makes very little appeal to the modern man when he has no traditional leanings in its direction and is free to choose. It is estimated that only about seventy thousand of the seceders have been absorbed into various Protestant denominations. Others among them, especially in a city like Prague, have swung away to the left and are now without any formal church connection. It is chiefly among these people that Dr. Norbert Capek finds his opportunity. To thousands of them he has given a spiritual interpretation of life and a new moral dynamic. With extra-

ordinary gifts of speech and a magnetic personality, he draws crowds to listen to him wherever he appears. He has been at work for only five years, but already the Liberal Religious Fellowship is a well-organized group which is growing steadily in strength. Its bookshop in Prague, which has been established with the help of Unitarians in England and America, is a revelation of intellectual vitality as new books and pamphlets and translations pour continually from the press; while its services are notable alike for the atmosphere of eager listening and for the new hymnody, largely the creation of Dr. Capek himself, in which a confident joyousness has taken the place of the sentimentalism and the familiar minor key of the past. At present everything in this movement depends upon its leader, as it draws comparatively little from the traditional sources of power; but if that is a weakness it is one which it shares with many another adventure of the spirit which has blossomed later into brilliant success.

Nearly fifty per cent. of the seceders from Rome have found a new spiritual home in the Czechoslovak Church, whose rapid growth into well-organized life is one of the most remarkable events in modern religious history. It is time that there should be accurate knowledge of its origin and aims, especially among Modernists in all lands. Official information was given to the Congress on these matters in two papers, the first by Bishop Prochaska on the history and spiritual outlook of the Church. the second by Professor Kovár, the Dean of the Theological Faculty, on its forms of worship and the development of its liturgical order. From these a short account of the Church may be drawn up, chiefly in the words of these two representative men. It owes its origin in 1920 to a small group of priests who began to say Mass in the common tongue and to introduce modifications of their own into the Roman order. Such liberty could not of course be allowed, and they were excommunicated. Under the leadership of Dr. Fársky, a man of wide sympathies and fine personal gifts, and backed by a large volume of popular enthusiasm, they decided to organize a Catholic Church on modern lines. Time has sifted out the men who were heart and soul in the movement from those who were only temporary adherents. There was a crisis over the question of orders, but it

became clear that more important things might be sacrificed to the desire to preserve apostolical succession, and Dr. Fársky himself was appointed by popular vote to be chief bishop of the Church. Another crisis arose over the theological orientation of the Church. Dr. Fársky was an avowed liberal who had cut himself loose from many of the dogmas of a pre-scientific age and valued sincerity in thinking as a condition of religious progress. Others in the more backward parts of the country were more inclined to adhere to the traditional and the familiar. The inevitable clash occurred; but again Dr. Fársky triumphed and the Church took its place definitely on the side of a liberal and progressive Christianity, confessing that even the venerable Catholic creeds can no longer be binding on the Christian mind and conscience in the modern world. The present situation had better be described in the words of Bishop Prochaska himself:

> 'The Czech felt and noticed the difference between the teachings of Jesus, as they were presented to and prescribed for him by the Roman Catholic Church, and the modern world view. He tried to reconcile this world view of his with the New Testament, critically examined, in such a way that he would be false neither to God nor to himself. He tries to belong to Jesus, but to that Jesus who is free from all prejudices of race and environment, who belongs to all humanity, and is the religion of truth, goodness, mercy and infinite love. He wishes, in the spirit of the great reformer, John Hus, to seek truth with his reason, to recognize truth, and then to defend it always and at all costs, on the principle 'truth above obedience, conscience before legal commands.' And in this spirit the aim of the Czechoslovak Church is to bring its members to lead a life of truth, goodness and immortality . . . The Bible we do not accept dogmatically as utterly faultless, but critically, so that we come to its reading and exposition in the light of reason and with experience and the achievements of science. We do not believe in the secret power and effectiveness of any act of consecration, nor do we believe that faith can operate beyond and in opposition to the laws of nature. As we do not accept the doctrine of original sin, we express by baptism the effort of the Church, with the help of the child, to do away with the sins of the fathers through the education of the children. Confirmation is a promise of loyalty to the Church, a promise of moral behaviour and of discipline. Holy Communion is to us a reminder of the Last Supper. We do not believe in transubstantiation. Joining the Church means to us a fellowship with Christ and the living presence of God and Jesus Christ in our soul.
>
> 'Atonement is to us a return from sin to God. The priest has no power to forgive sins—his duty is only to move men to seek the good, and to make their way easier. Indulgences we do not recognize. We do not give extreme unction to the sick. We give them the communion and words of comfort on their way into eternity.

'In the ordination of priests we instal qualified persons in their spiritual office, but we do not raise them thereby to a special, chosen station above other believers. Therefore our ceremony of ordination, which is done by the bishop and priests and laity by laying on of hands, is a symbol of ecclesiastical legal validity. Likewise the ordination of a bishop is only the accrediting of a priest for a superintendent's position in the Church . . .

'We believe in the Holy Spirit, which animates everything, manifested itself particularly in Jesus Christ, spoke to us through the prophets and our fathers and wishes to reign in us . . . We believe that the Heavenly Father created us in order that we, having the Holy Spirit within us, should be happy, should lead a life of truth, should not fear to defend the truth of God, and thus should surely attain eternal life. And this is possible if we only live in truth a life of goodness. Therefore the Church demands from its adherents in all their actions that they should unconditionally keep the moral laws of Christ. Therefore the Church lays the greatest emphasis on practice, that its members may be "doers of the word and not hearers only."'

Bishop Prochaska closes his illuminating exposition by emphasizing the fact that all the elements of the church service are intended, not to propitiate God, but 'to so perfect man in reason and morality that he may become, in the sense of Christ's great teaching of love, the brother of all things animate and inanimate here on earth.' 'The church should devote particular attention to suffering in the social field. . . . The religion of the modern man is a religion of love and service.'

It is impossible in the present article to attempt even a short sketch of the liturgical work which has been undertaken by the Czechoslovak Church and the development of its ritual. The central act of worship, as is natural to men who have no wish to cut themselves entirely adrift from their own past, has developed from the Roman Mass. It is a ritual of the altar, freed from its sacerdotal elements, but still rich in symbolism and poetry and imaginative appeal. The minister stands facing the people behind the altar, which is adorned with flowers and lighted candles. He wears a black gown with the Hussite chalice in crimson velvet on the breast and a white stole. The whole of the liturgy is congregational. The minister is simply the leader of the people in a common act of worship. Some delegates were rather bewildered by the great service which was held in St. Nicholas Church on the opening day of the Congress, and some Protestant heads were shaken a little doubtfully. But others came away deeply impressed, feeling the beauty and appeal of a ritual which combines modern thinking with rhythmic move-

ment and dramatic moments, elements in which traditional Protestant worship is often so sorely lacking. There is, however, nothing static either in the doctrine or the ritual of the Czechoslovak Church. The most arresting thing about it is that it is alive, and therefore everything is in movement with the exception of its central loyalties and affections. 'This is our liturgy to-day,' Professor Kovár said to me, 'but it may be different next year, for already we see that it contains elements which need revision; you must not regard it as finished; it is still being made.'

It was the most earnest desire of Dr. Fársky that the International Congress of Free Christians and other Religious Liberals should be held in Prague. From the time when the project was first mooted two years ago he threw himself heartily into it, and he was able to join in the official invitation. He saw in the Congress the opportunity, for which he had been waiting, to remove many misunderstandings and to proclaim to the world the true character of the Church which he had led forth into freedom. Never again should it be possible to repeat the ignorant gibe that it was merely Romanism without the Pope. To our grievous loss he was struck down with illness, and he died last June, leaving as his legacy to his Church the wish that at all costs it should be faithful to the liberty in which it had been cradled. So far as the Congress is concerned his prayer has been fulfilled, for if one thing may be counted as a notable achievement of the meeting in Prague, it is this, that the Czechoslovak Church now stands before the world as a church which refuses to be bound by the dogmatic trammels of the past. It belongs to the company of Modernists, or Liberal Christians, or any other name by which the sons of spiritual freedom may be called. Nor has it taken this step with a trace of the doubt or misgiving which has often crippled liberal movements in the past. Its leaders have expressed their gratitude in moving terms for the opportunity which was offered them, and now it faces the future with splendid confidence in the service which it can render to its own people and to the wider fellowship in which it has found its place.

In conclusion, there is one matter which requires special emphasis. The Congress at Prague was a much greater success

than its promoters even in their most sanguine mood dared to hope. It is impossible to belittle it when it brought a church of nearly one million souls into union with the liberal movement. For many reasons, however, it was not as large as it ought to have been either in numbers or in representation. It was merely a sample of a world-wide movement, and the next meeting ought to be on larger and more inclusive lines. But I think it may be fairly claimed for it that it has demonstrated the need and the possibility of a Modernist International. I will venture to express the hope that many readers of the *Modern Churchman* will give their support to such a project and will help forward the creation of a Modernist International without delay. It will require organization; it will require money; and above all it will require large sympathies and strong faith. Writing as a close observer of religious conditions in many lands I will only add, the need is great and the time is ripe.

BOOK REVIEWS

A GREAT JEWISH COMMENTARY.*

Dr. Montefiore is much to be congratulated on the Second Edition of his Commentary, which comes out most appropriately in the year that Oxford, his old University, has given him a well-deserved Honorary Doctorate. In certain respects it is a unique book. There have been many Commentaries on the Gospels in general, or the Synoptic Gospels in particular, but they have nearly all been written by Christians, orthodox or heterodox. In late years also there have been Jewish books on Jesus and on the Gospels, some of them of considerable interest, but these have been almost all of them written by persons who have come to the study of the Gospel as a sort of afterthought. Such books are not comparable with the work of well-trained Christian scholars, though valuable in showing how strange certain things in the Gospel really are, which to us Christians are so familiar that we do not notice their strangeness. But Dr. Montefiore is an old student of the Gospel. He is honourably associated, ever since his Hibbert Lectures, published in 1892, with a polemic against the misrepresentations of Jewish piety in general and 'Pharisaic' piety in particular, that are so often to be found in works on the Gospels by scholars who, though unorthodox in most other things, are only too true to the Christian tradition that the Jewish religion is a tiresome and uninspiring servitude.

What, then, is there that we have to learn from Dr. Montefiore? What has he to tell us from his peculiar point of view?

> 'This "peculiar point of view,"' as he says in his Preface (p. ix), 'is that of a Liberal Jew, who has not found his profound attachment to Liberal Judaism inconsistent either with a high appreciation of the

**The Synoptic Gospels.* Edited with an Introduction and a Commentary by C. G. Montefiore. (2 Vols. Second Edition, 1927. Price 30/- net.)

lives and the teachings of many of the ancient Rabbis on the one hand, or with a similar high appreciation of the character and teaching of Jesus upon the other . . . It is the point of view, as I hope, of reverence and freedom. And it is this combination of reverence and freedom which I owe to, and have learnt from, Liberal Judaism.'

I fancy I shall best meet the requirements of readers of the *Modern Churchman* if I show the character of Dr. Montefiore's book mainly by quotations.

On Mark :

'So far as we know, and, even more, so far as we may justly surmise, Mark is not only the oldest Gospel, but the first Gospel. There were sources behind him, even written sources, but no continuous Gospel, no continuous account of the ministry of Jesus, even in the baldest form, from the beginning to the end. If that be so (like every other statement about the Gospels and their hero it is disputed), Mark, even though he be only a collector and editor of "sources," was yet one of the great originators in religious literature—perhaps, one might even say, in biographical and historical literature. Though only a collector and an editor, he was a genius : he was, at any rate, most happily inspired' (Vol. I, p. xxvii).

And he adds, a little later, that the mere course of events, or the geographical course of the wanderings of Jesus, does not greatly concern him :

'The growth of his "Messianic" consciousness, on the other hand, the meaning *for him* of the terms Son of Man and Messiah, if he used the one and laid claim to the other, above all, the true nature of the disputes between himself and the Rabbis, and the measure of "rightness" on either side—these are questions which touch the scope and object of my work much more nearly' (I, p. xxxiv).[1]

From the Introduction we go on to the Commentary itself, though in passing I must refer readers to an admirable quotation from Renan on p. lxxxiii about the characteristics of Matthew. And the following is an observation of curious application :

'When everybody strictly observes the Sabbath, and when nobody eats milk and meat together, the fulfilment of such ceremonial enactments gives no distinction. They have almost become customs of propriety, the neglect of which would indeed be outrageous, but the observance of which is nothing to boast of. Distinctions, differences and "merits" had once more to be concentrated on the moral laws, which, by the very constitution of human nature, are by some obeyed well, by others feebly, and by yet others transgressed. But in the days of Jesus the domination of the ceremonial Law, as interpreted by the Rabbis, was not yet . . . coterminous with the whole population' (I, p. cxi).

On the original Galilean teaching :

'Though the more original and beautiful parts of the teaching of Jesus are, as it were, set in the framework of the conception of the coming Messianic era, and were partly produced by this dominant idea, they are yet independent of the framework, and they can be detached from it and can survive it . . . There is a good deal in his

[1] It is right here to notice Montefiore's judgment on Bultmann : while characterizing his scepticism on certain matters as 'much overdone' he considers it 'very improbable that his work will leave things as they were and remain without influence and effect' (I, p. lvii).

finest religious and ethical teaching which can survive such conceptions and be easily detached from them. For example, the "inwardness" of his teaching, his spiritualization, or screwing up the standard, of human righteousness and human religion; his estimate of ceremonial observances and ritual uncleanness; his heroic paradoxes concerning the love of one's enemies; his looking at morality and religion in the light of a few great illuminating and unifying principles, such as the love of God and the love of man; his doctrine of a needful childlike attitude of mind; his doctrine of faith; his attack upon certain aspects of the doctrine of proportionate retribution and reward; his insistence upon eager service, upon lowliness in service, and upon the nature of true greatness or superiority; his doctrine of actively seeking out the sinner and the outcast in order to redeem them; his doctrine of self-sacrifice. Here are large and important teachings, either quite independent of, or easily detachable from, any eschatological opinions' (p. 25*f.*).

Christian praise in this manner sounds presumptuous, but there is a real interest in hearing it from a learned Jew, who really does feel the difference of accent between Jewish and Christian ethic.

This again is interesting as coming from Dr. Montefiore, not from any of the learned works he quotes so much and so well:

'It seems most probable that for both the historic Jesus and the Jesus of Mark the Kingdom had nearly always, at bottom, its eschatological signification. It is the Messianic Kingdom of the near future. In Matthew the Kingdom in the sense of the Church as already existent, the fellowship of believers, comes also to the fore. How far it is ever a "process" or an "inward spiritual fact" is very much more doubtful' (I, p. 27).

Again:

'The main connotation of "authority" to the Evangelist seems to be that of inspiration. Jesus seemed to be possessed, or fired, by the spirit of God. . . . He does seem to have put his own personality more into the forefront than did the prophets. And this personality of his, this personal note, seemed both to claim and to possess authority' (I, p. 33).

On the Cleansing of the Temple, after quoting some views of other scholars, Montefiore remarks on xi 16:

'Mark only. Not to permit anyone to carry a vessel through the Temple shows Jesus in an unexpected light. If a Rabbi were so particular, the German theologians would call it externalism. When an external act shows a lack of reverence for the House of God, Jesus is rightly keen to condemn it' (I, p. 269).

On *Mark* xii 26:

'The proof of the resurrection is of the usual fanciful kind when proofs from Scripture are attempted. As God is (as *all* admit) the God of the living, and not of the dead, and as He calls Himself to Moses the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (who had died long ago), these patriarchs must still live; and this again can only mean that they will "rise" or "have risen." Is it assumed that they are now in "heaven"? Or are they only potentially alive, while at the resurrection they will live fully once more? The idea apparently is that the dead are waiting for the resurrection, not asleep, but with full con-

sciousness, whether of pleasure or pain. But only the righteous dead are thought of, or referred to, in this passage' (I, p. 283).[2]

On the parallel in *Luke* xx 38 (all live to Him), Montefiore very appropriately quotes 4 *Maccabees* vii 19, xvi 25, where it says that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob 'live to God' (II, p. 574)—another link, we may remark in passing, between Luke and Josephus!

On *Mark* xiv 41, Montefiore has a good word for de Zwaan's interesting explanation of ἀπέχει, usually translated 'It is enough,' but (so it seems) without sufficient evidence. De Zwaan suggests that it has the meaning, often attested in papyri, of acknowledgement of money paid, so that it means here: 'Do you still sleep? Judas is taking his bribe!' (I, 345). Montefiore's verdict about the trial of Jesus is:

> 'If the whole so-called trial was not a real trial at all, but only a preliminary examination, a setting up of an indictment, then the various irregularities and illegalities are of much less significance' (I, p. 353).

It is one of the special merits of Dr. Montefiore's Commentary that he bases his exposition on Mark. That is indeed now generally done, but Montefiore is the only Jewish work (I think) that does so. His first volume contains his Introduction and a full Commentary on Mark, the second volume is occupied with Matthew and Luke.

There is a long discussion of *Matt.* xi 25—30 (II, pp. 168—187). The most significant passages, perhaps, are these:

> 'If these verses could be proved to have been spoken by the historic Jesus, dogmatic Christianity would receive a great encouragement and justification. Not that Jews would be any the more inclined to become Christians. For if Jesus said 26 and 27, we do not think the better of him, but the worse. From our point of view, who are anxious to make of Jesus a great Jewish teacher, we should be, perhaps, almost as desirous to prove the spuriousness of 26, 27, as many Christians are to prove the authenticity' (p. 169).

He ends thus:

> '"Verses 28—30 are intimately connected with 25—27 and form an integral part of the whole. The adaptations of Sirach[3] go through each portion, and the intended contrast. But no part of the passage is authentic. Both by its content and by the fact that the passage is the product of *literarische Arbeit* it could not have been said by Jesus." Thus Meyer,' says Montefiore, 'and I think rightly. I should imagine that the voices who plead for authenticity will become feebler and feebler, and those who still utter them of less and less importance' (p. 186).

It is impossible to open a page of Dr. Montefiore's Commentary without finding an apt quotation or a shrewd and arresting remark of his own. I must end this *catena* with an interesting quotation made by Montefiore from Loisy on *Lk.* xii 4, 5:

> 'The small differences here between Matthew (x 28) and Luke are nevertheless worth noting, for they have a real theological interest. They are thus drawn out by Loisy (*Ev. Syn.* I, p. 888): "Instead of saying that men cannot kill the soul, he says that men can do no more than kill the body; instead of saying that God can destroy both body

[2] On this page, I, 283, there is actually a misprint! The last word of the first paragraph should be Tarphon, not Tarphen.

[3] Sirach, li 1, 23-27, iii 17-20, vi 28.

and soul in hell, he says that God has power not only to kill, but to throw into hell. One is greatly tempted to think that Luke revised the formulas in view of an anthropology and an eschatology different from those of his source. He did not wish to say that the dead man, before the Resurrection, was a soul without a body, and above all he did not wish to suggest that sinners will not be thrown into hell before the last Judgment; the individual, who must not be pictured as a shade which sleeps till the Resurrection, can be thrown into hell as soon as he leaves this world. The same conception of what awaits men beyond the tomb will be met again in the parable of Lazarus and in the promise of Jesus to the good thief'' ' (II, p. 486 *f.*).

I venture to think that the extracts I have here given will give some impression of the varied and unconventional contents of this Commentary. It is just because the writer is a Jew, and therefore not bound by the traditional loyalties and conventionalities of Christian commentators that it is so fresh and stimulating. It *is* necessary to stand away at a little distance before one can see the effect of a picture, and for us Christians there is always the danger of accepting familiar words just because they are familiar. Dr. Montefiore writes in the first place for his co-religionists, but Christians who read to weigh and consider, as Bacon counsels men to do, will find very much to learn from him.

F. C. Burkitt.

DIVORCE AND THE ROMAN DOGMA OF NULLITY.*

No student of the Christian aspect of marriage and its corollaries can afford to neglect this small but important booklet. It is an expansion and extension of an earlier study of 1921 ('Teaching of N.T. on Divorce') to which Archdeacon Charles was moved by recent decisions of the Roman Curia in two nullity cases.

Half of this work is concerned with the utterances of Jesus as given in the Synoptic Gospels. As in his previous essay, the author sets forth, as background, the controversy, which existed at the time of Christ, between the schools of Hillel and Shammai, as to the causes for which a man might put away his wife; the former holding that the Deuteronomic code (xxiv. 1, 2) gives the husband wide discretion as to the grounds of divorce ('some unseemly thing'), the latter holding that unchastity was the only ground intended. It seems, therefore, probable that our Lord was asked to decide between the rival schools, and that the answer of Jesus was in favour of the stricter view. The custom of the day favoured the laxer view; but both parties agreed that adultery by the woman not only allowed, but demanded, divorce. As Dr. Charles says, it is illogical to say that, if a man puts away his wife *for adultery*, that he causes her to commit adultery. Dr. Charles considers that Jesus taught that nothing entitles a man to divorce his wife except such conduct as constitutes a final breach of the spiritual tie.

As regards this general conclusion, I feel pretty clear that it is right; yet I find myself unconvinced by the particular critical arguments which he adduces. He definitely rejects the Marcan statement as patently incorrect, and accepts the Matthean as accurate. He holds that the Marcan statement teaches the technical indissolubility of marriage, which has been followed by the Western Church, while Matthew teaches its dissolubility for adultery, as in the Eastern.

**Divorce and the Roman Dogma of Nullity.* By Ven. R. H. Charles, D.D. (T. & T. Clarke. 1927. 1/6 net.)

This dismissal of the Marcan tradition in favour of a purely Matthean, seems a bold step at the present day, particularly when Matthew, in his main passage of some nine verses, follows the Marcan text very closely—with the exception of two interpolations, doubtless intended as explanatory ('For every cause?' and 'Save for fornication'). It is, of course, quite likely that the explanatory clauses, specially the 'For every cause,' are correct glosses; but apart from these two clauses it is not easy to see wherein lies the essential difference between the accounts of Matthew and Mark. It is true that the isolated verse in Luke agrees closely with Mt. v, 32, but this seems to create no presumption that Q. supports Mt. against Mk. It is true also that the text of Mk. mentions the case of a woman divorcing her husband, which could not refer to Jews of that time; but the text of this sentence is not beyond cavil; and, if it be correct, it seems little more than an adjustment of the (possibly) earlier text (as in Mt. v. 32, last three words) to the circumstances of a Roman audience.

It is hard to accept Dr. Charles's interpretation of the Matthean insertions *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ . . . παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* as unspecified unchastity. Whatever be the later uses of Ecclesiastical Greek, I do not find any confusion between fornication and adultery either in the Gospels or the rest of the New Testament. I myself have for long been of opinion that these glosses of Mt. are not without a retrospect to Mt. i, 19, where Joseph 'was minded to put her away privately,' where the supposed offence was *πορνεία*; but whether this be so or not, it is hard to accept the word in a generic sense here alone of the New Testament.

If we grant, as is doubtless true, that the question put to Christ was a dilemma between Hillel and Shammai, while it is quite possible that He made a definite choice, it seems more likely that (as was His wont) He avoided the dilemma by enunciating a great principle, *viz.* that the only ideal sexual relation was permanent monogamy. It is difficult to believe that Christ was here legislating for His Church—the more difficult if we have come to believe that He never consciously founded any ecclesiastical polity at all.

Having ventured so far in criticism of this compelling book, it cannot be left without a tribute to the clarity and acumen with which the whole subject is studied; Chapter iv, on the Roman dogma of nullity, is very specially worth careful reading. It exposes most bitingly how 'the Roman dogma of nullity, in so far as it is peculiar to Rome, is contrary to the law of God and man.' Bad as is the English law of divorce in many ways, it is infinitely better than the mediaeval system of easy-found nullity. Having read this book with so great pleasure and profit, one would like to have a further chapter on the intolerable moral evils following divorce *a mensa et thoro*, and its modern equivalent here, permanent judicial separation.

D.W.

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL REFORMERS.*

The study of social history on anything more than a meagre scale is a comparatively modern thing, and although there is now available a wealth of material it is only within recent years that this has proved its educational value upon any considerable number of Christians. Opposition to social progress in the past may have been due in part to the apathy of self-interested men of the world, but it was due not less to the ignorance under which Christians as a whole were content to live. Too often the epithet of

**Christian Social Reformers of the 19th century.* Edited by Hugh Martin. (S.C.M. Pp. 242. 7/6.)

'ignorant and unlearned men' has caused others to marvel on grounds quite different from that of the boldness of Peter and John. It is therefore a welcome sign of the present age that a growing number of schools are including in the curriculum study of social history. Such a study must inevitably be cursory, but it will serve a good purpose if it stimulates an interest in what is undoubtedly an absorbing subject. And, more than that, it may in more ways than one play an important part in righting the wrongs, real and fancied, of the present generation. For if in the past ignorance has impeded social progress, the danger to-day is that prejudice allied with misconception will rob that progress of much of its value.

It is unquestionably true that much of the social unrest of to-day is due to the fact that we are victims of the remembered grievances of a generation or so ago. We do not in the least deny that there are many real grievances in the social life of to-day. But much social unrest has another cause. Many a man retains bitter memories of a childhood made miserable because starved parents were trying to raise a large but starving family on a starvation wage with little or no concern on the part of the employer. Such a memory produces an attitude of bitter distrust which it is very difficult to eradicate. That a new spirit is moving in industry to-day is true, but its full significance and its potency for good depend in no small way on the extent to which the present generation can get that true perspective which a study of social history alone can give. Hence we welcome any book which seeks to throw light on the stages by which recent social progress has been achieved and the part which Christian thought and practice have played in promoting such progress. We are grateful, therefore, to the S.C.M. for the publication of a volume of essays by various writers dealing with prominent Christian reformers of last century. Of necessity these essays are slight and do not claim to break new ground; but they are written in an interesting way, they give a good deal of information in small compass and they should stimulate the reader to seek further information in the larger biographies which exist for most of the subjects.

Those who remember Goldsmith's description (in 'The Vicar of Wakefield') of the prison system of his day will not be surprised to find that the opening essay describes the magnificent work of John Howard, who, as an editorial note reminds us, belongs in spirit, if not in date, to the nineteenth century movement. It was he more than any other who opened men's eyes to the disgrace of the prisons and of the prison system and who taught the new idea that criminals were rational beings needing reform rather than beasts deserving contempt. Besides a short essay on Dickens in which Dr. Carlisle traces the wide European area in which his influence was felt, there are also essays on Wilberforce, Shaftesbury, Florence Nightingale, John Malcolm Ludlow (of whom Canon Raven writes that 'to his work from 1848-54 may be traced the origin of the whole social activities of the Church'), William Morris, George Cadbury, Kier Hardie and Henry Scott Holland. The last-named, by the Rev. J. Adderley, is one of the most interesting of the series and brings us right to modern times. The picture of the enthusiastic parish priest using every means in his power—parish magazines, sermons, pamphlets, etc.—to interest ordinary Church-folk in social problems, watching his own appeals at first ridiculed and later adopted in grave utterances of Lambeth Conferences, and through all keeping an exhilarating sense of humour, is one which is bound to please.

The Bishop of Manchester contributes an introduction in which he argues forcibly against any ascetic aloofness of the Christian to social and economic affairs: 'The Church, out of loyalty to its own first duty (the

formation of character) is bound to criticise the social and industrial order to see how far its influence tends to the formation of a Christian type of character and what modifications in it are both possible and desirable with that object in view.' We will only add that it is a pity that 'socialism' has come to denote the creed of a party, for, as this volume shows, social welfare has been promoted less by the concern of any party than by the efforts of courageous Christians in all parties to apply their Christian principles.

J.P.H.

THE BIBLE IN EDUCATION.*

Complaints are often heard that there is a lamentable dearth of books of any real use to those whose duty it is to instruct the young in Holy Scripture. Some teachers feel vaguely that the Higher Criticism has destroyed the truth and therefore the value of the Bible; others, who suspect this vague feeling to be not wholly of the truth, nevertheless think—or rather, fear—that to teach the Bible intelligently on modern lines requires a technial knowledge, to acquire which is a laborious task for which they have not time. Here are two books of really good value to all who are willing to take the ordinary pains, without which no teaching is likely to be of use. They are not collections of ready-made lessons; but any teacher of normal intelligence who will study them, and also read the Bible, will thereafter be in a position to give Biblical instruction of a kind and in a manner which will conflict neither with expert opinion nor with the interests of true religion.

Mr. Henderson and Professor Morgan Jones are men who understand whereof they affirm and whereof they teach. Mr. Henderson is Headmaster of Alleyn's School, Dulwich, and he writes with long experience of teaching the Old Testament to boys of his Sixth. He believes that the evolutionary view of man's apprehension of religious truth, aided by the critical labours of last century, have cleared away the moral difficulties—such as some of the presentations of the character of God, and the intellectual difficulties—those of history and of natural science—which were the chief and very real stumbling-blocks to the full appreciation of the Old Testament. If the process has resulted, as indeed it has, in revised estimates of some Old Testament characters, there is nevertheless a great balance of gain. Thus:

> 'We are able to understand some really great men in a manner quite impossible a century ago, and well worth study they turn out to be. Such men as Amos and Jeremiah at last come into their rightful inheritance, and are recognised as belonging to that select company of great men who have the power not only of rising above the general level of the rest of mankind, but of overcoming the barriers of time. They are as modern as we are; their message is as fresh to-day as when it was first delivered, and in their company we are humbly at home.'

Mr. Henderson's book deals briefly with the main subjects of Old Testament study. There is a chapter on some peculiarities of Hebrew idiom; he next deals with the composition of the Pentateuch, its sources and charac-

**A Modern Handbook to the Old Testament.* By R. B. Henderson, M.A. (Christophers. 1927. Price 4/6 net.)

The New Testament in Modern Education. By J. Morgan Jones, M.A. (Hodder and Stoughton. 1922. Price 12/6.)

teristics; then, in appropriate divisions, he traces the religion of Israel in its progress from the Exodus to the Greek period. The work and messages of the great prophets are told in their historical contexts, and finally the elements which approach nearest to the New Testament, whether in time or standard, are briefly and clearly set out. Mr. Henderson has accepted the historical sequence and the dating advocated by Professor R. H. Kennett. It is a reconstruction not widely favoured by Old Testament scholars, but Mr. Henderson recognises that precise dates are frequently conjectural only and of secondary importance. The point of real importance, more particularly in a book of this kind, is that Dr. Kennett's scheme is a connected sequence, 'a working hypothesis of the course of history' as he calls it; this, for the purposes of effective teaching, is as obviously necessary as it is necessarily tentative. Dr. Kennett contributes a brief Introduction in which he describes the book as a courageous and constructive attempt to help readers and students to form an idea of the religious history of that people among whom the books of the Old Testament originated and took shape. Here and there, perhaps, were Mr. Henderson's book of greater length, we should demand the introduction of some qualifications to certain statements. We cannot regard it as so certain that the Hebrew prophets, even the great ones, were absolutely and always opposed to the principle of animal sacrifice *per se*, even though they refused to regard it as pertaining to the covenant instituted by Jehovah; and it is too much to assert that to an ancient Hebrew 'self-sacrifice' 'would have been utterly devoid of meaning.' And when Ezekiel is criticised as being more anxious 'to keep alive the memory of the Temple than the worship of the God who could and would have no sacrifice but that of a humble and contrite heart,' it ought to be added that he also perceived that even the law written in the inward parts was not the greatest essential to its performance, but that man's deepest need was a heart of flesh to replace the stony heart—a transformation to be accomplished only with a Divine assistance. But these are small points, and in as far as they are errors, on the right side. They do not impair the value of a book which should be welcomed by all who wish to teach the Old Testament in a modern way. If they are fearful of so doing, let the author's experience encourage them:

> 'To me it has always been a profitable delight and, if I can read signs aright, there has been a lively interest on the part of some at least of the boys. If I were obliged now to go back to the old teaching—or anything in the least resembling it . . . I am afraid the Old Testament would figure no more in the school curriculum; so far as my influence went, attention would be confined to the New Testament, and the result would probably be complete ignorance of the one coupled with a partial misunderstanding of the other.'

Mr. Morgan Jones is Professor of Church History and Religious Education in the Independent College, Bangor. Seldom have we handled a book with greater pleasure. This statement is less the measure of our agreement with the author's opinions than of our sympathy with his ideals and method. His work is characterised throughout by a very frank acceptance of an advanced criticism of the New Testament, but it is combined with a sincere, constructive and successful attempt, abundantly illustrated, to show how it should be taught so as to take its proper place as the essential factor in education. He rightly observes that it is unfortunate that more attention has been given to educational methods than to the content of moral and

religious instruction, for '*how* we teach must in the end depend upon *what we want* to teach.'

The book is divided into two parts. Part I is concerned with the consideration of religious and modern education generally. The author's principles are stated thus:

> 'If the formation of character and the growth of personality or a society of personalities are to take their place effectively as the final end of education, the problem of the kind of character and the type of personality which are worth perpetuating must more and more secure the attention of educational thinkers.' The duty of the Christian teacher is 'to secure the adoption of the personal spirit of Jesus and the Kingdom of God as the ultimate end of all education.'

To do this, two conditions are necessary:

> (*a*) The Christian teacher must 'analyse the spirit and life of Jesus and the Kingdom in such a way as to distinguish between those elements in all historical presentations of them which were merely temporary and those which can lay claim to some permanent validity.'
>
> (*b*) He must be able to organise a large number of valid subsidiary educational aims 'into a system with the ultimate end as its centre and final sanction . . . The Christian teacher has no right to propose the Christian ideal as a standard unless he is able to show how it coheres with and includes such well-established educational aims as earning a living, gaining knowledge, self-realisation, harmonious development, moral character and social efficiency.'

Professor Morgan Jones proceeds to set out the main results of modern New Testament study, with an educational interpretation and evaluation of its content, and concludes this part of his work with a valuable chapter on the Christian Teacher and his Task. The modern teacher, he says,

> 'does not ask men to take what he says on blind, unreasoning trust to any greater extent than is done in other departments of human experience and knowledge. If anyone likes to obtain the necessary qualifications he can test for himself everything that is said . . . This inevitably means harder work, greater responsibility and greater courage, but it means also the redemption of the integrity of the teacher himself, both moral and intellectual. *That*, in itself, is one of the greatest of personal gains for him.'

Part II deals with all the important problems which arise in the actual modern teaching of the New Testament. We can only indicate the contents: The Life of Jesus for Childhood, The Synoptic Presentation of Christ for Adolescence, Teaching the Parables, The Problem of the Miracles, The Birth and Resurrection of Jesus, The Apostle Paul and His Letters, The Johannine Literature, Thought and Life, Jesus Christ and the Kingdom of God. In many instances illuminating instances are given of the treatment of these themes for young children and for adolescents. Throughout there is no faking or shirking of critical issues: the critical results assumed are, perhaps, more drastic than New Testament criticism actually forces us to adopt; while the presentation of the religious and educational value of this estimate of the New Testament is wholly without pretence and never unreal. The book is enhanced in value by excellent lists of relevant books appended to each chapter, and its directness and simplicity of style make it a pleasure to read. It is an important contribution to its very important subject.

J.S.B.

PRAYER AND WORSHIP.

Prayer is a subject teeming with difficulties of a practical and theoretical kind, and the literature dealing with it is extensive. Perhaps there is no question concerning which the parish priest is asked more questions than this, and since these usually come from those suffering keenly from their 'unanswered prayers' the effort to be sympathetic and helpful is not easy. In a little book on *Prayer, Some Facts and Fallacies* (S.C.M., 2/-) Mr. Brabant has summed up many points of advice which are almost as old as the problem itself. There is much suggestive material for the devotional life here, but the writer never seems to get to grips with the real difficulties. No doubt 'if we really want certain things very much we neither deceive nor impress God by pretending we don't,' so that we are only 'trenching on God's prerogative if we select our petitions too scrupulously' (p. 46); but to us this suggests an erroneous estimate of the place of prayer in religion. We frequently think of it as the means of access to the religious life, but in reality we must appreciate the meaning of the religious life before we can learn how to pray. 'Follow Me' preceded by a long way 'After this manner pray ye,' and meanwhile those who followed learnt something of what true discipleship meant. For one thing it meant subordination to a Leader and the consequent re-fashioning of their own ideas and ambitions along the lines of their Master's: hence, when He taught them to pray, He showed that this same due subordination must be the motive of their prayer—'Thy will be done . . .' It is because we have come to think of religion primarily as a means of getting what we want, whether it be peace or salvation, and of prayer as the handle which works the machinery that it has become unreal and ineffective to us. For him who is trying to be a follower, prayer should be the means by which he may bring his own desires, ambitions and plans to the criterion of the Divine will: and that is not to make prayer selfish, for no man is a Christian whose desires and ambitions are centred in himself. Perhaps it is this meaning which Mr. Roscoe (*The Rationality of Public Worship*. Skeffington & Son: 2/6) has in mind when he asks 'Is Prayer Scientific?' and replies 'yes' because 'it might be called research.' We disagree, however, that it has this meaning for most people who pray. The writer is fond of extravagant statement; and his examination of other sides of public worship with a view to providing 'philosophic grounds for its continued existence and utility' we found singularly uninspiring.

As regards the way in which prayer 'works,' Mr. Brabant seems a little frightened of any possible kinship with auto-suggestion, and while in one place he argues that this is a mechanical view of prayer (p. 14), in another he supposes—with dubious psychology—that inspiration, coming as hetero-suggestion, may then be *converted* into auto-suggestion. We should oppose any definition of prayer in terms of auto-suggestion, not only because of the unreal limitations which this would impose upon it, but also because it would identify prayer with effort to secure the gratification of merely personal wishes. But, in so far as auto-suggestion involves the strengthening of the will by an appeal to the imagination, we see no reason why it should not have its *place* in prayer. If the work of the Holy Spirit is thus 'explained,' it is not necessarily explained away. A parallel may be seen in the Christian attitude towards the work of the doctor: to quote from a useful 'manual of devotion for those who care for the sick,' compiled by a priest and a physician (*The Great Physician*. S.P.C.K.: 5/-): 'In his practice the physician relies upon the "healing power of nature." The Christian minister declares this power to be God, who is "Giver of

Life" and its Restorer.' We take it that this book is intended more for private use than for actual sick-visiting, though it is a little difficult to see why the same work should contain a section on 'How to visit the Sick,' another long one of Prayers for Expectant Mothers and also an Office for the Laying on of Hands. However, it covers a wide ground and includes some useful suggestions for Meditation, a series of Apt Quotations and a helpful selection of Bible readings. We may add that it is well printed and neatly bound.

Another problem, especially of Public Prayer, concerns the suitability of the thoughts and language used for those who are worshipping. In *School Prayers* (Rev. J. B. Goodliffe. S.C.M. : 2/-.) an attempt has been made to supply a need. We must confess that we cannot conceive of any school before which we would venture to use many of these prayers. We remember a preacher once beginning a course of sermons on the Creed by saying that the chief difficulty about it was that we know perfectly well what we mean, but find it so hard to tell God about it. Something of the same effort of instruction is suggested here. One prayer begins strangely with 'Unto Galahad and Percivale alone was it granted to see the Holy Grail, for they alone were pure . . .'; another is superscribed 'Vulgarity' and proceeds 'O God, the world is full of beauty and splendour and wonder, yet sometimes thy children wilfully or stupidly spoil the beauty of thy handiwork. Save us from vulgarity in art, that we may avoid crude pictures and silly films, keep far from us the empty laugh and the coarse jest, and deliver us from cynicism and snobbery . . .'

It may be assumed that anyone reading prayers in school or chapel has made himself familiar beforehand with the prayers he chooses to read, but to the rest they come with freshness, and the use of difficult language and the crowding of idea upon idea must surely spoil the value of a prayer. This is avoided in a book of *Everyday Prayers* (S.C.M. : 2/6), which is also 'primarily for use in schools, clubs and young people's services.' It includes a very varied selection of prayers in which simplicity has not involved paucity of thought or killed beauty of expression.

For those who desire to read the Psalms in a rhythm consonant with that of the original Hebrew, *The Psalms, Book IV & V. Rendered into English by Dr. Askwith* (Hopkinson & Co. : 6/-) provides a translation of Pss. 90—150 'at once rhythmical and accurate.' A future volume will contain the other psalms.

A little book which we recommend to clergy, and especially to those who are training for the Ministry concerns *The Conduct of Public Worship* (B. Dennis Jones. Heffer & Sons : 2/6). It deals, not with ceremonial, but with the saying and singing of the service. 'Considering how often the clergy sing to so many hundreds of people—which is the desire of many a concert singer—how careful and correct their methods should be.' We all know how often Public Worship is ruined through the carelessness of the minister; Mr. Dennis Jones proves that most of this is easily remediable. His advice and instruction are so helpful that we forgive him for the ludicrous Texts for Choir Vestries which he suggests on the last page.

J.P.H.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Church, its Worship and Sacraments (C. Anderson Scott, D.D. 3/6 & 2/6: S.C.M.) is a short though able account of the Free Church point of view. There are one or two quibbles, as, for example, whether our Lord meant us to *say* or *sing* His prayer; but the writer's justification of Infant Baptism and his discussion of the meaning of the Real Presence

are instructive and interesting. The book deserves a wide public. In *The Little Poor Man of Assisi* (S.C.M. : 3/6 and & 2/6) Mr. Dobson has painted a clear and appealing picture of St. Francis—a thoroughly medieval saint, yet who makes a very modern appeal. The keynote of his work was chivalry : he dreamed of it in the playtime of life, followed it when under arms and tried to perpetuate it in his Rule. The keynote of his success was love; his attempt to interpret the Third Crusade as a missionary effort to convert the Saracens rather than to kill them speaks volumes for his idealism—but also, unfortunately, for his isolation. We commend this interesting little study.

Mr. C. A. Gaskell believes that historical research has failed to elucidate the Christian religion and has only proved the incidents of the Gospel story to be untrue as facts. In *Gnostic Scriptures Interpreted* (Daniel Co. : 10/6) he shows that we have been following a wrong clue : the Scriptures are 'not historical, but allegorical and symbolical writings without exception,' and he proceeds to work out this principle on a selection of the Sacred Scriptures of the world. To us the result seems a combination of exaggeration and nonsense. In writing *Understanding the Bible* (Kingsgate Press : 2/- & 1/-) Mr. Nixon, a Baptist minister, went on the assumption that the only real reverence for the Bible consists in an honest attempt to understand it. The result is a very readable and instructive little book which we cordially recommend to thoughtful laymen and Sunday School teachers. *The Cross of the Servant* (H. Wheeler Robinson, D.D. 3/- : S.C.M.) is a study of Deutero-Isaiah made with the intention of bringing out the underlying ideas of the book and showing their significance in the development of the Jewish religion. Dr. Robinson finds the solution of the problem of the identity of the Servant in the idea of corporate personality, which includes at once the experiences of the individual and the missionary function of the nation. He discusses the expression of this in the sacrificial service of suffering and the influence of the whole idea upon the mind and work of Jesus ; and he offers the interesting suggestion that in *Phil.* ii, 7ff. Paul was influenced by the words of *Isaiah* liii, 12 : 'He emptied himself to death,' so that 'the Kenosis was properly that of the Crucifixion, though naturally involving the Incarnation' (p. 74). We need only add that this study maintains the lucidity and sound scholarship for which Dr. Robinson is known.

The amount of ingenuity which has been spent—or misspent—on the Apocalypse is amazing. Its continued popularity as a hunting ground for precise prediction is difficult to explain, yet, as Mr. Bevan points out in *The Apocalypse in the Light of To-day* (Skeffington's : 4/6), when one 'prognostication has been falsified by the unhastening passage of time, the seers complacently reconstruct their prospectus . . .' The author rightly regards this as futile speculation, and in this short exposition of the book he attempts to show the meaning of it by reference to the personality and environment of the original writer, as to whose identity he wisely makes no guess. A short introduction is followed by a chapter on the symbolism of numbers and then by a running commentary on the text. The writer is a little dogmatic on a few questionable points, and the writing is somewhat disjointed, but he has provided a useful popular account of a difficult subject. *The Spirit of Glory* (F. W. Drake. Longmans : 4/6 & 3/-) contains a series of meditations on the Holy Spirit and His inspiring influence in the daily round and common task. It deals with such subjects as Holiness, Sacrifice, Sympathy, etc., and looks to find the working of the Spirit in all the highest energies of human effort and desire.

Many of the problems of life are seemingly beyond our comprehension, but we are forced to adopt some attitude towards them; we may prefer indifference, but that constitutes our decision in the matter. For most this is insufficient, and it is for these that Mrs. A. D. Lindsay, in *The Spirit to Think* (S.C.M. : 3/6), contributes her own impressions. Of these, some appear as Essays, *e.g.* on 'Suffering,' 'Blind Fate?' 'Beauty as Meaning,' etc. There is a certain beauty of expression about many of them, but apart from an excellent comparison of Christ and Socrates in the essay called 'Forsaken?' and a well-phrased discussion of the 'Abstractness of Creeds,' the rest seem to lack completeness. There are also eleven poems, of which those describing Nature's ways have considerable interest and ability.

Christ and the World's Unrest (H. T. Silcock, M.A. Swarthmore Press: 2/6 & 1/6) analyses once more for us the revolt of the modern world against accepted standards and conventions, and attempts to show that this powerful nationalism is directed, not against Christ, but against the misrepresentations condoned, if not advanced, by Christian systems. If we are to deal with this our Christian message 'must be simple and never confounded with western civilisation.' There are difficulties here which the writer ignores, but we have much to learn from the simplicity of the Quaker way of life which he outlines. *Economics for Nicodemus* (J. C. McKerrow. Longman's: 2/-) was written in order to prove that the expensiveness of the rich is unjust and is therefore immoral. All that has been written here to establish this truth might have been reduced to two or three pages; it would then have lost the offensiveness of cynicism. And it was not Nicodemus to whom Jesus spoke the words about riches. Better economics and better Christianity will be found in *Christ and Money* (Hugh Martin, M.A. S.C.M. : 3/- & 2/-). Money, the writer says, is a root of most of the evils of the modern world, and yet its possession is also the indispensable means of achieving self-realisation. Jesus never said that great possessions were a sin, but He pointed out their extreme danger; He was less concerned with men's possession of money than with their use of it, and He condemned covetousness more than any other sin. It is the use of money, whether by casual labourer or millionaire, which reveals character. The rest of the book deals with points arising out of this, such as the conditional rights of property, the snare of inheritance, the regulation of private expenditure in terms of a stewardship, etc. There is much in this second half of the book over which opinion is sharply divided, but here is a clear and thoughtful statement of principles which deserves careful consideration.

J.P.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE CHURCHMEN'S UNION COUNCIL ELECTION, 1928.

SIR,

I shall be obliged if you will give publicity to the following official notice to members of the Churchmen's Union.

By the Constitution the following members of the Council retire on the day of the Annual General Meeting (June 13th), and are not eligible for re-election, *viz.* : Miss Hubbard, Dr. Macan, Mr. Mullins, Mr. Robson, Mr. Schomberg, Dr. Tollinton, Mr. Trueman and Miss Willis.

The following members, who have been co-opted or elected by the Council to fill casual vacancies, also retire on June 13th, but are eligible

for re-election, *viz.* : Mr. Bentley, Miss Ferguson, Mr. Given-Wilson, Dr. Major, Dr. Raven, Mr. Sharp, Mr. Sibley, Miss Ward and Canon Wilson.

All other members of the Council (whose names are printed on the cover of the *Modern Churchman*) continue to serve.

Ten members of the Council are to be elected this year, and nominations of candidates must reach the Secretary not later than March 1st. The names must be proposed and seconded by members of the Union. If more than ten nominations are received voting papers will be sent to all members of the Union.

T. J. Wood,
Organising Secretary.

The Churchmen's Union Office,
Church House,
Dean's Yard,
Westminster, S.W.1.

THE SACRAMENTAL PROBLEM.

Sir,

Erroneous beliefs are usually erroneous interpretations of real experienced facts, and to convince people who hold these beliefs of their error it is rarely sufficient to show their falsehood. The real fact and the belief are so combined in the mind that the denial of the one seems also to be the denial of the other, and this the person's own experience repudiates.

In the case of the sacrament of communion one may take as fact the religious experience of communicants and as belief the objective special Divine Presence in the bread and wine.

Now in other emotional experiences there often ensues what I may call a sanctity of association.

The anniversary of some great event (or of one great to us) seems imbued with a special significance, but one knows that the significance resides in our minds and that in itself the day does not differ from any other, for if we had made a mistake in our dates the day we thought was the anniversary would be the one that appealed to us.

Or take some article that had belonged to or had been closely associated with someone we had loved : to us it possesses an undoubted sanctity, which to us seems to reside in the object itself. But no one supposes that anyone else could perceive it, or that the object itself is really different from similar articles.

The sanctity is one of association residing in our minds, but so closely is it connected with the day or the object that it is most difficult not to feel that the sanctity resides in them themselves.

This is such a common human feeling that one cannot be surprised at its occurring in religious matters. To those who have experienced deep emotion in receiving communion there is naturally a sanctity of association connected with the bread and wine which to them seems resident in the elements themselves and leads to the errors which the Bishop of Birmingham is attacking.

The frank acknowledgement of this sanctity of association seems to me the first step in warning people from its misinterpretation. Once they can grasp the idea that this sanctity of association is a real fact in itself, and is not caused by the special objects to which it is attached, it becomes possible to advance arguments against the inherent sanctity of the object without in their minds attacking the sanctity of association which they experience as a real fact.

J. H. Hume-Rothery.

January, 1928.

RIPON CLERGY COLLEGE CORPORATION.

SIR,

It is probable that most readers of the *Modern Churchman* have some knowledge of the work done at Ripon Hall, Oxford, in the preparation of men for work in Holy Orders. Since the Hall was founded by Bishop Boyd-Carpenter in 1898, some 200 of its members have received ordination. The Hall's tradition of broad sympathies and sound learning is fully maintained at the present time. The value of Dr. Major's work at the Hall is widely recognised. The late Dean of Salisbury, on behalf of the Inspection Committee of the Central Advisory Council of Training for the Ministry, visited the Hall in 1926, and his report bears testimony to the quality of the service which the Hall is rendering to the Church of England.

Such enterprises cannot be carried on without regard to their legal and constitutional implications. Many who know something of Ripon Hall may have had no occasion to enquire into the system of its management. For their information, and in the hope of arousing or widening their interest, the present note is written.

The Ripon Clergy College Corporation is registered under the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898, and works under certain definite Articles of Association. Membership of this Corporation is open to all who have contributed, by one or several payments, a sum of money amounting in the aggregate to £10 towards its funds. A donor of this amount is entitled, if he so desires, to be registered as a member of the Corporation, without incurring any further financial liability and with freedom to retire from membership whenever he may wish.

The Corporation appoints a Governing Body of not less than twenty members, one-fourth of whom retire annually, but are eligible for re-election. The Governors are responsible for the property, finances, and management of the Hall. Their practice is to appoint an Executive Committee, with whom it lies to carry on the routine business of the Corporation. It is not absolutely necessary that the Governors shall all be members of the Corporation, and the Hall has been greatly indebted in the past to the services and interest of Governors who have not had this qualification. But it is desirable that such cases shall be exceptional. The normal procedure is for the Corporation to appoint Governors mainly from its own membership.

Unless fresh members are added from time to time, the number of the members of the Corporation tends necessarily to decline. At present it is desirable to add to the existing membership. Readers of the *Modern Churchman* who are in sympathy with the aims of Ripon Hall are invited to give this point their consideration. The Secretary of the Corporation, the Rev. A. W. Fletcher, Eckington Vicarage, Pershore, will be glad at any time to receive the names of persons willing to become members of the Corporation. Or they may be sent to Dr. Major at Ripon Hall. It is obviously needful for the future security of the Hall that the numbers of the Corporation should be well maintained. A first step towards this end is to make known the fact that new members will be welcome.

Tendring Rectory, Essex.
28th January, 1928.

R. B. TOLLINTON,
Chairman of the Governors and Treasurer.

CORRIGENDUM.

A Modern Confirmation Manual, by H. K. Luce, is published by A. & C. Black (1927), price 2/6, and not as stated in our last issue (p. 597).